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Abstract
Encouraged by the Enlarged Homestead Act, higher than 
average rainfall, and various boosters, thousands of 
Americans homesteaded in Montana and the northern Great 
Plains during the 1910s. The agricultural economy boomed 
during World War I, but the post-war contraction during the 
1920s, coupled with drought, caused serious economic problems 
for farmers. In response to the problems in the agricultural 
economy, a Land Utilization movement emerged, led by 
agricultural economists such as Lewis C. Gray. Land 
utilizationists believed that a readjustment of land use 
would correct the problems in the agricultural economy.
Toward that end they sought changes in federal land policy, 
especially on the Great Plains, because of the problems 
caused by cultivating submarginal land — land that could not 
consistently raise crops. Federal land laws, including the 
Homestead Act, had all but guaranteed that land on the plains 
would not be put to its best use. The situation worsened 
during the Great Depression and subsequently, under the New 
Deal, many of the ideas of the Land Utilization movement came 
to fruition. During the mid-1930s, the federal government 
made dramatic changes to land policy, ending the homestead 
movement and initiating a Land Utilization Program that 
repurchased failed submarginal farmland and created a new 
public domain. The program purchased more than 11 million
vi
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acres, including nearly 100,000 acres in Fergus County, 
Montana. Through the purchase of submarginal agricultural 
land and the conversion of that land to grazing, the Land 
Utilization Program contributed to the stabilization of the 
agricultural economy in Fergus County. In part because of 
the implementation of the ideas of the Land Utilization 
movement, grazing increased, wheat farming decreased, and 
farms got larger and more diversified. The influence of the 
movement is also reflected in land classification and 
planning efforts. Ultimately, the new policies signified a 
deeper shift in the role of government as the government 
relinquished its trust of individual landowners to protect 
and maintain the country's land resources.
vii
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
The New Deal ushered in dramatic reforms in 
government policy in an effort to remedy the economic 
problems that plagued the country during the Great 
Depression. While reforms in federal land policy under 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal affected the 
entire country, many of these reforms were meant to 
correct problems on the drought-plagued Great Plains. 
Historically, farmers and ranchers on the northern Great 
Plains have not followed land use practices best suited 
to the arid environment. Federal land laws all but 
guaranteed that land on the plains would not be put to 
its best use. Since homestead laws required that land be 
cultivated, many homesteaders plowed up the native 
grasses even when it was not prudent (in the long-term) 
to do so. Under the New Deal, the federal government 
made dramatic changes in land policy in an effort to make 
agriculture (grazing and cultivated) more sustainable 
over the long-term in that region. This study 
demonstrates how a new land policy developed and was 
meted out in one county — Fergus County, Montana — on the 
northern Great Plains.
1
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Fergus County serves as a case study of the larger 
story of homesteading, farm failure, and the New Deal 
program that purchased and rehabilitated many of those 
farms. But it also reflects the changes in federal land 
policy over the decades, from the tradition of settling 
the frontier (public domain) with independent family 
farmers to the New Deal's dramatic changes that resulted 
in greater government control of a new public domain that 
would be leased, not sold. I have chosen Fergus County 
because the land utilization project in that county was 
typical of many of the projects in the West. Although 
the Central Montana Land Use Project was large, acquiring 
nearly 80,000 acres during the late 1930s and early 
1940s, the largest land utilization project was actually 
in three counties immediately north and east of Fergus, 
where the Federal government acquired more than ten times 
as much land.
Settlement on the Great Plains was difficult. The 
arid region has fewer trees and lower, sometimes erratic, 
precipitation than the eastern United States, and 
consequently settlers had to make immediate adjustments. 
Walter Prescott Webb, taking an environmental determinist 
position, discusses these adjustments in his seminal 
study The Great Plains. He argues that the unfamiliar
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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arid environment of the plains stalled westward 
settlement at about the ninety—eighth meridian until 
technological advancements could be made to help settlers 
deal with that environment. Furthermore, according to 
Webb, that environment eventually altered the cultural 
institutions that were imported across that fault line.1 
Since Webb published his book before the worst years of 
the Great Depression and before the New Deal, he does not 
discuss the shift in federal land policy that occurred in 
the 1930s and that is a crucial subject in my 
dissertation. But this study does support Webb's idea 
that institutions, including federal land policy, 
ultimately have to adapt to the arid environment.
Because Fergus County's natural environment was 
important to the success or failure of its settlers, and 
is critical to understanding what happened during the 
1910s, 1920s, and 1930s, I offer a general description of 
it in Chapter 2. Early explorers such as Meriwether 
Lewis and William Clark noted the arid climate and 
doubted the success of settlement. Similarly, early 
settlers such as Granville Stuart chose their
1 See Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New York: 
Ginn and Company, 1931).
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landholdings carefully to take advantage of scarce 
surface water sources.
Federal land policy evolved in the humid eastern 
United States, and the efforts by Congress over the years 
to adjust the land laws reflected many misconceptions 
about the arid West. The 1862 Homestead Act granted 160 
acres of land to homesteaders who agreed to cultivate it 
for several years. On the northern Great Plains, that 
meant that homesteaders had to cultivate the land but 
frequently it was land that could not consistently 
produce cash grain crops. Furthermore, although 160 
acres might have supported a family in the humid eastern 
United States, it was not enough to support a family in 
the arid West. For half a century Congress amended the 
Homestead Act in various efforts to transform the West 
into a garden.2 For example, the Timber Culture Act of 
1873 encouraged tree planting (in a region that could not 
naturally grow trees except in riparian areas) and the 
Desert Lands Act of 1877 promoted reclamation (which took 
substantial capital or massive cooperative efforts as
2 Henry Nash Smith discusses the various images of the 
West, including that of a garden, in Virgin Land 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950). Walter
Prescott Webb later gave his perspective on the images of 
the West in his article, "The American West: Perpetual
Mirage" in Harper's Magazine 214(May 1957):24-31.
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well as access to surface water). By 1909, the Congress 
recognized that it required more than 160 acres of land 
to successfully homestead in the northern Great Plains, 
so through the passage of the Enlarged Homestead Act it 
increased the amount of land granted to homesteaders to 
320 acres.3
Encouraged by the Enlarged Homestead Act, 
homesteaders poured into the northern Great Plains.
Fergus County, Montana, was no exception to this 
migration — between 1910 and 1920, the number of farms 
there nearly doubled. As the country was becoming more 
industrialized, Montana provided what seemed like the 
"last best" opportunity to homestead and acquire a farm.4
Although federal land laws encouraged settlement and 
cultivation in Montana, other influences helped to bring 
settlers West. Boosters, including railroad companies, 
state and local governments, and businessmen, published 
and distributed pamphlets about the bounty of the
3 For a comprehensive look at the major land laws, see 
Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968),
hereafter cited as Gates, Public Land Law.
4 Daniel N. Vichorek's Montana's Homestead Era, Montana 
Geographic Series, vol. 15 (Helena: Montana Magazine,
1987) provides a good overview of the Montana homestead 
experience.
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northern Great Plains and its farming potential.5 
Perhaps most importantly, the homestead boom during the 
1910s coincided with a period of higher than average 
precipitation that lulled many homesteaders into 
believing that the climate was becoming more humid. 
Consequently, many of them overestimated the agricultural 
potential of the region.
In Chapter 3, I discuss the boosters and the factors 
that contributed to the homestead boom of the 1910s, 
which was centered largely on the northern Great Plains, 
where there were millions of acres of the public domain 
open for settlement. Federal land policy, boosters, and 
increased precipitation all encouraged the plowing of the 
plains, but the increased agricultural production might 
not have been so significant had it not coincided with 
several years of improved agricultural markets due to 
World War I. The Allies needed the grain crops produced 
on the Great Plains and the rising price of wheat 
reflected that need, increasing at a higher rate than 
other consumer goods. The 1910s boom helped farmers 
improve their status as many borrowed money to buy more
sMary Wilma M. Hargreaves extensively covers the booster 
efforts and farming on the northern Great Plains in Dry 
Farming in the Northern Great Plains, 1900-1925 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1957) .
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land or improve the land they already had. Homesteaders 
on the Great Plains, then, profited from very cheap land 
(acquired through Homestead laws), several years of 
higher than average rainfall, and greatly improved 
agricultural markets, despite the aridity of the land. 
Perhaps the boosters had been right.
In Chapter 4, I discuss the inevitable bust that 
came as World War I ended and drought set in on the 
northern Great Plains. The problems were intensified 
because the land use had been inappropriate for the arid 
environment. Acres of once productive grassland that had 
been plowed to produce cash grain crops lay idle. As the 
agricultural economy declined, so did the fortunes of 
those who depended on agriculture. Rates of foreclosure, 
bankruptcy, and tax delinquency increased as farmers 
struggled to pay their financial obligations. As farmers 
lost their land to creditors and county governments, the 
rate of farm tenancy increased.
Although individuals bear some responsibility for 
the problems that plagued agriculture on the northern 
Great Plains, the federal government actually created 
problems by instituting land policies that did not take 
into account the arid western environment. Making 
matters worse, the government had encouraged the plowing
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of the plains to feed Europe during World War I, with 
little concern for the inevitable post-war contractions.
Chapter 5 is a discussion of the emerging Land 
Utilization movement which sought solutions for the 
declining agricultural economy. Agricultural economists, 
including several from the University of Wisconsin, 
studied the problems facing agriculture and determined 
that the root cause of much of the difficulties facing 
agriculture stemmed from improper land use. They 
believed that careful land planning coupled with 
efficient land use would prevent many economic problems 
and stabilize the agricultural economy. Consequently, 
these agricultural economists formed the core of the Land 
Utilization movement, with University of Wisconsin 
graduate Lewis Gray serving as vanguard for more than two 
decades.
An important tenet of land utilization was the 
readjustment of land use. Although they did seek rural 
zoning as part of their land planning efforts, land 
utilizationists recognized the rights of individual land 
owners. In order to readjust land use to a more 
appropriate use, then, they believed that the federal 
government should acquire submarginal land (land that was 
unsuitable for cultivation) and alter its use. In some
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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areas that meant the reforestation of cut-over land, but 
because much of the concern was for the Great Plains, it 
often meant converting cultivated land to grazing land.
Land utilizationists, above all, wanted 
comprehensive national land use planning, which they 
believed could ameliorate the effects of boom and bust 
economic cycles. They believed that with federal land 
planning, large surpluses or shortages of agricultural 
products and natural resources could be avoided. They 
wanted sustainable agriculture (although they did not use 
the term) — agriculture that matched land use to the 
environment for the long-term. Land utilizationists, in 
their push for efficiency, wanted higher yields per acre 
as agricultural technology improved and as crops and 
soils were appropriately matched. For planning purposes, 
land needed to be classified according to its potential 
its use adjusted appropriately.
Land utilizationists looked not only at the land, 
but various problems resulting from "maladjusted" land 
use. They studied foreclosure, bankruptcy, tax 
delinquency, and farm tenancy (although they initially 
did not see farm tenancy as a problem) . After publishing 
several land utilization studies, the land 
utilizationists believed that, in addition to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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comprehensive national land planning, larger more diverse 
farm units were better than small single cash grain crop 
farms.
The Great Plains, wreaked by years of drought and 
depression, was the area of principal concern. Because 
of aridity, many land utilizationists believed that parts 
of the northern Great Plains should be converted to 
grazing land. The federal purchase of land would assure 
the alteration of land use, but it would also stabilize 
the land tenancy and ownership in areas of great flux 
(such as on the Great Plains, because the poor economic 
situation did not promote stability) because the 
government could offer long-term leases. A portion of 
the grazing lease fees would be granted to the county 
government, relieving the tax collecting problems that 
plagued the submarginal areas while putting money into 
county coffers.
As the agricultural economy worsened, the 
comprehensive planning ideas of land utilization seemed 
like a cure-all and political support gradually 
developed. And even though many supported land 
utilization efforts, years passed before the federal 
government made changes in land policy. Land 
utilizationists had begun arguing for reform in the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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1920s, but it was not until the agricultural depression 
worsened in the 1930s that the federal government forced 
the land policy reforms.
I discuss the inauguration of federal land 
utilization reform in Chapter 6. Through the massive 
reforming efforts of the New Deal, land utilizationists 
were eventually able to achieve some of their goals. In 
1934, the Taylor Grazing Act, coupled with an Executive 
Order, essentially ended the homestead movement.6 The 
New Deal also ushered in some of the land utilization 
reforms, including efforts at national land planning, 
with the creation of a National Resources Board. And in 
order to readjust land use, the federal government began 
the submarginal land purchase program. After decades of 
a federal policy that alienated the public domain, the 
federal government began a policy of acquiring a new 
public domain.
Frederick Jackson Turner recognized the significance 
of the closing of the frontier when he wrote his 1893
5 Paul Gates disagrees that 1934 marked the end of 
homesteading because homesteading was allowed under 
certain circumstances and, for example, in Alaska. See 
Gates, Public Land Law, and E. Louise Peffer, The Closing 
of the Public Domain: Disposal and Reservation Policies,
1900-50 (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History," but the closing of the frontier he wrote about 
was more symbolic than real.7 It was the changing of 
federal policy during the New Deal that actually closed 
the frontier, cutting off future expansion of settlement 
by homesteaders. Furthermore, the implementation of the 
federal Land Utilization Program to acquire a new public 
domain represented a dramatic reversal in public land 
policy. Instead of alienating the public domain by sale 
or by granting homestead patents, the federal government 
began acquiring it.
During the New Deal, the government set out to solve 
the problems in the agricultural economy. But solving 
the problems involved major changes in federal land 
policy and caused major shifts in agriculture. The era 
of unfettered homesteading ended, and the federal 
government began acquiring a new public domain — often 
repurchasing land it had only alienated two or three 
decades before. The federal Land Utilization Program, 
then, reversed the homestead movement. This study
Press, 1951), hereafter cited as Peffer, The Closing of 
the Public Domain.
7 Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History, " in The Frontier in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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illustrates how the tradition of settling the frontier 
with the small independent farmer ended with the New 
Deal.
Chapter 7 is a discussion of the implementation of 
the federal Land Utilization Program in Montana, 
particularly in Fergus County. The federal Land 
Utilization Program underwent several incarnations to fix 
various internal problems, but by the late 1930s the 
federal government began purchasing parcels of land on 
the northern Great Plains in Montana to convert to 
grazing land. Montanans had pioneered the development of 
cooperative grazing organizations, and it was those 
organizations that initially leased the newly converted 
grazing land.
Many Great Plains residents had recognized the 
sources of problems in agriculture even while policy 
makers in Washington debated the future of the region. 
Most Montanans realized by the 1930s that the prosperity 
of the 1910s would not return because it had fundamental 
flaws. And Fergus County farmers, many in a desperate 
situation, welcomed reform as the federal government 
implemented the Central Montana Land Use Project.
American History (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1920) .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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One important, question arises about the flow of 
federal funds into Fergus County and the Great Plains.
Who profited from the Land Utilization Program? A few 
profited in the short run. Abstract offices near land 
utilization project areas had a steady business during 
the Depression. A few people who purchased land from the 
county shortly before the implementation of the 
submarginal land purchase program were able to profit 
from sale to the federal government, but many banks and 
other investors sold land to the government for much less 
than they had invested in it. A few homesteaders may 
have profited from borrowing money and then skipping out 
on the loans. The homesteaders who stayed on to sell to 
the federal government had very little to show for two or 
three decades of work. While it could be argued that the 
federal government profited from paying little for land 
that had many improvements made by homesteaders or 
subsequent landowners, the federal government removed 
buildings and fences and spent thousands on land 
rehabilitation that included reseeding, erosion control, 
and stock tank projects. Because the federal government 
converted much of the land acquired on the northern Great 
Plains to grazing land, improved it with fences, 
reservoirs, and soil conservation measures, and
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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subsequently leased it to cooperative grazing 
organizations, ranchers may have benefited most from the 
Land Utilization Program.
Chapter 8 is a look at the long-term results of the 
federal program, particularly as it was meted out in 
Fergus County. Although the federal Land Utilization 
Program failed to purchase the proposed 75 million acres 
of submarginal land, it did have some effect in the areas 
that had land utilization projects. The purchase of more 
than two hundred parcels in Fergus County, Montana, for 
example, helped reduce the number of farms (those most 
likely to fail), and increased the average farm size.
The program, then, promoted large scale farming as well 
as government control of a new public domain available 
for long-term lease, not sale, ultimately to large ranch 
businesses. The federal government, instead of promoting 
the sale of the public domain, became a landlord. This 
was a fundamental shift away from the idea that the 
federal government should encourage individual ownership 
of land to one that encouraged the leasing of land.
In order to understand how the Land Utilization 
Program worked in an individual project at the local 
level, I studied the individual parcel files for the 
Central Montana Land Utilization Project. These records,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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which previously had not been studied, are available in 
the Records of the Bureau of Land Management at the Rocky
Mountain Region branch of the National Archives in
Denver, Colorado. Each file includes abstract 
information that gives all of the county legal
information pertaining to the land, so details such as
mortgages, liens, foreclosures, and tax delinquency 
provided information on many individuals' financial 
situation. Files also include the federal land 
assessments which provide detailed information on the 
land use and value at the time of purchase as well as the 
improvements to the land. Federal assessors measured 
buildings and structures on the properties and detailed 
their condition on forms included in the files. The 
Fergus County Clerk of Court supplied additional or 
missing information on the parcels purchased by the 
federal government. Local histories and two decades of 
the Lewistown Democrat-News filled in the details on some 
individuals and furnished further information on Fergus 
County. Also useful are the state and county documents 
available in the Montana Historical Society Library. The 
paper trail left by New Deal bureaucrats is invaluable; 
many of the federal government documents can be found at
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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a good federal depository library, such as Louisiana 
State University's Middleton Library. Two very important 
sources were Phil Hooker's unpublished "Chronology of the 
Land Utilization Program" and H. H. Wooten's The Land 
Utilization Program, 1934-1964. Both provide important 
information, but neither has the analysis or detail of 
this work.8
Despite the volumes of secondary sources on the New 
Deal or federal land policy, many historians have 
overlooked the land utilization efforts of the 1930s. 
Theodore Saloutos discussed New Deal agricultural policy, 
including efforts to reduce agricultural production, in 
his book The American Farmer and the Mew Deal. His 
emphasis, however, was on aspects of federal policy other 
than the permanent retirement of submarginal lands from 
cultivation.9 John Opie has written extensively about 
federal land policy but has written little about efforts 
to buy back submarginal land. In The Law of the Land:
8 See Phil Hooker, "Chronology of the Land Utilization 
Program," Unpublished Manuscript , United States 
Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management, 
Montana State Office, Billings, Montana, 1941; and H. H. 
Wooten, The Land Utilization Program, 1934 to 1964 , 
Agricultural Economic Report No. 85 (Washington, D. C.: 
USDA Economic Research Service, 1965).
9 See Theodore Saloutos, The American Farmer and the Mew 
Deal (Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1982).
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Two Hundred Years of American Farmland Policy, he 
recognized the importance of the federal reservation of 
lands in the public domain but he did not discuss the 
Land Utilization Program.10
Richard Lowitt discusses the importance of the 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) to the 
Great Plains during the New Deal in his book, The Mew 
Deal and the West. He emphasizes the problems caused by 
the expansion of cultivated agriculture on lands more 
suited for grazing, and cites the various ways the New 
Deal worked to alleviated those problems. Lowitt 
discusses the submarginal land purchase efforts and 
efforts to change land use within the context of broader 
New Deal efforts, but his broad scope did not allow for a 
detailed discussion of the Land Utilization Program. He 
does highlight the problems the USDA had in working with 
the Department of the Interior (DOI). Agriculture 
Secretary Henry A. Wallace and Interior Secretary Harold 
Ickes battled over grazing, conservation, and reclamation 
both in the Great Plains and in what Lowitt refers to as
10 See John Opie, The Law of the Land: Two Hundred Years
of American Farmland Policy (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1987).
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"Ickes's Inland Empire," the mountain and Great Basin 
states.11
E. Louise Peffer detailed a half a century of 
federal land policy in her book, The Closing of the 
Public Domain: Disposal and Reservation Policies, 1900-
1950. Particularly useful is her discussion of the 
Taylor Grazing Act and federal grazing policy. 
Unfortunately, Peffer does not discuss the federal Land 
Utilization Program and how it reversed earlier federal 
land policy.12 Paul Wallace Gates published and edited 
several important books on public land law but, like 
Peffer and others, he did not write about the submarginal 
land purchase program.13
R. Douglas Hurt does briefly discuss the submarginal 
land purchase program in his book, The Dust Bowl: An
Agricultural and Social History. Hurt's research was 
focused on the southern Great Plains and, consequently,
11 See Richard Lowitt, The Mew Deal and the West 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984).
12 See Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain.
13 See for example, Gates, Public Land Law; Paul W. 
Gates, History of Public Land Law Development 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1979);
Paul Wallace Gates, ed., Public Land Policies: 
Management and Disposal (New York: Arno Press, 1979).
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his book, did not include information on the program in 
the northern Great Plains.14
Donald Worster wrote about the efforts of land 
utilizationists in more detail than Hurt. In a chapter 
titled "Facing up to Limits" in his seminal bock. The 
Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the 1930s, he included
information on the Land Utilization movement and the 
submarginal land purchase program. According to Worster, 
these early land use planners realized that a maturing 
country faced limits to expansion and that planning and 
conservation would be necessary for wise natural resource 
use. Unlike the Progressive conservationists, land 
utilizationists proposed to conserve agricultural land. 
Worster recognized the importance of Lewis Gray and the 
Bureau of Agricultural Economics at the United States 
Department of Agriculture to land planning efforts during 
the 1920s and 1930s. Perhaps more importantly, he sees 
the implications of such planning as approaching a 
compromise between socialism and capitalism. Even though 
Worster provides a brief summary of land utilization 
efforts during the 1930s, he does not go into great
14 See R. Douglas Hurt, The Dust Bowl: An Agricultural
and Social History (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1981).
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detail, and he did not use the individual parcel records 
in Denver.15
Tim Lehman also discusses the land utilizationists 
and their efforts to conserve farmland in a chapter in 
his book Public Values, Private Lands: Farmland
Preservation Policy, 1933-1985. He recognized the 
importance of Lewis Gray's leadership as well as the 
significance of the submarginal land purchase program, 
and includes a discussion of New Deal land use planning 
efforts. Those efforts, however, did not survive through 
World War II and, Lehman suggests, the nation lost an 
opportunity to avoid the rural land abuse of later 
generations.16
The efforts of historians provide important 
information and insight into past events, but academic 
history cannot always convey the entire story. Writer 
Jonathan Raban filled in many gaps in the story of 
Montana homesteaders in his book, Bad Land: An American
15 See Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in
the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979),
182-197.
16 See Tim Lehman, Public Values, Private Lands:
Farmland Preservation Policy, 1933-1985 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
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Romance.11 Raban visited with several families who 
homesteaded during the homestead boom, many of whom 
failed during the Great Depression. His book includes 
some of the historical details, but it also conveys the 
emotion and essence of those homesteaders. Raban's book 
does not cover the same ground as this study, and in many 
ways they complement each other. Both are a story of 
homestead failure in an environment not meant for 
sustained cultivation. This study documents that 
homestead failure as well as the federal efforts to 
remedy some of the problems inherent in farming an arid 
landscape.
17 See Jonathan Raban, Bad Land: An American Romance
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1996) .
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 2
The Arid Landscape: Fergus County, Montana
Fergus County, Montana is located in the center of 
the state (see Figure 1). The Missouri River forms the 
northern boundary and Arrow Creek, a Missouri tributary, 
serves as the northwestern boundary of the county. The 
Judith River, named by Lewis and Clark for Judith 
Hancock, the woman Clark eventually married, drains the
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Figure 1. Map of Montana Counties.1
1 Roland R. Renne, Montana County Organization,
Services, and Costs, Montana Agricultural Experiment 
Station Bulletin no. 298 (Bozeman: Montana Agricultural
Experiment Station, 1935), 6.
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northern and western part of the county into the Missouri 
River, while the Sacagawea River, named for the Shoshone 
woman who acted as a guide for Lewis and Clark, and Box 
Elder and Flat Willow Creeks drain the southern and 
eastern part of the county into the Musselshell River, 



















Figure 2. Map of Fergus County, Montana.
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The Judith and Moccasin Mountains in the central 
part of the county separate the watersheds. The Big and 
Little Snowy Mountain ranges rise out of southern Fergus 
County; West Peak, the highest point in the county, 
reaches an elevation of 8211 feet. Some of the central 
Montana mountains hold gold, silver, and sapphires. Not 
including the mountains, the altitude of Fergus County 
gradually rises, east to west, from about 2800 feet to 
about 4400 feet.
Benchlands of short grass prairie stretch from the 
foothills down to the tributary rivers, though near the 
Missouri River itself the land breaks up into the steep 
hills and bluffs called the Missouri Breaks. The Judith 
River, like other rivers and creeks in the basin, slices 
deeply through the landscape, leaving bluffs and cut 
banks. Coulees meander through the landscape toward the 
rugged badlands and the rivers. Despite these creeks and 
rivers, some of which have water only seasonally, Fergus 
County has an arid climate. Weather stations at Denton, 
Grassrange, Lewistown, and Winifred average between 14 
and 18 inches of precipitation per year, with most rain 
falling during the spring and summer growing season. 
Higher elevations in the mountains receive more 
precipitation. Lewistown averages a temperature of 23°
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during the winter and 63° in the summer, but the recorded 
extreme temperatures are -46°F and 105°F.2
Some of the first Euro-Americans and the first 
trained naturalists to explore the upper Missouri River 
recognized the limits of the region. They did not 
envision its ever being farmed, nor did they expect any 
kind of thriving community to develop there. Meriwether 
Lewis and William Clark traveled through what became 
Fergus County on their way to and from the Pacific coast 
and wrote the first descriptions of the area. On the 
expedition up the Missouri toward its source somewhere to 
the west, both Lewis and Clark kept journals that 
included information on the climate, flora, fauna, 
geography, and geology, providing a detailed picture of 
the landscape they traversed.3 On Thursday, 23 May 1805,
2 Claire O. Clark, Soil Survey of Fergus County, Montana, 
United States Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation 
Service (Washington, D. C. : Government Printing Office,
1988), 1-3, hereafter cited as Clark, Soil Survey; Fergus 
County Agricultural Economic Conference, A Program for 
the Development of Agriculture in Fergus County, Montana, 
1927 (Lewistown, Montana: Montana State College
Extension Service, 1927), 6.
3 The literature on the Louisiana Purchase and on the 
Lewis and Clark Expedition abounds. A recent study of 
much merit is D. W. Meinig, The Shaping of America: A
Geographical Perspective on 500 Years of History, vol. 2: 
Continental America, 1800-1867 (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1993), 4-23, 58-77. For the latest 
assessment of the Lewis and Clark Expedition, a biography
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a little more than a year after starting out, they 
reached what would eventually became the northern 
boundary of Fergus County. It took them nearly a week to 
travel the Missouri along the future county's border, but 
they took time to go ashore at several locations to 
explore the land beyond the river. Lewis and Clark 
commented again and again on the aridity of the land and 
questioned its ability to sustain human life. Lewis 
wrote in his journal, "This is truly a desert barren 
country. . . .”4 They did get rained on while in central 
Montana, but it was not enough to change their opinion of 
the climate. The expedition endured temperatures below 
freezing several mornings in May 1805 as they traveled up 
the Missouri. Such late freezes are common in the short 
growing season typical of the area.5
Lewis and Clark carefully noted and mapped the 
tributaries of the Missouri, large and small, as they 
moved north and west. The first two creeks they passed
of Meriwether Lewis, see Stephen Ambrose, Undaunted 
Courage: Meriwether Lewis, Thomas Jefferson, and the
Opening of the American fifest (New York: Simon and
Schuster, 1996).
4 Gary E. Moulton, ed., The Journals of the Lewis and 
Clark Expedition, 8 vols. (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1987), 4:202, hereafter cited as Moulton, 
Journals.
5 Ibid., 4:183-207.
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in what would become Fergus County were nearly dry, with 
obvious salt buildup along the banks and in the stream, 
but the deep percolation of rainwater dissolved salts and 
moved them downslope, creating saline seeps and salt 
deposits along the streams. Lewis and Clark passed the 
visibly dry Sand Creek, although Lewis speculated that 
the water flowed under the sand. Five and a half miles 
upstream from Sand Creek, South Mountain Creek (later 
renamed Armells Creek) flowed out of the Judith Mountains 
south of the Missouri River. It was three times wider 
than Sand Creek and had more flowing water than several 
of the streams they had recently passed.6
Further upriver, they passed the mouth of Two Calf 
Creek, which was about twenty yards wide and, like Sand 
Creek, had no running water. On the 29th of May, the 
expedition came upon a large tributary of the Missouri 
River. Clark named it the Judith River. Lewis went 
ashore to walk south along the clear flowing river, which 
he estimated was about 100 yards across and was lined 
with more timber than was the Missouri River. Lewis also 
found the remains of a recent Indian camp along the 
Judith. That night, the explorers camped on the north
6 Ibid., 4:187-193.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
29
side of the Missouri River, opposite the mouth of Arrow 
Creek, the northwestern boundary of modern Fergus 
County.7
Lewis noted that "the Country on either hand is high 
broken and rockey” [sic]. These steep, rocky hills, 
later called the Missouri Breaks, had been carved during 
the last glacial period. About five or six miles down 
river from Cow Island, near one of their campsites, Lewis 
and Clark were able to see the Judith Mountains to the 
south. On Sunday, 26 May 1805, Lewis and Clark went 
ashore, climbed a hill, and looked at the snowy peaks of 
the Rocky Mountains for the first time. "Whilst I viewed 
those mountains," Clark wrote, "I felt a Secret pleasure 
in finding myself So near the head of the heretofore 
Conceived boundless Missouri . . . ." As they moved 
West, Lewis and Clark passed "steep" and "rugged" bluffs. 
Although they mentioned that the Missouri had an obvious 
cline, the river gradually widened to 200 yards, and 
included many islands.8
As the expedition moved up the Missouri River 
through Montana, the vegetation along the river became 
increasingly sparse. Lewis noted that the high river
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., quotes on 4:195, 204.
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banks along the Missouri had no trees, but that the 
broken hills had some "pine spruce" or Douglas fir 
(Pseudotsuga menziesii) and "dwarf cedar" or creeping 
juniper (Juniperus scopulorum). He thought the soil in 
the sandy hills along the river "poor and sterile," with 
little grass or ground cover evident. The bottom lands 
supported mostly sagebrush (Artemisia abrotanum) and 
greasewood (Sarcobatus vermiculatus), both indicating the 
aridity of the land. When they saw the Judith Mountains, 
they commented on the paucity of trees — only a few pines 
and spruces. One evening they camped near two dead 
cottonwoods {Populus deltoides), the only wood they could 
find. (The lack of wood later caused problems for 
steamboat traffic on the Missouri River and led to 
deforestation where any wood was found.) Lewis recorded 
that the land along the Judith River had more trees, 
however, including boxelders (Acer negundo), cottonwoods, 
and willows (Salix sp.).9
Lewis and Clark's journals provided an early picture 
of the natural environment in central Montana. Both men 
took careful field notes on the animals they saw, their 
numbers, and behavior, but they killed some for food, and
9 Ibid.
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others to preserve as scientific specimens. As they 
traveled west through the future Fergus County, they 
wrote that the wildlife became scarcer, perhaps because 
of the increasing aridity of the land. Lewis described 
in his notes a large prairie dog (Cynomys ludovicianus) 
colony, the first detailed written description of those 
animals. They went ashore at various points and killed 
deer (Odocoileus virginianus), elk (Cervus elaphus), 
beaver (Castor canadensis), buffalo (Bison bison), and 
bear (Ursus americanus). Lewis and Clark collected their 
first bighorn sheep in central Montana (Ovis canadensis), 
although they had seen bighorn earlier on the trip. They 
also saw antelope (Antilocapra americana), a skunk 
(Mephitis mephitis), jack rabbits (Lepus sp.), a 
rattlesnake (Crotalus viridis) , a spotted spiny soft 
shell turtle (Trionyx spiniferus), and several species of 
birds, including Ross' goose (Chen rossi) .x° North of 
the -mouth of the Judith River, Lewis found the remains of 
many buffalo at what he believed was a buffalo jump (also 
called a piskun), a bluff used by Indians to kill large
10 Ibid., 4:183-207.
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numbers of buffalo by driving them over the edge; he also 
spotted wolves (Canis lupus) around the carcasses.11
On 29 May 1805, the expedition left Fergus County 
and headed toward the Pacific. On their return from the 
west coast in the summer of 1806, Lewis and Clark split 
up as they traveled through Montana so Clark could 
explore the Yellowstone River while Lewis followed the 
Marias and Missouri Rivers. The trip east was much 
faster, and since much of it was over territory they had 
previously mapped, they took fewer notes. Lewis 
continued to write about the flora and fauna he saw in 
central Montana, noting several species of birds, 
including mourning doves (Zenaida macroura), rain crows 
or cuckoos (Coccyzus americanus or C. erythropthalmus) , 
and red-headed woodpeckers (Melanerpes erythrocephalus). 
And he took additional notes on the wild clover he saw in 
bloom, the golden rye (Elymus sp.), and prickly pear 
cactus (Opuntia fragilis or 0. polycantha). On July 30, 
Lewis again passed the mouth of the Judith River; two 
days later he passed the Musselshell, and two months 
later Lewis and Clark arrived in St. Louis. Although 
they were not the first Euro-Americans to explore the
11 Ibid.
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American West, their reports were the first that were 
(after some delay) made available to the public.12
Because of its remote location and because of Lewis 
and Clark's pessimistic outlook for settlement, several 
decades passed before any real effort was made to extract 
resources, other than furs, from central Montana. Fur 
trappers and traders established short-lived trading 
posts there, but little permanent settlement occurred. 
Manuel Lisa's Missouri Fur Company established a fur 
trading post at the confluence of the Big Horn and 
Yellowstone Rivers in 1807, only one year after the 
return of Lewis and Clark, but the post lasted only a few 
years. John Jacob Astor's American Fur Company sent fur 
traders to the upper Missouri River in the 1820s, and by 
the 1830s the company began using steamboats on the 
Missouri to transport goods as far as Fort Union, at the 
confluence of the Yellowstone and Missouri Rivers. The 
American Fur Company built the short-lived Fort Chardon 
at the confluence of the Judith and Missouri Rivers in 
1843, but shortly thereafter, fur trade declined.13
12 Ibid., 8:140-145, 4:215-271.
13 Bernard DeVoto discusses early westward exploration 
and the fur trade in two of his classics, The Course of 
Empire (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952) and Across the
Wide Missouri (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1947). See
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The Lewis and Clark Expedition was the first of many 
government-sponsored expeditions to explore and report on 
the West beyond the hundredth meridian. Lewis and Clark 
were optimistic but realistic about western resources, 
but the reports of later expeditions described the West 
as either a desert or a garden. Some even argued that 
cultivation increased rainfall.14 Nonetheless, in the 
early nineteenth century, the outlook for permanent 
agricultural settlements on the high plains was bleak. 
Certainly the West seemed formidable because it was arid 
and unlike the East. According to the historian Walter 
Prescott Webb, the Great Plains were so arid and so
also K. Ross Toole, Montana: An Uncommon Land (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1959), 40-63, hereafter 
cited as Toole, Uncommon Land; Federal Writers' Project, 
Montana: A State Guidebook (New York: Viking Press,
1939), 418; Michael P. Malone and Richard B. Roeder, 
Montana: A History of Two Centuries (Seattle:
University of Washington Press, 1976), 42-47.
14 White, "It's Your Misfortune and None of My Own": A
History of the American Nest (Norman: University of
Oklahoma Press, 1991), 121. Lieutenant Zebulon Pike 
labeled the Great Plains the "Great American Desert" 
after his 1806 expedition, and Stephen Long's 1820 
expedition reinforced Pike's assessment. In the 1840s, 
Francis Parkman also viewed the plains as being desolate. 
On the other hand, boosters, such as Missouri Senator 
Thomas Hart Benton, his son-in-law John Charles Fremont, 
and William Gilpin, in an effort to encourage settlement 
of the plains, promoted the West as a lush and fertile 
garden. For a discussion of the changing image of the 
West, see Henry Nash Smith, Virgin Land (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1950).
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
overwhelming that the 98th meridian, more or less the 
eastern boundary of the Great Plains, served as a 
"faultline" that halted immigration for a generation 
before Americans could come to terms with the landscape 
of the Great Plains.15
In 1863, President Abraham Lincoln named Sidney 
Edgerton as the chief justice of Idaho Territory and 
assigned him to Bannack, which was located east of the 
Continental Divide. Edgerton soon realized that it was 
impossible to govern on both sides of the Divide and 
joined with others in requesting that a territory 
separate from Idaho be delineated. On 26 May 1864, 
Congress established Montana territory and named Edgerton 
governor.16
As in much of the West, a pastoral frontier preceded 
an agricultural frontier in the Great Plains. Stockmen, 
such as Granville Stuart, began using the range land in
15 Parts of Webb's environmental determinist thesis have 
been refuted, but his book remains a landmark study. See 
Walter Prescott Webb, The Great Plains (New York: Ginn
and Company, 1931). About Webb and his definition of the 
West, Donald Worster wrote, "I know in my bones, if not 
always through my education, that Webb was right." See 
Donald Worster, "New West, True West: Interpreting the
Region's History," Western Historical Quarterly 18(April 
1987):146.
16 Toole, Uncommon Land, 96.
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Fergus County in the 1880s. Journals and notes he kept 
over the years became the basis for a book that provides 
glimpses of Fergus County when it had few settlers. The 
territory was unsettled open range when Stuart began 
scouting for grazing land in central Montana in May 1880. 
The area was ripe for settlement; the federal government 
had eliminated the Indian threat and hunters had 
drastically reduced the great herds of buffalo that once 
lived in the Judith Basin. Stuart traveled along the 
Yellowstone River, then moved north over the divide to 
the Musselshell River near what became Fergus County in 
1885. He thought the water was better than he had found 
earlier on his trip, because it was less alkali. He 
described the area near the Musselshell River as "black 
with buffalo," quite unlike the descriptions of Lewis and 
Clark decades earlier. The numerous buffalo actually 
posed a threat to their camp, so they worked to frighten 
the animals away. As Stuart and his companions moved 
northwest toward Flatwillow Creek, he commented on the 
buffalo consuming the sparse range forage. But the 
buffalo provided them with buffalo chips for fuel when 
there was no wood available. Buffalo, elk, deer, and 
antelope provided meat when necessary. Other wildlife 
included beaver, frogs and birds, but Stuart recorded few
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details. Near Flatwillow Creek, he and his companions 
shot, fried, and ate prairie chickens (Typanuchus 
pallidicinctus) .17
Stuart further noted: "The country, both bottom and
hills, is all covered with stunted sage and greasewood 
and but little grass. There are petroleum indications 
all through here and some day Montana will produce oil 
but it is worthless now. The myriads of buffalo have 
eaten out what little grass there is so our poor horses 
will fare badly here.” As Stuart and his companions 
moved northwest toward Flatwillow Creek, he wrote that 
the hills became rounded and covered with "short curly 
buffalo grass."18
Muddy Flatwillow Creek was lined with sandstone 
bluffs on which pines and cedars were growing. In the 
valley there were only a few trees, mostly cottonwoods,
17 Clark, Soil Survey, 1; Stuart prospected in 
California, then moved to Montana and worked as a 
merchant before becoming a cattleman. He later became a 
U.S. envoy to Uruguay and Paraguay, traveled all over 
North and South America, and in 1904 became the librarian 
at the Butte, Montana library. See Granville Stuart, 
Forty Years on the Frontier as seen in the Journals and 
Reminiscences of Granville Stuart, Gold-Miner, Trader, 
Merchant, Rancher, and Politician, ed. by Paul C. 
Phillips, 2 vols. (Cleveland: Arthur H. Clark Company, 
1925), 2:124-136, quote on 2:124.
18 Ibid., quotes on 2:124, 126
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boxelders, and chokecherries (Prunus virglniana), but 
there were plum thickets (Prunus sp.), and the best grass 
Stuart had seen since he had left the Big Horn River to 
the south. He moved up the valley toward the Little 
Snowy Mountains and found hawthorn (Crataegus sp.) and 
bull berries (Shepherdia argentea) .19
Much of Stuart's journal was devoted to the type, 
height, and quality of the grass, and as he moved up 
Flatwillow and McDonald Creeks he found the grass 
improved. North and east of McDonald Creek, the quality 
of the grass diminished, and sagebrush became more 
prevalent. Availability of water was an important factor 
when one considered the grazing potential of land.
Stuart noted that there was standing water in several 
places, more than two weeks after a heavy rain, and he 
was rained and snowed upon during his travels through 
central Montana, but he realized that standing water 
usually would not last long. The cold lasted, however.
On 19 May 1880, near the Little Snowy Mountains, he 
wrote, "this is a cold bleak region and there are snow 
drifts still under banks and in ravines. "20
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., quote on 2:135.
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In June 1880, Stuart scouted further north and west, 
near the Judith River, which he described as being "high, 
swift, and quite muddy owing to the placer [gold and 
silver] mines at Yogo. . . . This whole basin is fine 
grass country but poor shelter for stock." Stuart 
selected a site for a ranch headquarters on Ford's Creek 
near the base of the Judith Mountains, and there he built 
a stable, a bunkhouse, a blacksmith shop, and two cabins. 
He purchased and fenced 400 acres of land and also
"located one thousand acres of hay land," but it was not
clear if he gained title to it. In addition to his 
private property, Stuart used acres of unfenced, 
unclaimed public domain to graze large herds of cattle.
In July, the United States Army established Fort Maginnis 
on part of Stuart's hay meadow. He hated the loss of 
land but appreciated the conveniences of the fort.
Within a few months, he had 5,000 head of cattle and was
supplying a few head to the fort. Within a few years
many other ranchers had moved into the area.21
By 1885, enough settlers had moved to central 
Montana to justify forming a county government, so the 
Montana Territorial Legislative Assembly established
21 Ibid., 2:142-174, quote on 2:142.
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Fergus County, with Lewistown as the county seat.
Although the county lost territory when several other 
counties were created, it still totals about 2,716,160 
acres (4,244 square miles), making it more than twice the 
size of the state of Delaware.22
The grazing took its toll on Fergus County's natural 
environment. By 1902, when Montana Agricultural 
Experiment Station scientist Frank Spragg studied the 
grasses of the Judith Basin, stockmen had been using the 
land for forage for two decades and only a few 
homesteaders had trickled into Fergus County. He 
expressed concern for the future of the range because 
overgrazing threatened to destroy important grasses.
"When the pioneer came west he found the ranges covered 
with vast forage resources. . . .  Now conditions have 
changed. There is more stock on our ranges than they can 
support." Spragg did not foresee a massive influx of 
homesteaders, probably because much of the land was 
unsuitable for farming without irrigation (although he 
does mention artesian water and springs in the Judith 
Basin). Instead, he predicted that the public domain 
would eventually be owned or leased by ranchers, but he
22 Toole, Uncommon Land, 96; Clark, Soil Survey, 1.
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was not so optimistic about the future of the range. "It 
has been asserted," he wrote, "that all the ranges need 
is rest, but it has been pointed out, in speaking of the 
blue gramma [Bouteloua oligostachya] (the most important 
of the native forage grasses), that conditions have come 
where the most valuable of our range grasses have been 
nearly exterminated.1,23 Even though the county had 
little settlement and agriculture, the environment had 
noticeably changed since Lewis and Clark traveled through 
nearly a century before. Because of overgrazing, native 
grasses were vanishing, removing the ground cover that 
held the top soil in place and prevented wind and water 
erosion. The conditions for the disasters to come were 
already in the making.
23 Frank A. Spragg, Forage Conditions of Central Montana, 
Montana Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin no. 3 
(Bozeman: Montana Agricultural Experiment Station,
1902), 12.
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Chapter 3
Tha Hamastaad Boon and Economic 
Prosperity in Fergus County
Despite the misgivings of those early explorers and 
settlers, homesteaders did flock to central Montana. The 
federal government eagerly divided up the land and 
parceled it out to willing settlers. Railroads crossed 
the state, improving access to markets. A long period of 
higher than average rainfall misled many homesteaders to 
overestimate the agricultural potential of the region.
And during the 1910s, war in Europe improved the market 
for agricultural products dramatically.
Before settlement could take place, however, the 
land had to be surveyed and divided.1 The U.S. 
Rectangular Land Survey, established by the Ordinance of 
1785, divided the country into six-mile square townships 
that were in turn divided into thirty-six numbered 
sections of 640 acres each (one square mile), which were 
then divided as necessary for sale. The grid survey
1 The public domain has not been officially defined, but 
it was usually considered that land which was owned by 
the federal government, yet was not set aside or reserved 
for a specific purpose. Since the end of homesteading in 
1934, the meaning of the term has expanded to include 
more federally owned lands, even if set aside for a 
specific purpose. See E. Louise Peffer, "Which Public
42
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system, strictly oriented to the cardinal directions 
(north, south, east, and west), made land disposal 
orderly and relatively easy, but it failed to take into 
account the natural landscape, imposing an unnatural 
rectangular form on the natural curvilinear landscape. 
Nonetheless, according to some geographers, the United 
States Rectangular Land Survey provided a relatively 
even-handed dispersal of land because it used a 
systematic survey process. In addition, it allowed more 
equitable access to roads and communities because roads 
tended to follow survey lines.2 But, perhaps most
Domain Do You Mean?," Agricultural History 23 (April 
1949) :140—146.
2 For information on the U.S. Rectangular Survey and how 
it affected land use, see Hildegard Binder Johnson, Order 
Upon the Land (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976),
and Norman J. W. Thrower, Original Survey and Land 
Subdivision: A Comparative Study of the Form and Effect
of Contrasting Cadastral Surveys (Chicago: American
Association of Geographers, 1966). Johnson stopped just 
short of blaming the dust bowl of the 1930s on the 
tendency of American farmers to follow survey lines 
instead of landscape contours when plowing. Thrower 
found the rectangular survey so influential that, for 
example, roads strictly followed the grid even if it 
meant crossing rivers and streams at inefficient angles, 
forcing the construction of longer bridge spans than 
necessary. Furthermore, Thrower's research indicated 
that there were more roads under the grid survey system 
because roads were built at section lines, and that under 
the grid system no one was more than one-half mile from a 
road, unlike under the metes and bounds survey system. 
Thrower also found that the grid system reduced the 
monopoly of desirable riparian land. However, his
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importantly for the arid West, as John Wesley Powell 
eventually pointed out, the rectangular survey failed to 
take into account the location of surface water.
The United States government promoted settlement for 
a variety of reasons. The sale of public lands generated 
revenue for the federal government for the building of an 
infrastructure of roads, canals, and schools. The 
Ordinance of 1785 set aside one section per township 
(this would later be increased to two sections per 
township) to generate income for public schools, either 
by lease or sale and investment. More importantly, as 
some of the country's founding fathers believed in the 
late eighteenth century, the methodical division and sale 
of land would ensure a republican future for the country 
as the public domain was transformed into small farms. 
Because land was readily available at a reasonable price, 
the entrenched social and political system of landlords 
and tenants in Europe could be avoided. The federal
research focused on two different sections of Ohio, in 
the humid East. In the West a researcher might come to 
different conclusions because of the aridity. For a 
general history of the rectangular survey, see C. Albert 
White, A History of the Rectangular Survey System 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1983).
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government then, instead of acting as a landlord, worked 
to alienate as much of the public domain as possible.3
In 1862, the United States Congress enacted the 
Homestead Act to encourage the settlement of the Trans- 
Mississippi West. The Homestead Act stipulated that to 
receive a grant of 160 acres of land (one-quarter of a 
section), prospective homesteaders must be over the age 
of twenty-one or the head of a household, and must either 
be or plan to become American citizens. After living on 
the property for six months, homesteaders could buy the 
homestead for $1.25 per acre ($200 for 160 acres), or 
after five years of living on and cultivating the 
homestead, they could pay a $15 filing fee and receive 
patent (full title) to the land.4
3 Richard White, "It's Your Misfortune and None of My 
Own": A History of the American Nest (Norman:
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991), 138-140, hereafter 
cited as White, Four Misfortune.
4 A land patent is a fee simple title to land, granted by 
the United States government. United States Department 
of the Interior Bureau of Land Management, Historical 
Highlights of Public Land Management (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1962), 29-30, hereafter cited 
as BLM, Historical Highlights. For more detailed 
analysis of public land law, see Paul Wallace Gates, 
History of Public Land Law Development (Washington,
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968). See also E.
Louise Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain:
Disposal and Reservation Policies, 1900-50 (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1951), and John
Opie, The Law of the Land: Two Hundred Years of American
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From 1862 through the 1920s, settlers headed West to 
take advantage of the vast public domain that the federal 
government put up for grabs, gradually pushing the edge 
of frontier settlement westward across the Great Plains. 
For several decades, Congress continued to amend the 
Homestead Law in an effort to remake the West into the 
garden the promoters of Western settlement imagined 
possible, and later, to accommodate the laws to the 
Western environment. Treelessness made the plains seem 
more forbidding, so to encourage the planting of forests 
on the plains, Congress passed the Timber Culture Act in 
1873, which granted an additional 160 acres of land to 
settlers who planted and maintained trees for a decade on 
forty of those acres. Little understanding the arid 
environment, lawmakers expected to remake the plains in 
the image of the East. There were reasons trees did not 
grow naturally on the plains nor would they grow there 
without irrigation, which, where available, would be used 
on cash crops, not on trees. Nevertheless, many did file 
timber claims. Because this law was so impractical and
Farmland Policy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1987), hereafter cited as Opie, Law of the Land.
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made so little sense, many claimants filed false claims 
and in 1891, Congress repealed the act.5
In 1877, Congress changed federal land policy again 
when it passed the Desert Lands Act, which granted 640 
acres of the public domain in several western states and 
territories (including Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, 
South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wyoming) to homesteaders 
who paid a total of $1.25 per acre and showed proof of 
reclamation of the land through irrigation and 
cultivation. This law did not make much sense either. 
Very little of the West could be irrigated and irrigation 
projects took substantial capital homesteaders did not 
have or cooperative efforts they were not willing to 
make. The amount of land granted to each homesteader 
under the Desert Lands Act was cut by half in 1891, 
because (Congress presumed) irrigation would reduce the 
amount of land needed to support a family.6
5 BLM, Historical Highlights, 34, 35, 40, 44, 46; White, 
Your Misfortune, 150-151. Walter Prescott Webb also 
described the problem of treelessness, and the resulting 
delay in settlement of the plains, in The Great Plains 
(New York: Ginn and Company, 1931), hereafter cited as
Webb, Great Plains.
6 BLM, Historical Highlights, 40, 44, 46; Webb, Great 
Plains, 413.
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In 1909, Congress passed the Enlarged Homestead Act, 
which increased the amount of non-irrigable land granted 
to homesteaders from 160 acres to 320 acres, but only 
one-half had to be cultivated. Three years later, 
Congress passed the Three-Year Homestead Act, which 
allowed a homesteader to receive the patent on a 
homestead in three years instead of five, and allowed an 
absence of five months a year, essentially to allow 
homesteaders to earn an income somewhere else. The 
Stock-Raising Homestead Act in 1916 granted 640 acres of 
grazing land to homesteaders (a wildly inadequate amount 
of land for stock raising on the arid high plains).7 
These acts and modifications were supposed to further 
encourage settlement of public lands or to adjust the 
land laws to the arid Western environment. None worked 
as planned.
Ideally, the Homestead Act was meant to further the 
republican ideal, to create a society of independent 
small landholders in the West. It never worked as 
planned. Under the Homestead Act more than 1.3 million 
people settled on the public domain and received the 
final patent for their land, but the Homestead Act did
7 Ibid.
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not relocate the Eastern urban poor to their own land in 
the West. It took resources, and at least some capital 
to homestead: to pay the filing fee, purchase supplies
to last a year before a crop was harvested, to build a 
shack, dig a well, and build fence. During the first two 
decades of the twentieth century, the settler on the 
northern Great Plains needed at least $1000 to make it 
through the first harvest, and perhaps twice that much.8 
Generally the urban poor could not afford the costs of 
homesteading. Some homesteaders lacked the skills or 
knowledge necessary to farm anywhere, much less on the 
dry Great Plains. Moreover, the requirement that 
homesteaders live on their claim caused settlers to be 
widely separated. This isolated farm families from each 
other and made it difficult to provide public services 
such as schools. Only one-third of those who filed land 
claims under the Homestead Act eventually received title 
to the land they tried to settle.9
8Mary Wilma M. Hargreaves, Dry Farming in the Northern 
Great Plains, 1900-1925 (Cambridge: Harvard University
Press, 1957), 519-520, hereafter cited as Hargreaves, Dry 
Farming, 1900-1925.
9 There is a vast amount of literature on the homestead 
movement. Gilbert Fite discusses the historiography of 
the homestead movement and public land policy in "The 
American West of Farmers and Stockmen," Historians and 
the American West, ed. by Michael P. Malone (Lincoln:
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For the first four decades after the passage of the 
Homestead Act in 18 62, only a few homesteaders settled in 
Montana. In 1867, the United States Congress established 
the Montana land district, named a surveyor general, and 
shortly thereafter began distributing the public 
domain.10 David Carpenter filed the first homestead
University of Nebraska Press, 1983), 209-233. Roy M. 
Robbins criticizes the federal government's land policy 
in Our Landed Heritage: The Public Domain (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1942). Fred Shannon studied 
the Homestead Act, Timber Culture Act, Desert Land Act, 
as well as the railroad land grants and found that few 
small yeoman farmers benefited from the acts designed to 
help them acquire public land. Instead, it was the 
railroads and land monopolists who profited. Shannon 
believed that land fraud characterized much of the land 
purchases in the West. See The Farmer's Last Frontier: 
Agriculture, 1860-1897 (New York: Farrar and Rinehart,
1945). Paul Wallace Gates discusses the failings of and 
contradictions in federal land policy in "The Homestead 
Law in an Incongruous Land System," American Historical 
Review 41 (July 1936):652-681. Gates found that despite 
efforts to the contrary, more land went to speculators. 
Gilbert C. Fite debunks several ideas about homesteaders 
in his study, The Farmers' Frontier, 1865-1900 (New York: 
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966). Fite refuted Fred 
Shannon's argument by showing that there was a 
significant increase in the number of small farms as a 
result of the Homestead Act. He also discusses the 
hardships of the homesteaders (including drought, 
grasshoppers, hard winters, and low capital), but shows 
that they persisted, many due to governmental relief. 
Moreover, according to Fite, it was the success of 
agriculture that fueled America's industrial expansion 
and helped America become a large creditor nation during 
World War I.
10 James McClellan Hamilton, From Wilderness to 
Statehood: A History of Montana, 1805-1900 (Portland,
Oregon: Binfords and Mort, Publishers, 1957), 345-412.
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claim in Montana, near Helena, in 1868, but he chose to 
purchase the land before the end of the usual five years. 
In 1873, five years after the first homestead claim in 
Montana had been filed and the first year any patents
could have been issued for Montana land, only one Montana
homesteader made the final entry to receive full title to 
his land.11
Homesteaders eventually flocked to Montana.12 
Between 1870 and 1890, the number of farms in Montana
grew at a moderate rate (from 851 to 5,603). But between
1900 and 1920, the number grew from 13,097 to 57,700, an 
increase of 6,680 percent in fifty years.13 Between 1900 
and 1920, when the population of Montana more than
11 Daniel N. Vichorek, Montana's Homestead Era, Montana 
Geographic Series, vol. 15 (Helena: Montana Magazine,
1987), 8, hereafter cited as Vichorek, Montana's 
Homestead Era.
12 Montana homesteaders were sometimes referred to as 
"honyockers.” The origin of the term is unknown, but 
elsewhere in the northern Great Plains Slav immigrants 
were pejoratively called "hunyacks." Most histories of 
Montana use the term, but I did not find the term in 
primary sources, and it is not clear if the term was 
derisive. See Joseph Kinsey Howard, Montana: High,
Wide, and Handsome (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1943; reprint ed., 1959), 180-181.
13 Clark C. Spence, Montana: A Bicentennial History (New
York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1978); Montana
Agricultural Statistics Service, Montana Agricultural 
Statistics, State Series 1867-1991 (Helena: Montana
Department of Agriculture, 1992), 3, hereafter cited as 
Montana Agricultural Statistics.
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doubledf it was land promoters' or boosters' propaganda 
on the potential of dry land farming, above all else, 
that lured people to homestead on the northern plains.14
Railroads, chambers of commerce, and real estate 
speculators sponsored dry farming promotional campaigns. 
Newspapers carried stories about the fertile land 
awaiting cultivation. Politicians spoke of the bounty of 
the West. State and local governments encouraged 
settlement on and cultivation of the dry land. Federal 
and state land disposal encouraged the division and 
distribution of the public domain for homesteads, rather 
than disposing of large parcels for grazing purposes.
Only the Northern Pacific Railway Company tried to 
suspend land sales until dry land farming had been 
tested.15
14 K. Ross Toole, Twentieth-Century Montana: A State of
Extremes (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1972),
60, hereafter cited as Toole, Twentieth-Century Montana.
15 Hargreaves, Dry Farming, 1900-1925. Hargreaves 
defines dry farming as "agriculture without irrigation in 
regions of scanty precipitation." (p. 3) She argues that 
land promoters were interested in the success of the 
farmers, refuting Fred Shannon who argues that land 
promoters were only interested in immediate self-gain, 
not the long-term success of the farmer, and that the 
railroads and land monopolists made great profits from 
land settlement policies, instead of the farmer. See 
Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier: Agriculture, 1860-
1897 (New York: Farrar and Rinehart, 1945).
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While homesteaders moved West during the boom in 
hopes of acquiring land and making money off of that 
land, others encouraged settlement hoping to profit from 
the population influx. Among those who hoped to make 
money off of the homesteaders were companies with money 
to lend. Farmers, hoping to improve their land or to buy 
more land borrowed money easily during the boom years 
because their land values had increased. In Lewistown, 
the Wright Land and Investment Company advertised in the 
local newspaper that its company offered low rates for 
farm loans, several payment plans, quick service, and 
unlimited funds. Alex B. Lehman, president of the Hilger 
Loan and Realty Company, advertised that his loans had 
"all the good features of every other Farm loan and then 
some."16
During several years of the homestead boom, the 
Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity published 
booklets promoting agricultural settlement. In 1914, it 
published The Resources and Opportunities of Montana, 
which extolled the agricultural bounties of Montana, 
county by county. Near Grass Range, one farmer 
supposedly planted turkey red wheat and harvested 49
16 Lewistown Democrat-News 2 January 1920, 1 January
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bushels to the acre. Since the yield in 1913 for the 
entire state of Montana was $5.5 bushels per acre, the 
Fergus County farmer's yield was almost twice the state 
average. The Montana booklet described homestead laws 
and requirements under the heading, "How to Go About It 
to Secure a Free Farm From U u d e  Sam.” (In July 1913, 
Fergus County still had about 1.4 million acres available 
for homesteading, although no-t all of that land was 
necessarily arable). The pamphlet included the 
agricultural advice of Thomas Shaw, who worked for Great 
Northern and Northern Pacific Railways and who considered 
himself an expert on dry farming techniques, even though 
his education was in animal husbandry. Whether working 
for railroads or helping with the state publication, Shaw 
acted as a booster for Montana* trying to draw 
homesteaders to settle the state. He recommended deep 
plowing and disc harrowing to conserve moisture and 
control weeds, coupled with otop rotation and the 
practice of summer fallowing (lotting the land rest every 
other year or so) .17
1920.
17 Montana Department of Agriculture and Publicity, The 
Resources and Opportunities OF Montana, 1914 Edition 
(Helena: Independent Publishing Company, 1914), 34-80,
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Like the state government, railroad companies 
published pamphlets and booklets to lure settlers to 
Montana since settlement meant business and profits for 
the companies. The Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul 
Railway published a booklet in 1908 on Fergus County that 
was typical of much booster literature. According to the 
pamphlet, Fergus County gold mines were very productive 
and successful and provided an important nearby market 
for agricultural products. The pamphlet claimed that 
Fergus County wheat farmers averaged over 36 bushels per 
acre, much higher than the state average. The pamphlet 
went so far as to claim that the county's soil was twice 
as productive as that of the "central states." While 
Montana's soil fertility may have been higher than that 
in some long-cultivated land in the Midwest, its lower 
rainfall reduced its production capability.18
In promoting Fergus County, railroads hoped to 
profit from the influx of settlers, not from the sale of 
land. Although several railroads had been granted land 
by the federal government to help finance construction,
quote on 53; Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4; 
Hargreaves, Dry Farming, 1900-1925, 134-135, 179-183.
18 Chicago, Milwaukee and St. Paul Railway, Fergus 
County, Montana, 1908 (n. p., 1908); Montana Agricultural 
Statistics, 4.
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none of the granted land was in Fergus Couf1̂ .  Lewistown 
and Fergus County were originally served by locally 
funded Jaw Bone Railroad, but it was purch#\^d by the 
Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Paul Railway if* ^-908» The 
Northern Pacific had some success in sellif^ during
the homestead boom, selling more than 1.3 acres
in Montana in 1916 alone. The Great North^y1 p.ailroad, 
which ran north of Fergus County, was the d ^ Y  major 
Western railroad built without major federal ^id. The 
Northern Pacific Railroad, because Montana a 
territory, had received forty sections (25,*^0 acres) per 
mile of track constructed.19
The railroads and other boosters had fr<?m
mother nature in drawing the homesteaders during the
boom. Although periodic droughts occurred, ^^companied 
by crop failures, periods of above average ^  ir\fail 
during the 1880s and 1910s helped encourage ^^ltl©ment.20 
When several years of higher than average a^\ua.l rainfall 
coincided with the swell of homesteaders mo'^jhg w^st, 
many people came to believe that "rain foll^/d the
19 Toole, Twentieth-Century Montana, 60; Whic^ ' Your 
Misfortune, 145-147, 252-257; Dan Noble, Th# /udith Basin 
of Central Montana (Chicago: Chicago, Milw^^e#, and St.
Paul Railway, 1927), 2.
20 Hargreaves discusses this phenomenon in hook» Dry 
Farming, 1900-1925.
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plow."21 Geologist Samuel Aughey wrote that plowing the 
land increased the "absorptive power of the soil" which 
in turn caused increased evaporation and then increased 
rain.22 One Montana civil engineer theorized that 
changes in the Pacific Ocean's currents were responsible 
for the improved rainfall.23 Misconceptions such as this 
about farming on the Great Plains were common because 
people were unfamiliar with the arid environment.
The United States Department of Agriculture Weather 
Bureau collected data at several locations in Fergus 
County during the first three decades of the twentieth 
century, but much of its record keeping was sporadic.
The data for Lewistown, however, were nearly complete, 
the information missing for only one year (1917) between 
1896 and 1930 (see Figure 3). And Lewistown may be taken
21 Many historians have discussed the "rain follows the 
plow" misconception, including Walter Prescott Webb in 
Great Plains, 375-382; and Richard White, Your 
Misfortune, 132, 150-151. See also C. Warren 
Thornthwaite, "Climate and Settlement in the Great 
Plains" in Climate and Man, United States Department of 
Agriculture Yearbook of Agriculture, 1941 (Washington, D. 
C.; Government Printing Office, 1941), 177-187.
22 Samuel Aughey, Sketches of the Physical Geography and 
Geology of Nebraska (Omaha: Daily Republican Book and
Job Office, 1880), 43-46.
23 Dan Fulton, Failure on the Plains: A Rancher's View
of the Public Lands Problem (Bozeman: Big Sky Books,
1982), 53.
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as representative of Fergus County in general, even 
though rainfall in the western United States is erratic, 
varying greatly over short distances, depending on the 
topography and the vagaries of weather. Higher 
elevations in Fergus County may have received more 
precipitation, while areas north and east of Lewistown 
often received less. Between 1900 and 1945,
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Figure 3. Annual Rainfall for Lewistown, Montana, 
1900—1920, also showing average rainfall for 1900- 
1945.24
24 United States Department of Agriculture Weather 
Bureau, Climatic Summary of the United States 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1937)
7/1- 11/19, hereafter cited as Weather Bureau, Climatic 
Summary; National Climatic Data Center, National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration, Department of Commerce, 
Asheville, North Carolina.
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Lewistown averaged about 17.86 inches of rain per year, 
ranging from nearly 25 inches in 1909 to about 11 inches 
in 1900.25 In general, Lewistown fit the pattern across 
much of the West: during several years of above average
rainfall, much of the available land was claimed by 
homesteaders.
In his Report on the Lands of the Arid Region of the 
United States, John Wesley Powell warned of the 
unpredictable nature of rainfall in the West. He 
believed the only consistent way to produce reliable 
crops in the arid West would be to irrigate. Powell 
stated that "the limit of successful agriculture without 
irrigation has been set at 20 inches" of annual 
rainfall.26 Lewistown was several hundred miles west of 
that isohyet but received more than twenty inches of rain 
annually during several years of the homestead boom.
Most of Montana's homesteads were filed for after 
Congress passed the Enlarged Homestead Act in 1909, 
coinciding with a period of increased rainfall, and in
25 Ibid.
26 John Wesley Powell, Report on the Lands of the Arid 
Region of the United States With a More Detailed Account 
of the Lands of Utah, House Executive Document No. 73,
45th Cong., 2d sess., serial 1805 (Washington, D. C. : 
Government Printing Office, 1878), 1-13, quote on 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
1908, 1909, and 1911, Lewistown averaged over twenty-two 
inches of precipitation. In 1914, Lewistown received 
nearly twenty inches, and in 1915, it again received over 
twenty-two inches.27
Even though many settlers homesteaded during periods 
of higher rainfall, they still had to cope with what was 
for them a strange agricultural environment. The early 
settlers on the Northern Great Plains were unprepared to 
deal with the semiarid environment. They faced both an 
unfamiliar climate and unfamiliar soils and had to adjust 
their methods and crops to successfully farm the northern 
plains. The key seemed to be the development of dry 
farming techniques.28
Although agricultural scientists, encouraged by 
colleges and the federal government, were important to 
the success of agriculture on the northern Great Plains, 
it was often the "experts” who worked for the railroads 
who were more well known among settlers. While the 
former advocated a realistic approach to agriculture on 
the northern Great Plains (developing drought-resistant
27 Weather Bureau, Climatic Summary, 7/1- 11/19.
28 Dry farming is "agriculture without irrigation in 
regions of semiaridity." See Mary W. M. Hargreaves, Dry 
Farming in the Northern Great Plains: Years of
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crops and diversified cropping methods), booster- 
supported experiments (which may have been less than 
scientifically rigorous) clouded scientific advances in 
dry farming.29
Hardy Webster Campbell developed dry farming methods 
during the 1880s, began publicizing them a few years 
later, and became an important dry farming booster for 
the railroads. He homesteaded in Dakota Territory in the 
1870s, and though he had no farming or scientific 
background he began experimenting with dry farming 
techniques. He noticed that grass grew in horse and 
wagon tracks even though an adjacent field failed, 
leading him to believe that packed subsurface soil, with 
some loose soil on the surface, would be the best way to 
prepare the arid northern Great Plains soil for raising 
crops. He developed a method for packing the subsurface 
soil, which was to be used in conjunction with frequent 
surface cultivation, and began publicizing it. He argued 
that this method helped retain soil moisture and 
prevented the soil from blowing. Railroads hired
Readjustment, 1925-1990 (Lawrence: University Press of
Kansas, 1992), 1.
29 Hargreaves, Dry F a r m i n g 1900-1925; Mary W. M. 
Hargreaves, "Dry Farming Alias Scientific Farming," 
Agricultural History 22(1948):83-125.
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Campbell to manage demonstration farms and to promote dry­
land farming in an effort to attract homesteaders and 
settlers west, and his name became synonymous with dry 
farming. About the turn of the century, he began 
promoting the practice of summer fallowing. Campbell was 
a dry farming booster; he encouraged homesteaders to take 
advantage of fertile soils and helped bring about new 
farming methods on the northern Great Plains.
Agricultural scientists discredited Campbell somewhat 
because of his association with the railroads and land 
speculation, but he helped to usher in an interest in 
scientific farming that would be important to those 
trying to farm the arid northern Great Plains.30
Boosters eventually encouraged scientific farming 
methods to help bring in settlers. The Lewistown Chamber 
of Commerce, for example, published the Farmers' Bulletin 
and in 1917 helped establish a county farm bureau.31 The 
publication and dissemination of booster literature on 
the favorable prospects for Montana agriculture continued 
into the 1920s, in an effort to lure more homesteaders
30 Ibid., James C. Malin, The Grassland of North America: 
Prolegomena to Its History (Lawrence, Kansas: By the 
Author, 1947), 227-242; Vichorek, Montana's Homestead 
Era, 10.
31 Hargreaves, Dry Farming, 1900-1925, 179-187.
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into the state. For instance, as late as 1925 the 
Milwaukee Railway still sponsored educational farm 
meetings conducted by agricultural experts, who spread "a 
message of optimism" for the farming industry on the 
northern Great Plains at a farm meeting in Fergus 
County.32 That year the Lewistown Democrat-News also 
reported that Montana State College President Alfred 
Atkinson urged the state to "study her resources of soil 
and climate and compile information which will guide 
incoming settlers . . . . 1,33 Boosters promoted the dry- 
farming movement in an effort to draw settlers to the 
northern Great Plains instead of basing it agricultural 
science and the development of new crop varieties 
suitable for the arid Western environment.34 More 
farmers read or heard more about booster literature than 
scientific literature, the pseudo-scientific booster 
propaganda being more ubiquitous during the boom years 
than the more responsible educational efforts of 
agricultural scientists. As a result, homesteaders on 
the northern Great Plains often took up claims on the
32 Lewistown Democrat-News 26 October 1925
33 Lewistown Democrat-News 8 January 1925.
34 Hargreaves, Dry Farming 1900-1925, 220.
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basis of false or exaggerated information. They had, in 
a way, already been programmed to fail.
The number of homesteaders slowly increased, but the 
Montana homestead boom did not begin until after the turn 
of the century. Montana was admitted to the Union as a 
state in 1889; that year homestead final entries 
increased to 372. In the same year, the Dakotas recorded 
more than fifteen times as many final entries.35 
Settlers gradually moved west, taking up claims on the 
best arable land available. Not much of that land was in 
Montana, but homesteading in Montana dramatically 
increased after the passage of the Enlarged Homestead Act 
in 1909. From 1910 through 1918, there were 33 million 
acres of homestead entries in Montana — nearly 4 million 
per year.36 Two-thirds of the land homesteaded in 
Montana was entered between 1910 and 1919. Because the 
homesteading boom coincided with periods of increased 
rainfall, homesteaders overestimated the agricultural 
potential of the land.37 At the same time, World War I
35 Vichorek, Montana's Homestead Era, 8-9.
36 R. R. Renne, Montana Farm Bankruptcies, Montana 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin no. 360 
(Bozeman: Montana Agricultural Experiment Station,
1938), 42.
37 Neil W. Johnson and M. H. Saunderson discuss the 
rainfall and settlement trends briefly in Types of
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stimulated the agricultural economy during the late 
1910s. Europeans turned to the United States for 
agricultural commodities. In order to meet the demand 
and to support the American war effort, the federal 
government encouraged homesteaders to cultivate as much 
acreage as possible.38 Furthermore, the increased demand 
for agricultural products inflated their price. 
Homesteaders flocking to the northern Great Plains 
envisioned a bright future, with ample rainfall and 
rising prices for what they planned to grow.
In Fergus County, Montana, there was public domain 
available to be taken up from the 1870s through the 
1920s, although the best land (most arable) always went 
first. In 1878 a Mr. and Mrs. Janeaux filed for the 
first homestead in what would become Fergus County, 
Montana.39 Four years later Abraham and Mary Walton 
Hogeland were among the first settlers in Fergus County,
Farming in Montana, Part I, Montana Agricultural 
Experiment Station Bulletin no. 328 (Bozeman: Montana
Agricultural Experiment Station, 1936), 30-31. Weather 
Bureau, Climatic Summary, 7/1- 11/19.
38 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of 
Agriculture, 1919 (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1920), 32-33.
39 Claire 0. Clark, Soil Survey of Fergus County, 
Montana, United States Department of Agriculture Soil 
Conservation Service (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1988), 1.
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buying land and establishing a ranch along Spring Creek, 
a tributary of the Judith River. Abraham Hogeland, a 
Pennsylvania native and an honors graduate of Lafayette 
College, became a surveyor for the Northern Pacific 
Railroad, and like many young men moved West with the 
railroad. At the age of 27, he left the railroad to take 
advantage of Montana's natural resources, believing that 
the Judith Basin had great promise, with rivers and 
grassland, and timber in the nearby mountains. He filed 
for a homestead and brought his wife and infant to the 
cabin he built on Spring Creek. He acquired more land 
and became a sheep rancher but continued to conduct 
surveys for Fergus County. Even though Hogeland 
homesteaded early enough to get some of the better land 
in Fergus County, he apparently farmed only enough to 
prove up his homestead claim, then turned to ranching, a 
land use more appropriate to the arid environment. He 
also continued to work at an outside job, which may have 
indicated that his land could not support a family.40
Only a few homesteaders like the Hogelands settled 
in Fergus County before 1900; most of the land was
40 Mary Clearman Blew, All but the Waltz: A Memoir of
Five Generations in the Life of a Montana Family (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1991), 15-38.
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homesteaded during the 1910s. The later homesteaders had 
to contend with the same problems as earlier settlers. 
They too had to build dwellings and cultivate the land. 
George Martin left his native North Dakota in 1910 and 
headed west, eventually settling in Fergus County during 
the homestead boom. (Many Fergus County homesteaders 
came from North Dakota and Minnesota, essentially 
following the railroad West.) He claimed a 160-acre 
homestead near Armells Creek, northeast of Lewistown, 
receiving his patent in November 1915. That same month, 
he married Lena Lucier, a Fergus County native whose 
French Canadian parents had come to Fergus County because 
of the gold rush in the early 1880s but stayed to 
homestead. Like Abraham Hogeland, George and Lena Martin 
worked at various jobs in addition to working the land. 
The Martins worked to make the most of their property and 
limited income. For example, their chicken house was 
built into the side of a hill to save on building 
materials. Moreover, Lena Martin used a coffee can to 
churn butter and sold the excess butter and eggs for 
cash.41
41 LUMT-38-22-358, Box 20, Land Use Case Files, 1934- 
1953, Records of the Bureau of Land Management, Montana, 
Record Group 49, National Archives, Rocky Mountain 
Region, Denver, Colorado, hereafter cited as Land Use
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It was not unusual for several family members to 
take up adjacent homesteads, trying to acquire land and 
take advantage of the boom. Harry McDonald, along with 
his brother and two sisters, left Iowa for Montana during 
the early 1910s. All four McDonald siblings took up 
homesteads near Rose Creek, in northeastern Fergus 
County. Harry McDonald later married Pearl Johnson, who 
had also homesteaded in northeastern Fergus County near 
her brother. Despite the fact that Harry and Pearl 
McDonald had two homesteads between them, they both 
worked at other jobs to support themselves. Harry 
McDonald worked at grain elevators, while Pearl McDonald 
taught school.42
Montana homesteaders lived relatively isolated 
lives. The Frank Weygant family were typical 
homesteaders during the 1910s Montana. Frank Weygant 
left Ada, Minnesota, near the North Dakota state line, 
and headed west to Montana to homestead in 1913, in part 
to improve his health but perhaps also because three of
Case Files; Babbie Deal and Loretta McDonald, eds., The 
Heritage Book of Central Montana (Lewistown: 1976 Fergus
County Bicentennial Heritage Committee, 1980) , 216-218, 
235-236.
42 Jim Arthur, ed., A History of Winifred, Montana 
(Lewistown, Montana: Central Montana Publishing,
1988), 89.
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his nine children had already settled there. His wife 
and part of the family stayed behind to sell their 
possessions, but in May 1914 they took the train to 
Denton in northwestern Fergus County and joined him. 
Despite the luxury of train travel (in comparison to 
earlier homesteaders who headed West in Conestoga 
wagons), the Weygants found themselves in an isolated 
area, with few neighbors and no amenities. Like many 
other homesteaders, the Weygants had little or no 
agricultural experience; Frank Weygant was a pharmacist. 
They homesteaded in the badlands along Wolf Creek, near 
the Missouri River breaks, in northern Fergus County.
The homestead had little bench land to cultivate, but to 
comply with homestead laws the Weygants planted some 
wheat with no real expectation of crop success. Instead, 
they raised cattle and hogs for a living while Frank 
Weygant worked in a nearby town. Some of their neighbors 
went ahead and plowed under the sagebrush, cultivating 
the arid land, confident about success. There had been a 
few good years of rainfall, so many homesteaders were 
optimistic.43
43 Noemi Weygant, Rimrock Land: Our Homestead Site
(Duluth, Minnesota: Priory Press, 1978), 1-33.
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Homesteaders often invested little in their homes, 
often by necessity, occasionally by choice. The Frank 
Weygants, and their son, Otto Weygant, built two typical 
homesteader's cabins when they arrived. These were often 
just simple one-room dwellings, although some had no 
intention of making the homestead a permanent home. Otto 
Weygant's cabin was an investment of labor rather than 
capital. Logs for his cabin were hauled to his homestead 
from coulees and the Judith River breaks. Once the logs 
were in place, they had to be chinked with cement, and 
the corners trimmed. The finished size was 16 feet wide 
by 20 feet long. The cabin roof consisted of one-inch 
lumber sheathing covered with tar paper and a layer of 
sod. The cabin had two frame windows and a door made of 
tongue and groove siding. One corner of the cabin held 
an important cache, four hundred bushels of Turkey red 
wheat to be used as seed, which conveniently served as a 
bed.44
Frank Weygant's cabin was similar in size and 
construction but had an additional window and was more 
carefully constructed. While Otto Weygant's cabin was 
located on bench land, the Frank Weygant cabin was
44 Ibid., 19-20.
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located near Wolf Creek, in rougher country, but had 
protection from the rimrocks. The roof had wide eaves to 
provide some protected outdoor storage. According to one 
of the Weygant daughters, " a hundred and one things were 
stored there from hammer and colored crayons, to bottles 
of creosol and packages of garden seed. One night a box 
of bullets for the '22', kept high up under the eaves, 
was struck by lightening; and while none of the bullets 
penetrated the thickness of the logs, we did wait for 
what seemed endless moments, wondering which one of us 
was going to be shot first, and from what direction."
The large uniform logs smelled like pine and served as 
good insulation for the cabin. The sod which insulated 
the roof sprouted a native garden. Unlike many homestead 
dwellings, the Frank Weygant cabin had mosquito netting 
over the windows and a screen door. Mrs. Frank Weygant 
tried to make the cabin comfortable and attractive. She 
created cots that turned into couches during the day, 
made decorative pillows, hung curtains, and placed 
embroidered cloths on tables. According to her daughter, 
Mrs. Weygant even washed the sheets every week. An oil 
painting and an ivory carving added an elegant touch.45
45 Ibid., 34-35.
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The Weygant family seemed comfortable in their log 
cabins, but other homesteaders were not as comfortable, 
especially in winter. Many homestead shacks often had 
only thin tarpaper to supplement wooden siding, and 
newspaper had to be used as insulation on the inside.
The cellar underneath the floor of many homestead 
dwellings helped keep milk and butter cool in the summer, 
but in the winter, cold air moved in through cellar 
doors, chilling the homesteaders.46 Few could afford to 
build shacks on their claim and nice houses in town. 
William E. Jones left Nebraska for Fergus County,
Montana, in the fall of 1913 and filed on 160 acres, one- 
quarter of a section, west of the town of Roy. He built 
his "homestead shack" in the late fall in order to comply 
with the homestead laws but returned to Nebraska for the 
winter. In the spring of 1914, Jones returned to his 
homestead and was joined by his wife and children, who 
brought their household goods and machinery from 
Nebraska. Jones either had substantial savings or was 
able to borrow money on his land because he built a house 
and garage in the town of Roy in August 1914, just as war
46 Ibid., 67.
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began breaking out in Europe. He then had to travel back 
and forth to his homestead.47
Despite the physical hardships associated with 
homesteading and the lack of amenities, many people 
flocked west to homestead. Ultimately, homesteaders 
believed that, with hard work, they would be able to 
secure their homestead and make a profit. Before 1914, 
agricultural prices were relatively stable; Wheat prices 
remained between $.61 and $.91 per bushel (see Figure 
4) .48 Although the prices were low, their stability made 
it easier for farmers to plan their future because, for 
example, tax assessments would also remain relatively 
stable.
World War I, however, ushered in an economic boom in 
agriculture, which provided further incentive to 
homesteaders as the United States began supplying the 
Allies with foodstuffs. Wheat acreage in the United 
States increased from 53.5 million in 1914 to 60.5 
million in 1915, and continued to increase during the war 
years. In 1915, America produced a record-breaking 
billion bushels of wheat. In 1916 and 1917, the wheat
47 Alberta C. Sparlin, The Trail Back (Published by 
Author, 1976), 140-141, quoted 140.
48 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4.
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Figure 4. Montana Wheat Prices Before World 
War I.49
crop was not as great, but the price of wheat in Chicago 
jumped from $1.06 in June 1916 to $3.40 in May 1917. 
(Montana's wheat prices went from $1.06 to $2.28 during 
the same time.) As a result, Montana's homesteaders made 
great leaps in income during the war years. In addition, 
the federal government encouraged homesteading and 
plowing up the Great Plains during World War I to help 
the war effort. In 1917, after the passage of the Food 
Control Act, the government made more public land 
available to homesteaders and Americans were urged to
49 Ibid.
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homestead and farm to increase world food supplies to 
help prevent famine.50 Consequently, the number of farms 
climbed with the price of wheat (see Figure 5) .51
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Figure 5. Montana Farms and Wheat Prices during the 
Economic Boom, 1910-1919.52
Agricultural economists expected food shortages in 
the United States as well as in Europe, and settlement 
and cultivation of the Great Plains seemed to be the 
solution. Secretary of Agriculture David Houston made a
50 Murray R. Benedict, Farm Policies of the United States 
1790-1950: A Study of their Origins and Development (New
York: The Twentieth Century Fund, 1953), 156-161.
51 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 3-5.
52 Ibid.
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patriotic plea to farmers in the annual "Report of the 
Secretary" in the Yearbook of Agriculture, 1917 to 
respond to the predicted emergency and to raise more 
crops.53 Farmers responded, increasing the acreage under 
cultivation to raise the necessary food.
Following the national trend, Montana cattle as well 
as wheat prices began climbing after the war started in 
Europe, and peaked in 1919 and 1920 (see Figure 6).
Before the war, average annual wheat prices in Montana 
remained below a dollar a bushel, but prices climbed 
during the war, and in 1919 and 1920 farmers received 
more than two dollars per bushel. In 1914, cattle 
averaged between $6 and $7 per hundredweight, but the 
price climbed to a pre-World War II high of over $12 per 
hundredweight in May 1919.54
During the 1910s, the agricultural economy in 
Montana boomed. Although farmers paid more for goods 
during the boom years, their purchasing power increased 
even faster as the price of wheat and cattle climbed. 
Montana farmers enjoyed significantly more purchasing
53 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of 
Agriculture, 1917 (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1918), 9-61.
54 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 93, 108.
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Figure 6. Montana Wheat and Cattle Prices, 
1900-1919.55
power between 1915 and 1919. Between 1900 and 1919, the 
price of wheat nearly quadrupled, while the Consumer 
Price Index slightly more than doubled (see Figure 7),56 
With bright prospects, they looked for ways to improve 
their lives and their livelihoods, often by borrowing 
money for equipment or land.
55 Ibid., 4-5, 48-49.
56 U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the Census, 
Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial 
Times to 1970, Part 1 (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1975), 192, 211.
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Figure 7. Index of Montana Wheat Prices and the 
Consumer Price Index, 1900-1919.57
As fanners prospered, so did others in the community 
— there was money to be made during the boom. Banks 
enjoyed profits from high-interest loans, often 10 
percent or more. Merchants benefited from the increased 
flow of money as people increased their consumption.
Those trading in wheat also made money. The Lewistown 
Democrat-News reported that Henry De Young "left 
[Lewistown] after accumulating quite a stake playing the 
wheat market. . . .  "50
57 Ibid.
58 Lewistown Democrat-News 24 March 1931.
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Even though agricultural prices were rising, it took 
capital to develop a homestead. Not all homesteaders had 
the capital, so many borrowed money during the boom 
years. Banks encouraged farmers and homesteaders to 
borrow as the government urged agricultural expansion.
As a result, many borrowed to improve or expand their 
homestead. After years of relative stagnation, 
agricultural prices climbed and many farmers assumed the 
trend would last.
Montana homesteaders had faith in the future.
Martin and Anna Stofer homesteaded on 320 acres just east 
of Roy in Fergus County, probably in late 1916, when he 
was in his early forties and she about a decade younger. 
In March 1917, the Farmers State Bank of Roy lent them 
$880, with a 10 percent interest rate on the loan if it 
passed the due date of 1 August 1917. The following 
year, the Stofers borrowed an additional $1246.11 from 
the First National Bank of Roy. They continued to borrow 
on their homestead into the 1920s. By the early 1920s, 
the couple had managed to accumulate "household 
furniture, farm machinery, horses, cattle, hogs, 
chickens, grain, and farm tools” and to improve their 
homestead with wells and reservoirs. Walter H. Gooch and 
his wife, Helen R. Gooch homesteaded in eastern Fergus
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County during the early years of the boom. The federal 
government granted a patent to Gooch in 1915 for 320 
acres of land. They built a large log cabin (16 by 48 
feet) and several outbuildings. In 1919, when they 
wanted capital to invest in their homestead, they went to 
the Montana Joint Stock Land Bank of Helena for a $2500 
loan.59 Fergus County homesteaders, like farmers across 
the Great Plains, believed the future looked bright and 
chose to borrow against that bright future.
The agricultural economy did look promising, not 
just to the boosters and those who homesteaded, but also 
to many who purchased mortgages as an investment.
Farmers arranged their mortgages through banks, but the 
mortgages were quickly sold to other investors — such as 
banks and insurance companies as well as individuals — 
usually from out of state. Central Montana had little 
capital, so the sale of mortgages to outsiders kept up 
the influx of outside capital. (Fergus County banks 
often found investors in Minnesota, which was easily 
linked to Montana by the Great Northern Railway.) The 
mortgage of Fergus County homesteaders Charles and Tillie 
Peterson was typical. They took out a mortgage on May 9,
59 Land Use Case Files, Box 8, LU-MT 38-22-155.
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1917; ten days later it was assigned to an individual 
investor in Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota. In 
1921, the University State Bank of Minneapolis purchased 
the mortgage, and in 1922 the Petersons paid off their 
mortgage.60
As the country was becoming more industrialized, 
Montana offered a final opportunity to homestead and 
farm, and opportunity to be one's own boss.
Consequently, more and more people moved to Montana to 
homestead, to gain economic independence earning a profit 
from their labor. As the agricultural economy improved 
during the 1910s, the earning power of the land 
increased, often at a higher rate than consumer goods.
The increased rainfall led to higher yields per acre, and 
the increased demand for agricultural goods forced 
agricultural prices up. Because their land brought in 
increasingly more income, farmers could borrow more money 
to improve their property. On the whole, the standard of 
living seemed to be improving for rural Montanans and the 
future looked bright.
60 Land Use Case Files, Box 16, LU-MT 38-22-284.
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Chapter 4 
Montana Farmers Go Bust
In June 1919, World War I officially came to an end 
with the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and, 
subsequently, the agricultural boom in America collapsed. 
It would be more than a half century before wheat prices 
matched those for the 1919 Montana wheat crop. An 
economic boom lasted through the 1920s for much of the 
country, but not for American farmers, who after the end 
of World War I faced declining markets, falling prices, 
and drought. During the 1910s, plowing up as much of the 
Great Plains as possible had seemed appropriate to 
further the war effort, and wheat production there did 
boost the American economy, but once European farmers 
returned to their fields after the war, demand for 
American agricultural products declined. The resulting 
contraction in agricultural prices continued through the 
1930.S. In Montana, the average price of wheat for the 
1919 crop was $2.34 per bushel; two years later it had 
dropped to less than a dollar per bushel.1 A drought on
1 Montana Agricultural Statistics Service, Montana 
Agricultural Statistics, State Series 1867-1991 (Helena: 
Montana Department of Agriculture, 1992), 4-6, hereafter 
cited as Montana Agricultural Statistics.
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the northern Great Plains during the 1920s and 1930s 
coincided with the end of the agricultural boom and 
further reduced agricultural income by reducing output. 
But because of the market contraction, agricultural 
prices did not rise as the drought worsened and 
production fell. The agricultural boom of the 1910s that 
had coaxed homesteaders West and encouraged the breaking 
of the sod on the northern plains was over.
Although the year 1919 marked the beginning of the 
end of the agricultural boom, drought had reduced the 
Great Plains wheat crop and world demand for wheat 
remained high, but the drought would last longer than the 
high demand for wheat. That year, Lewistown received 
just over eleven inches of rain; Havre, about 175 miles 
north of Lewistown, received less than nine inches. As a 
result, wheat farmers in Montana averaged only five 
bushels per acre, the lowest recorded yield for that 
state, while the annual average price of wheat reached a 
record $2.34 per bushel.2 Despite the problems, many 
homesteaders hung on and continued to farm, dependent now
2 Ibid.; United States Department of Agriculture Weather 
Bureau, Climatic Summary, 7/1- 11/19, hereafter cited as 
Weather Bureau, Climatic Summary; U.S. Department of 
Agriculture, Yearbook of Agriculture, 1923 (Washington,
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on outside help, such as loans. For example, in 1919, 
Walter and Helen Gooch mortgaged their 320 acre homestead 
in Fergus County and took out a loan for $2500.3 In 
early 1920, F. B. Linfield, the Director of the Montana 
Agricultural Extension Station, tried to be somewhat 
optimistic about the three years of drought and declining 
crop yields when he pointed out that the drought was an 
aberration in the forty years during which records had 
been kept.4
Wheat prices were an important determinant in the 
success of homesteaders, but many other factors affected 
agricultural prosperity, including rainfall, acreage 
planted, acreage harvested, yield per acre, and total 
bushels harvested. A comparison of wheat prices and 
yield shows that there was a negative relationship 
between those two factors (see Figure 8). From 1900 to 
1929, when the wheat yield (bushels per acre) was high, 
prices went down but when wheat yield was low, prices
D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1924), 1211-1222,
Table 37.
3 LUMT 38-22-155, Box 8, Land Use Case Files, 1934-1953, 
Records of the Bureau of Land Management, Montana, Record 
Group 4 9, National Archives, Rocky Mountain Region,
Denver, Colorado, hereafter cited as Land Use Case Files.
4 University of Montana Agricultural Extension Station, 
Twenty-Sixth Annual Report (Bozeman: University of
Montana Agricultural Experiment Station, 1920), 7-8.
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went up. The relationship between yield and price 
diminished somewhat after 1929, when prices dropped even 
when yield was low, and the entire country began to 
suffer economic problems.5
Wheat Prices Compared to Yield
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Figure 8. Wheat Prices Compared to Yield.6
While the price of wheat is an important element in 
assessing the Montana farm economy, other important data 
should be considered, such as yield per acre. A 
combination of those two factors showing the actual gross
5 Ibid. The years 1900 through 1945 were selected for 
convenience to show the economic trends from before the 
homestead boom through the end of the Great Depression.
6 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-5.
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income per acre of wheat provides a fuller picture of the 
economic situation Montana farmers and homesteaders faced 
(see Figure 9). For example, drought or insects might 
reduce the production per acre, but increased prices
Wheat Earning* Per Acre Harvested 
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Figure 9. Montana Wheat Earnings Per Acre 
Harvested (Yield Per Acre multiplied by the 
Price Per Bushel).7
Could negate the crop loss. Although many other factors 
helped determine the income of a farmer or homesteader, 
who may have raised other crops or livestock, wheat
7 Ibid. In order to provide a better picture of the 
income from wheat in Montana, I multiplied the yield per 
acre (in bushels) by the dollar price per bushel to come 
up with a figure showing the actual gross income per acre 
of wheat that was harvested.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
87
proved to be the most lucrative cash crop. During the 
mid 1910s, the earnings per acre of wheat hit new highs, 
reaching $28.46 in 1916. By 1931, the earnings per acre 
had plummeted to $3.30. During the 1920s and 1930s, 
problems surfaced because those high income years during 
the boom had established an unrealistic standard for 
farmers, bankers, and boosters. Because those high 
earning years coincided with the homestead boom in 
Montana, many of the homesteaders believed that the 
higher income was the norm.8
Wheat prices fluctuated according to a variety of 
factors which were generally out of the control of the 
average farmer. During the first few years after the 
passage of the Enlarged Homestead Act, 1910 through 1916, 
a farmer could anticipate reaping, on average, 22.4 
bushels per acre of wheat, and could average just under 
$20 per acre income on wheat acreage harvested. During 
those years, Lewistown averaged about two inches more 
precipitation than normal each year. Those were high 
yield years, although the price of wheat was not high.
But the following seven years (1917 through 1923) were 
not as good. Lewistown averaged below normal rainfall,
8 Ibid.
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and from 1917 to 1923, Montana wheat farmers harvested 
only 11.9 bushels per acre, about half the crop of the 
previous seven years, but the average price of wheat 
climbed to $1.52 per bushel, making the per acre dollar 
yield just over $18, about 90 percent of the dollar yield 
for the previous seven years. The difference in the 
average earnings per acre for those two time periods is 
not as significant, because of the relationship between 
wheat yields and price, but the price declines continued 
through the 1920s and the 1930s as yields per acre 
sagged.9
According to Montana Agricultural Experiment Station 
statistics from 1919 to 1934, on average, Fergus County 
raised more wheat than any other Montana county. The 
county yield for those years was 13.9 bushels per acre, 
only slightly higher than the state average of 12.6 
bushels per acre.10
9 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-5; Weather Bureau, 
Climatic Summary, 7/1- 11/19.
10 The Missouri River has always served as the northern 
boundary of Fergus County, although remaining boundary 
lines for Fergus County have changed several times as new 
counties were created. There have been no changes in the 
Fergus county boundary since 1924. Because of changes in 
the county size, any comparison of county crop statistics 
before 1924 with later years would be flawed, unless 
adjusted to take into account the land loss.
Nonetheless, the county statistics hint at the importance
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During the 1920s, despite the fluctuation in the 
agricultural economy and a growing unease, there was 
still an optimism among farmers and boosters reflected in 
newspaper articles. The Lewistown Democrat-News 
suggested that the ordinary farmer was doing well, and 
that those with poor judgment were the ones having a 
difficult time.11 Long-term averages of wheat earnings 
indicate that may have been true for the first three 
decades of the century, but consumer prices were not 
stagnant during the same period. The average earnings 
per acre of wheat varied from year to year, but averaged 
by decade the variation was not as great during the first 
three decades of the twentieth century as during the 
1930s. From 1900 through 1909, the earnings per acre of 
harvested wheat averaged $16.07. The following decade 
averaged $19.42, and during the 1920s it dropped to 
$15.51, a variation of less than a dollar from the first
of wheat to the Fergus County agricultural economy as 
well as the county's contribution to the state 
agricultural economy. E. A. Starch, Readjusting 
Montana's Agriculture, VII. Montana's Dry-Land 
Agriculture, Montana Agricultural Experiment Station 
Bulletin no. 318 (Bozeman: Montana Agricultural
Experiment Station, 1936), 8-9, hereafter cited as 
Starch, Readjusting Montana 's Agriculture, VII.
11 Lewistown Democrat-News 3 January 1925.
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decade to the third decade.12 What appeared to be 
relative stability actually was stagnation, because 
prices increased on the goods the farmer purchased. 
According to F. B. Linfield, prices on products farmers 
purchased in the early 1920s were between 75 percent and 
100 percent higher than the pre-war prices, and freight 
rates charged Montana farmers remained high compared to 
prewar rates. Even though both the price of wheat and 
the Consumer Price Index declined from their highs at the 
end of World War I, during the 1920s and 1930s, the price 
of wheat remained comparatively lower than the Consumer 
Price index in most years (see Figure 10). Furthermore, 
farmers faced the added expense of purchasing expensive 
new machinery, even though machinery improved yield and 
efficiency. The 1930s, however, were catastrophic for 
farmers in Montana as the average earnings per acre of 
wheat plunged to $3.30.13
12 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-5.
13 Although during many years farmers were able to 
harvest more than 90% of the wheat acreage they planted, 
some years were devastating. In 1919, only 52% of the 
acreage planted was harvested. Montana Agricultural 
Statistics, 4-5; University of Montana Agricultural 
Extension Station, Twenty-Eighth Annual Report (Bozeman; 
University of Montana Agricultural Experiment Station, 
1922), 8; U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of the 
Census, Historical Statistics of the United States, 
Colonial Times to 1970, Part 1 (Washington, D. C.:
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Figure 10. Index of Montana Wheat Prices and the
Consumer Price Index, 1900-1939.14
Environmental factors influenced the income of 
Montana farmers as well. Farmers rarely harvested all of 
the wheat they planted. Hail, drought, and insects 
caused crop loss. After 1915, statistics were kept on 
the acreage of wheat planted and the acreage of wheat 
harvested, so it is possible to come up with a percentage 
of acreage that made it to harvest (see Figure 11). From 
1916 through 1929, Montana farmers harvested 90 percent 
of the wheat acreage that was planted, but during the
Government Printing Office, 1975), 192, 211, hereafter 
cited as Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics.
14 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-5; Bureau of the 
Census, Historical Statistics, 192, 211.
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1930s, only 74 percent of the acreage was harvested. 
Agricultural income declined in the 1920s in comparison 
to the earlier boom years, but during the 1930s, 
agricultural income plummeted. In 1936, Montana wheat 
farmers harvested only 45 percent of the wheat acreage 
they planted, the lowest percent recorded. The 
widespread loss of wheat before harvest was compounded by 
dramatic decline in agricultural prices. Wheat averaged
Wheat Earnings Par Acre 












$10 Value Per Acre
30% 6




1900 1905 1910 1915 1920 1925 1930 1935 1940 1945
Year
Figure 11. Montana Wheat Earnings Per Acre 
Compared to Percent of Crop Harvested.15
only $.71 per bushel in the 1930s, and the average yield 
declined to less than ten bushels per acre, making the
15 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-5.
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earnings per acre about $6.60, one-third what fanners had 
received during the agricultural boom during the 1910s. 
Wheat prices dropped to a low of $.35 per bushel in 
1932.16
Despite the contraction in the agricultural economy
and several years of drought, boosters attempted to
reassure farmers and settlers — and to lure more
homesteaders west. The Lewistown Democrat-News reported
on the success of a few area farmers in January, 1925.
The price of wheat had risen slightly, so the boosters
had some reason to be optimistic, if only for the short
term. The newspaper reported:
From reports gathered from people who have an 
intimate knowledge of what the farmers in this 
section have been up against the past few years 
and what can be accomplished on the low priced 
and heavy yielding lands found in this section 
it is given as a conservative estimate that 
more than 95 per cent of the farmers who stayed 
on their farms and took care of their crops and 
used ordinary judgment in preparing the soil 
for planting are coming through the depressing 
times in splendid shape and are rapidly getting 
back onto their feet again.17
The Democrat-News suggested that the farmers who 
were having difficulties had failed to use prudent 
financial judgment. Giving specific examples of how area
16 Ibid.
17 Lewistown Democrat-News 3 January 1925.
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farmers handled their money, the newspaper painted a rosy 
financial picture, as if farmers would have no problems 
if they were more judicious with their spending. No 
names were given, so the veracity of the reports cannot 
be proven. In one example, the owner of a 240 acre 
parcel near Denton supposedly planted 110 acres of 
"grain," and with the income from its sale was able to 
pay interest of $973.82 on a $5,000 mortgage, $848.85 in 
taxes (including back taxes), and $264 on a seed lien. 
Those three payments totaled nearly $2,100. According to 
the article, the owner "wiped out all back indebtedness 
with nothing more to bother about regarding payments 
until tax season in 1925."18 If the farmer paid $973.82 
in interest, he had borrowed the money at twenty percent, 
a very high rate. Traditionally, farm loans required the 
annual payment of interest, with the principal due in a 
lump sum, but the practice was changing to include 
amortized loans, so perhaps that payment included 
principal and interest. According to production 
statistics, farmers averaged 16.1 bushels of wheat per
18 Ibid.
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acre in 1924, and in January 1925 the price of wheat had 
climbed to $1.57 per bushel. If that fanner had all of 
his 110 acres in wheat, brought in an average crop, and 
waited to sell until January, he may have earned about 
$2,780. In 1924, Montana wheat farmers harvested 98 
percent of the acreage they planted, so that most farmers 
were able to bring in a full crop. If he or she sold 
earlier than January or if part of the acreage was in 
another grain (wheat was the most lucrative dry land 
grain crop), the income would have been less. After 
paying the three major expenses mentioned in the 
newspaper article, that farmer would have had less than 
$700 to pay for other expenses such as supplies, fuel, 
machinery, food, and other necessities. The article 
related several other presumed examples of Fergus County 
farmers who got out from under debt and paid back taxes 
with their 1924 crop. While the article may have been 
meant to encourage (or shame) people into sticking with 
their homesteads, it was written after a good wheat 
harvest, when prices were moderately increasing. Those 
conditions did not last long, because wheat prices began 
falling again after 1925.19
19 Ibid.; Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-22, 93.
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Cattle prices may also help depict the financial 
situation of Fergus County farmers. Homesteaders 
cultivated their land, because they had to in order to 
win clear title to it, but many also grazed livestock. 
Some homesteaders, including the Frank Weygant family in 
Fergus County, made only a minimal effort to cultivate 
their homestead land, because they ultimately intended to 
become ranchers. Unfortunately for them, cattle prices 
generally followed the same broad trends as wheat, 
particularly after 1912 (see in Figure 12) .
In Montana, the average price per head for cattle 
and calves from 1900 through 1909 was $23.28. During the 
following decade, during the homestead boom, average 
cattle prices per head doubled to $46.49, but declined to 
$37.21 during the 1920s. Prices further declined during 
the 1930s, dropping to an average $30.93 per head.20
With the fluctuations in agricultural prices, 
farmers and ranchers had a difficult time planning for 
the long term. The agricultural boom during the war 
years had been intoxicating, but those who counted on 
continued high prices for their agricultural products 
suffered when the war ended. Those carrying a heavy debt
20 Ibid.
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Figure 12. A Comparison of Wheat and Cattle 
Prices from 1900 through 1945.21
load when either prices or production dropped could be 
forced out of business. Many farmers gradually took on 
more and more debt, only to find themselves unable to 
service that debt during the Great Depression. As the 
economy worsened, Montana farmers faced mounting 
financial difficulties. Tax delinquency, foreclosure, 
and bankruptcy loomed for many. In several Montana 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletins, agricultural 
economist Roland Renne discussed farm failures and 
warned: "Such tax delinquency and mortgage foreclosure
21 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-5, 48-49.
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is indeed just cause for alarm. Not only is it tragic 
for a great many individuals to lose their homes and life 
savings, but it causes general social instability by 
threatening the collapse of local governmental units and 
challenges the institutions of private property 
itself.”22
Other agricultural scientists expressed concern 
about the declining agricultural economy. In 1924, 
Milburn Lincoln (M. L.) Wilson, the head of agricultural 
economics at Montana State Agricultural College gave 
Henry C. Taylor of the USDA Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics a tour of Montana, where scores of wheat 
farmers were losing their farms.23 Unlike others working 
to shape agricultural policy, Wilson personally 
understood the plight of farmers and homesteaders. After 
earning his undergraduate degree in agriculture at Iowa 
State College, where he had befriended Henry A. Wallace,
22 Roland R. Renne, Readjusting Montana's Agriculture, 
VIII. Tax Delinquency and Mortgage Foreclosures, Montana 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin no. 319 
(Bozeman: Montana Agricultural Experiment Station,
1936), 3, hereafter cited as Renne, Readjusting Montana's 
Agriculture, VIII. Renne, an agricultural economist, 
wrote several land utilization articles and eventually 
became president of Montana State College.
23 Russell Lord, The Wallaces of Iowa (Boston: Houghton 
Mifflin Company, 1947), 295, hereafter cited as Lord, 
Wallaces of Iowa.
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Wilson headed west to farm. After tenant farming in
Nebraska, he homesteaded in Montana in 1909.24 Wilson
described the 1924 trip with Taylor:
We saw what was left of the old pioneer order, a 
pitiful remnant scratching at sections and half­
sections with inadequate equipment. All the eggs in 
one smashed basket, and that basket too small1 
Great blocks of land had passed into the hands of 
loan and insurance companies that did not know what 
to do with it. And on all sides we saw good farmers 
- young men, many of them lately married, with the 
beginnings of a family - caught, starved out on the 
lower sections of the ladder that leads to farm 
ownership, with no chance to climb.25
Montana farmers faced additional problems with taxes
during the 1920s and 1930s. As property values increased
during the boom years, so did the taxes that were based
on property assessments. But the flawed prosperity could
not sustain the boom or the high real estate prices.
Agricultural prices declined through the 1920s and 1930s,
and property values followed, but there was a lag between
the two. Consequently, many landowners had difficulty
paying their property taxes. The average tax per acre
for Montana farm land and buildings dropped somewhat
24 Merrill G. Burlingame and Edward J. Bell, Jr., The 
Montana Cooperative Extension Service: A History 1893-
1974 (Bozeman: Montana State University, 1984), 28-29,
65-92; William D. Rowley, M. L. Wilson and the Campaign 
for the Domestic Allotment (Lincoln: University of
Nebraska Press, 1970), 3, hereafter cited as Rowley,
M. L. Wilson.
25 Quoted in Lord, in Wallaces of Iowa, 295.
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during the 1920s, but farmers still paid 51 percent more 
per acre in taxes in 1933 than 1913. The value of the 
wheat, however, was not higher. In 1913 it was $.65 per 
bushel, but only $.62 in 1933.26
A comparison of data from a 1934 study of Montana 
farm taxes and the Consumer Price Index indicates that 
both similarly increased between 1913 and 1922 but both 
slightly decreased between 1922 and 1933. Although 
earnings per acre of wheat climbed dramatically during 
the mid-1910s, they were slightly lower in 1922 than in 
1933, and declined dramatically between 1922 and 1922. 
Farm taxes did not reflect that dramatic decline in 
income (see Figure 13) ,27
As more homesteaders moved to Fergus County during 
the boom years, more services such as schools and roads 
were required to serve them. Their taxes should have 
paid for the needed infrastructure, but when homesteaders 
abandoned their land or when farmers could no longer pay 
taxes, the county still had to provide schools and roads
26 Roland R. Renne, Montana Farm Taxes, Montana 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin no. 286 
(Bozeman: Montana Agricultural Experiment Station,
1934), 3-4, hereafter cited as Renne, Montana Farm Taxes.
27 Ibid., 3-10; Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-5; 
Bureau of the Census, Historical Statistics, 192, 211.
The tax rates for Fergus County are not
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in areas of declining population. The burden of taxes 
rested heavily on farmers, despite the fact that their 
land had lost value as agricultural prices dropped. In 
1933, Fergus County remained heavily in debt and was 
among the four most indebted counties in Montana.28
Index of Consumer Price Index, Farm Taxes and Earnings Per 
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Figure 13. Index of Consumer Price Index, Farm 
Taxes and Earnings Per Acre of Wheat in Montana, 
1913, 1922, 193329
28 Renne, Montana Farm Taxes; Roland R. Renne,
Montana County Organization, Services, and Costs, 
Montana Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin 
no. 298 (Bozeman: Montana Agricultural Experiment
Station, 1935).
29 Renne, Montana Farm Taxes, 3-10; Montana Agricultural 
Statistics, 4-5; Bureau of the Census, Historical 
Statistics, 192, 211.
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Many landowners had difficulty paying taxes on their 
land during the 1920s and 1930s and some lost their land 
as a result. As their incomes declined, county 
governments suffered as well. The number of counties in 
Montana rose sharply during the homestead boom, creating 
more county governments and increasing the tax burden.
In addition, the increasing population had demanded 
better governmental services, so during those years of 
growth counties accumulated debt which had to be paid off 
during the leaner years that followed. By the mid-1930s, 
Montana counties received about 85 percent of their 
income from property taxes, and most of that from 
property taxes on farms.30
As farm incomes declined the tax delinquency problem 
became widespread. In 1920, the Lewistown Democrat-News 
published a list of Fergus County residents who had 
failed to pay their property and personal taxes the 
previous year. The list went on for ten pages. Nearly 
2500 landowners were delinquent in paying their real 
estate taxes, and about a thousand were delinquent in 
paying personal property taxes.31 Taxes were a problem
30 Ibid.
31 Lewistown Democrat-News 5 January 1920,
27 December 1920.
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for other Montanans as well. In July 1930, agricultural 
prices dropped again — the price of wheat was down to 
$.64 per bushel, but across Montana, taxes were 
increasing. So as farmers faced a continuing loss of 
income, their taxes increased. Forty of the fifty-six 
counties in Montana in 1930 increased or maintained their 
taxes, while only sixteen reduced their taxes.32
By 1934, 40 percent of the agricultural land on tax 
rolls in Montana was tax delinquent. Twenty-five percent 
had had no taxes paid for three years or more, and 10 
percent had been delinquent for more than five years. 
Montana counties eventually seized the tax delinquent 
land, and as a result, from 1925 through 1934, Montana 
counties increased their land holdings by nearly 5000 
percent.33 In Fergus County, the percent of tax 
delinquent agricultural land was nearly 55 percent, 
higher than the state average.34
Many homesteaders had difficulty paying their taxes. 
In 1917, Ralph and Ida Tait homesteaded on the 320 acres 
allowed by the Enlarged Homestead Act, although their
32 Lewistown Democrat-News 8 July 1930.
33 Renne, Readjusting Montana's Agriculture, VIII, 3-11.
34 H. G. Bolster, Planning an Agricultural Program for 
Fergus County (Bozeman: Montana Extension Service,
1936), 43.
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acreage was in two parcels that included parts of three 
sections. They borrowed $400 in 1922 from the First 
National Bank of Grass Range and were able to satisfy 
that loan two years later, but they began paying their 
property taxes late. By 1930, the Taits were unable to 
pay all of their property taxes. In 1937, the 120 acre 
tract was valued at $160, but a year later the United 
States Department of Agriculture Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics Division of Land Acquisition appraised the 
property at only $90 {$.15 per acre), about 60 percent of 
the previous assessment. The Taits had tried to make a 
living from the property, but the land was unsuitable for 
cultivation and eroded easily. By the late 1930s, 
saddled with poor land and tax debt, there seemed to be 
no solution to their problems.35
Others had similar problems paying taxes. George 
Martin homesteaded 160 acres near Armells Creek in Fergus 
County during the homestead boom, but a quarter of a 
century later his land was unproductive. After Martin 
developed health problems, in 1919 he and his wife rented
35 Land Use Case Files, Box 12, LUMT 38-22-223, LUMT 38- 
22-224; Fergus County Clerk of Court, Deed Record 64:223; 
Claire 0. Clark, Soil Survey of Fergus Countyr Montana, 
United States Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation 
Service (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1988).
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out their homestead and moved to Washington state for a 
year. When they returned, their homestead was in 
disrepair, so they moved to his wife's parents' ranch, 
but continued to rent out their land. They held onto 
their homestead but had difficulty paying the taxes after 
1935, even though they leased the land out for grazing. 
Most of the land was on a slope and was not suitable for 
cultivation, but sixty acres could have been cultivated. 
The homestead had an old frame two-room house of only 336 
square feet (14 x 24 feet), probably the original the 
Martins built to satisfy homestead requirements, as well 
as an old shed, a garage, less than two miles of fences, 
and a twenty foot well. The Martin homestead, like many 
in Fergus County, was too small to be a ranch but did not 
have enough arable land to support a family.36
In order to analyze the economic problems facing 
Montana farmers, agricultural economists developed an 
index to compare economic factors from year to year. On 
one particular index, the years 1924 to 1926 were 
considered the base, and assigned 100 points. By 1928, 
the index had climbed to 130, demonstrating that the
36 Land Use Case Files, Box 20, LU-MT-38-22-358; Babbie 
Deal and Loretta McDonald, eds.. The Heritage Book of 
Central Montana (Lewistown: 1976 Fergus County
Bicentennial Heritage Committee, 1980), 216-218, 235-236.
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economic position of Montana farmers had improved, but by 
1932, the index had dropped to 24.2, illustrating how far 
farm income and purchasing power had declined. During 
the same four years (1928-1932), farm taxes dropped from 
an index of 102 to 91. Although farm income declined 
dramatically in the 1930s, tax liability declined only 
slightly.37
Indices demonstrate dramatic increases in taxes over 
the years, although a simple comparison of the actual 
amount of tax per acre of farm land diminishes the 
significance of those increases. In 1913, Montana 
farmers earned an average of $14.95 per acre of wheat, 
but paid just under $.08 per acre in taxes. In 1922, the 
earnings per acre of wheat were $13.88, but taxes 
averaged $.14 per acre. By 1933, drought had reduced 
wheat production. The earnings per acre had dropped to 
$4.71; farm taxes were about $.11 per acre. Although 
these figures suggest that, on average, Montana farmers 
could have paid their taxes out of their wheat profits in 
1913 and 1922, but these figures do not reflect the debt 
load that many farmers carried. Many probably paid their 
mortgages before their taxes, because foreclosure
37 Starch, Readjusting Montana's Agriculture, VII.,
11-15.
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proceedings could take place within months, but it was 
usually several years before counties began the tax sale 
process. Farmers simply delayed paying taxes so they 
could pay other bills. Furthermore, few farmers had all 
of their land in the profitable cash crop wheat, so a 
farmer with 320 acres probably did not make those profits 
on every acre owned.38 By 1933, Montana farmers were in 
financial straits and clearly had problems paying the 
taxes on their land, however small they seemed.
Montana Agricultural Experiment Station researchers 
and other agricultural economists believed that the tax 
delinquency problem was caused by drought, depression, 
and "land use maladjustment," although the reasons for 
failure to pay taxes included "carelessness, 
indifference, improvidence, or misfortune." Agricultural 
economists argued that wise land use and adequately sized 
land holdings would reduce farm failure, but careful tax 
assessment also would be necessary.39
By the 1920s and 1930s, many agricultural economists 
recognized what John Wesley Powell had half a century
38 Renne, Montana Farm Taxes, 3-10; Montana Agricultural 
Statistics, 4-5; Bureau of the Census, Historical 
Statistics, 192, 211.
39 Starch, Readjusting Montana's Agriculture, VII.,
11-15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
108
before: that it took more land than 320 acres to 
successfully farm and ranch in the arid West. In a study 
of tax delinquent land holdings in Montana, farms of less 
than 260 acres were significantly more likely to become 
tax delinquent, while farms with more than 500 acres were 
significantly less likely to fail to pay their taxes.
But there were other factors that influenced tax 
delinquency. Absentee owners (in this study those who 
resided out of state), were more likely not to pay their 
taxes and were generally less interested in the long term 
wise use of the land as well.40 Fergus County residents 
owned the largest percent of the county (nearly 38 
percent), but individuals from out of state owned 18 
percent of the county. The federal, state, and county 
governments together owned about 30 percent, and banks, 
insurance companies, and other corporations owned about 
15 percent of the county.41
40 Ibid., 11-15. Leslie Hewes researched farm ownership 
patterns for his book The Suitcase Farming Frontier: A
Study in the Historical Geography of the Central Great 
Plains (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973) .
He similarly found that resident farmers showed more 
regard for the land, although nonresident farmers usually 
introduced farming innovations.
41 Roland R. Renne, Montana Land Ownership: An Analysis
of the Ownership Pattern and Its Significance in land Use 
Planning, Montana Agricultural Experiment Station 
Bulletin no. 322 (Bozeman: Montana Agricultural
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Tax delinquency was just one fiscal problem Montana 
farmers faced during the 1920s and 1930s. For many 
penniless farmers, if the county did not acquire the 
land, other creditors would. Many Montana farmers faced 
bankruptcy and foreclosure as well as tax delinquency. 
During the boom years, farmers borrowed heavily, counting 
on a rosy economic future. Instead of just borrowing on 
the value of their land by taking out a mortgage, some 
farmers borrowed money using their personal property, 
such as vehicles, equipment, or personal possessions of 
value, as collateral. Tenant farmers, for example, had 
no land to borrow against, so they used personal property 
as collateral. In addition, many farmers purchased goods 
on credit. When indebted farmers could not pay their 
loans and bills, many had to declare bankruptcy. 
Agricultural economist Roland Renne recognized the 
problem and wrote that credit had benefited farmers, 
helping them upgrade equipment, and survive economic 
downturns, but that "it has also been a great burden to 
many through its excessive use; and in the case of a
Experiment Station, 1936), 56, Table 1, hereafter cited 
as Renne, Montana Land Ownership.
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surprisingly large number of Montana farmers, it has 
proved their complete undoing."42
Because of the loss of personal property and the 
admission of failure, bankruptcies represented "the worst 
and most hopeless condition that can occur in loan 
experience," even more so than foreclosure. It is not 
clear if Montana farmers took advantage of the exemptions 
allowed by law, but in Montana during the 1930s, unless 
foreclosed upon, a farmer could exempt a homestead of 320 
acres or less, some farming equipment, and some personal 
goods from bankruptcy claims.43
Between 1898 and 1937, about 3,900 Montana farmers 
declared bankruptcy, but nearly two-thirds of those 
bankruptcies were between 1922 and 1926. In some Montana 
counties, 25 percent of the farmers had to declare 
bankruptcy, the highest rate in the country. Not 
surprisingly, bankrupt farmers tended to have a high 
mortgage liability, often higher than the long term 
productivity estimates on the land, and were likely to be 
dry land farmers. But it was not just farm owners who
42 R. R. Renne, Montana Farm Bankruptcies, Montana 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin no. 360 
(Bozeman: Montana Agricultural Experiment Station,
1938), 7.
43 Ibid., 10-11.
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went bankrupt; tenant farmers went bankrupt at more than 
twice the rate of farm owners since they had no landed 
assets to borrow against. Agricultural economists in the 
1930s noted that the bankrupt farms were "too small, in 
most cases, to constitute an economical operating unit." 
According to agricultural economists, government 
intervention in the economy slowed the farm bankruptcy 
rate by 1930, but the farmers with the worst financial 
problems may have been forced out during the peak 
bankruptcy years (1922-1926) .44
As the agricultural economy sagged, many farmers 
could not pay their mortgages and faced foreclosure. A 
study of Montana farm foreclosures from 1870 to 1938 
showed that the heaviest period of foreclosures was from 
1921 through 1925, when nearly two-thirds of the 34,000
foreclosures occurred. Eighty percent of those 34,000
foreclosures took place during the 1920s. Fergus County
did not have the highest rate of farm foreclosure in the
state, but from 1921 through 1935, banks foreclosed upon 
more than 40 percent of the mortgages in Fergus County.45
44 Ibid., 3.
45 R. R. Renne, Montana Farm Foreclosures, Montana 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin no. 368 
(Bozeman: Montana Agricultural Experiment Station,
1939), 3-19.
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Foreclosures moved land into the hands of banks and 
insurance companies, which then attempted to recover 
their investment, either by sale or lease. But the land 
was difficult to sell during the 1920s and 1930s. Some 
farmers ended up working as tenants on the land they had 
once owned. As the number of foreclosures increased, the 
land holdings of the banks and insurance companies 
increased. The Federal Land Bank of Spokane in Montana 
increased its land holdings by more than 500 percent from 
1925 through 1934. By the mid-1930s, banks, insurance 
companies, and other corporations owned about 15 percent 
of Fergus County. Because individual investors, many 
from out of state, also purchased mortgages during the 
homestead boom, foreclosure proceedings often transferred 
land ownership to nonresidents.46
Not surprisingly, agricultural economists found that 
farm and ranch foreclosures were related with the quality 
of the land. In a study of farm foreclosures from 1878 
to 1938, Montana Agricultural Experiment Station 
researchers found that land that had higher wheat yields 
was significantly less likely to have been foreclosed 
upon than acreage that had lower wheat yields. Wheat
46 Renne, Readjusting Montana's Agriculture, VIII., 3; 
Renne, Montana Land Ownership, 56, Table 1.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
113
acreage that yielded 20 bushels per acre represented only 
8 percent of the foreclosures, while land that yielded 
less than 5 bushels per acre represented 61 percent of 
the foreclosures. During good years, acreage was often 
over-appraised as assessors ignored the long term 
production capability of the land.47
Farmers who lost their land to foreclosure or tax 
sale lost their livelihood and had to find some new way 
to earn a living. Some became tenants on their former 
property. Many looked for other work in the vicinity. A 
few packed up and left Montana. Mr. and Mrs. A. C. 
Doehrel bought land in Fergus County by assuming a prior 
mortgage, but by the early 1930s, they had difficulty 
paying the mortgage and the taxes on the land. By the 
time the Denver Joint Land Bank foreclosed upon the 
mortgage in 1935, the Doehrels had already moved to the 
Seattle, Washington region in search of work.48
Debt service caused problems for many Montana 
farmers, as demonstrated by the Clarys. Like many 
farmers, they borrowed money to pay off earlier
47 Phil S. Eckert and Orlo H. Maughan, Farm. Mortgage Loan 
Experience in Central Montana, Montana Agricultural 
Experiment Station Bulletin no. 372 (Bozeman: Montana 
Agricultural Experiment Station, 1939), 2.
48 Land Use Case Files, Box 2, LUMT 38-22-45.
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mortgages, ratcheting themselves into greater and greater 
debt. Chester R. Clary and his wife, Ida L. Clary 
homesteaded on some land in northern Fergus County about 
1915; four years later Chester Clary received a patent on 
the 240 acres. In June 1915, Rogers-Templeton Lumber 
Company furnished the couple with $58.40 worth of "lumber 
and material" to build fence on their property. The 
Clarys were unable to pay the bill immediately, so the 
lumber company filed a lien on their land. Agricultural 
prices were fairly stable during the early 1910s, and the 
Clarys were able to satisfy the lien in December 1915, 
but the Clarys sought financial assistance the following 
year. In October 1916, the Farmers State Bank of 
Winifred lent the couple $600, which was due a year 
later. Within three months, the Clarys had satisfied the 
mortgage. The average price for wheat for those three 
months was over $1.50 per bushel; cattle prices were over 
$61.60 per head. The Clarys were doing well. In March 
of 1918, the Clarys went back to Winifred, this time to 
the First State Bank of Winifred, to get another loan.
The $1600 mortgage, plus 10 percent interest, was due in 
October of the same year. Wheat was up even higher, 
averaging $1.96 per bushel for the year; cattle prices 
were up to $9.88 per hundredweight. The agricultural
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economy was booming. The Clarys satisfied that mortgage 
on 18 November 1918, a week after the armistice was 
signed by Germany, seven weeks after taking out yet 
another mortgage. They essentially borrowed money to pay 
off an earlier mortgage. The Clary's third mortgage, 
from the Vermont Loan and Trust Company, was for $3000, 
and was due five years later on 1 October 1923. Vermont 
Loan and Trust Company offered a lower interest rate of 6 
percent. Interest coupons were due annually, and the 
$3000 was due in a lump sum on 1 October 1923. This term 
loan was typical of the loans made to farmers by banks 
other than federally supported land banks.49
Also typical was the almost immediate assignment of 
the mortgage to another institution or individual 
investor. On 26 November 1918, Vermont Loan and Trust 
Company sold the mortgage to the Bellows Falls Savings 
Institution of Bellows Falls and Brattleboro, Vermont.50 
It took a lot of capital to fund farming and settlement, 
so banks in farming regions and recently settled areas 
had to look elsewhere for sources of capital. As a 
result, many Montana farm mortgages were sold to other
49 Ibid., Box 29, LUMT 38-22-507; Montana Agricultural 
Statistics, 93, 108.
50 Land Use Case Files, Box 29, LUMT 38-22-507.
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commercial banks, life insurance companies, and private 
investors out of state.51
In October 1921, the price of wheat had dropped to 
$.96 per bushel, down from the May 1920 average of $2.99 
per bushel. Cattle prices had dropped to $4.80 per 
hundredweight from a May 1919 high average of $12.20. As 
a result, the Clary's income dropped dramatically. They 
went back to the Vermont Loan and Trust Company for a 
fourth mortgage of $835.60, due on the first of October 
the following year. The Clarys continued to have 
financial difficulties as prices remained comparatively 
low. Stephens & Son filed a lien on part of Clary's 
property on 14 September 1922. Wheat prices had dropped 
to $.83 per bushel and Clary had been unable to pay 
Stephens & Son's the bill for threshing his grain, but he 
did manage to pay it in November, satisfying the lien.52
The Clarys were unable to pay off their $835.60 
mortgage (plus interest) by October 1922. In January 
1923, they paid $765.87 on the loan, and so fell short by
51 Nils Olsen et al., "Farm Credit, Farm Insurance, and 
Farm Taxation," U.S. Department of Agriculture, Yearbook 
of Agriculture, 1924 (Washington, D. C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1925), 192-198, hereafter cited as Olsen 
et al, "Farm Credit."
52 Land Use Case Files, Box 29, LUMT 38-22-507; Montana 
Agricultural Statistics, 93, 108.
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$94.08. Furthermore, they were able to pay only $46.38 
toward the $180 interest due 1 January 1923 on their 
$3000 loan. The Clarys were unable to pay even the 
interest on the debt that had seemed so easy to repay 
when they took it on five years previously.53
The banking institutions did maintain their claim to 
the property. Vermont Loan and Trust Company began 
foreclosure proceedings in March 1923 with a Notice of 
Lis Pendens.54 A summons was given to Ida Clary, but her 
husband, Chester Clary could not be found. He later 
turned up in Vigo County (Terre Haute), Indiana and was 
served a summons. Eventually, the bank gained title to 
the property. In order to do something with the Clary's 
240 acres and begin recouping some of their loss, Vermont 
Loan and Trust Company leased the land for six months to 
Blake Dawson in June 1923. Dawson must have given up the 
lease early, because the company leased it to Elmer 
Johnson in September 1923, for a period of three years.55
53 Ibid.
54 The process of foreclosure began with a notice of the 
pending foreclosure, called a Lis Pendens. The county 
sheriff then confiscated the land from the delinquent 
owners, and "sold" the land to the claimants for the 
amount owed. The land, then, was essentially transferred 
to the claimant and the debt erased by the acquisition by 
the party that held the mortgage.
55 Land Use Case Files, Box 29, LUMT 38-22-507.
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In 1936, realizing that they could recover no more of 
their investment, and that the Bellows Falls Savings 
Institution had more of a claim to the property, the 
Vermont Loan and Trust Company issued a quitclaim deed to 
Bellows Falls Savings Institution.56 The latter 
institution, realizing that the Clarys had fled the 
county more than a decade earlier, released Chester and 
Ida Clary from the mortgage and established their claim 
to the property. That year, no one paid the taxes on the 
property.57
The Clarys were not unlike many other homesteaders 
who became so buried in debt that they could not regain 
control of their finances. But many factors were out of 
their control. During the boom years, borrowing money to 
improve the farm did not seem unwise. But as the 
agricultural economy declined, farmers could not pay 
their loans. In addition, it took time for farm 
assessments to shrink, although it may be argued that 
taxes never completely followed the decline in income.
The Clarys had based their financial decisions on a 
flawed economic boom. The subsequent collapse of the
56 A quitclaim is a legal renunciation of any claim of 
land ownership.
57 Land Use Case Files, Box 29, LUMT 38-22-507.
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agricultural economy caught the Clarys and thousands of 
other farmers off guard.
Another Fergus County homestead family that chose to 
borrow when times were good ultimately had to skip town. 
The Gibson family, neighbors of the Weygants, also found 
credit easy to get during the boom years. They built a 
four-room house and a garage (an unusual amenity on a 
homestead), then bought a car to put in the garage. They 
lived well for a few years during the boom, but as prices 
began declining they faced difficulties in paying their 
loans. Instead of going through foreclosure and 
bankruptcy proceedings, they abandoned their homestead 
one night, telling no one where they were going.58 Many 
Montana farmers felt equally helpless, unable to regain 
any financial footing; abandonment was one option. It 
left banks and other creditors, such as county 
governments to sort out ownership.
Flight from fiscal responsibility was not uncommon 
as the agricultural economy declined. Banks suffered 
significant losses as homesteaders went bust and 
abandoned their homesteads as well as their debts. John 
Sears, with his wife Jean Sears, homesteaded on about 327 
acres near the head of Coulee Creek in northern Fergus
58 Noemi Weygant, Rimrock Land: Our Homestead Site
(Duluth, Minnesota: Priory Press, 1978), 119, 163, 
191-196.
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County, tte received his patent in the summer of 1918, 
and purchased an additional 23 acres. In early 1918, he 
and his wife took out a $2500 mortgage from the First 
National Bank of Winifred and were able to pay it off 
only four months later, but within a month the Sears 
borrowed $2100 from the Federal Land Bank of Spokane.
The following year the average earnings per acre of wheat 
in Montana had dropped more than 50 percent to $11.70.
The Sears did not stay on the land long, even though 
their mortgage was a 5*2 percent interest loan amortized 
over more than thirty years. They deeded their land over 
to Abraham and Dora Row in exchange for the assumption of 
the mortgage in 1919. The Rows quickly escalated their 
debt by borrowing an additional $1,043.65 at 10% interest 
from the partnership of T. W. Reeves and L. W. Day. 
Apparently that was not enough cash to get by on, because 
less than three weeks later the Rows went to the First 
National Bank of Winifred and borrowed an additional 
$345, also at 10% interest. By the end of October 1919, 
the-Rows owed about $3,400, not counting interest, to 
three different companies. They managed to pay back the 
First National Bank of Winifred loan in January 1921, 
about nine months late, but they failed to pay the Reeves
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and Day partnership, which acquired the land in 1921 
during foreclosure proceedings- The Federal Land Bank of 
Spokane had a claim to the land as well, and began 
proceedings in 1926 to get their money back, about 
$2,950. By that time, all of the parties involved were 
scattered. John and Jean Sears had picked up and moved 
to Ojuela, Durango, a town in north central Mexico. 
Abraham and Dora Row had moved to California, as had L.
W. Day. The Federal Land Bank of Spokane became the 
owners of the 350 acres of submarginal land, not worth 
the more than eight dollars per acre that bank had 
invested in it.59
Abandonment was often the homesteader's last option. 
As the editors of the Lewis town Democrat-News pointed 
out, "Most people of normal instincts become attached to 
the locality which they have long inhabited. . . .  We 
have seen people cling to their precarious existence upon 
a scrub oak farm with a tumble-down shack where nothing 
but privation has ever been served to supply their 
material needs. . . .  During those booming years from 
1905-1915, thousands of these homes, now unoccupied, were 
built in this state."60
59 Land Use Case Files, Box 17, LUMT-38-31-536.
60 Lewistown Democrat-News 30 November 1931.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
Debt (or its lack) often determined the success or 
failure of many Great Plains farmers during the 1920s and 
1930s. In at least one farming community on the northern 
Great Plains, the Great Depression had little impact.
The town of Northwood, North Dakota, and much of 
surrounding Grand Forks County prospered during the Great 
Depression in part due to luck (rain at the right time, 
but not over a wide area) and careful financial 
management (the farms there carried little or no debt). 
The farmers who borrowed during the agricultural boom 
years believed the prosperity would last, but many faced 
financial ruin during the 1920s and 1930s as they 
struggled to repay their debts. In Grand Forks County 
"Norwegian frugality" had prevented the accumulation of 
debt.61
Unlike the Grand Forks County experience, many 
Fergus County farmers suffered financially during the 
1920s and 1930s, even with no debt service. In 1915, Mr. 
and Mrs. Frank Weygant, homesteaders in the northwestern 
part of the county, argued vehemently with each other 
over whether to borrow money. The argument made a clear 
impact on their daughter, who wrote about it more than 
sixty years later. Mrs. Weygant, who chose to stay on
61 Gordon Morris Bakken, Surviving the North Dakota 
Depression (Published by author, 1992), vii-xiv, 45.
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the homestead and worked to make it profitable, opposed 
going into debt, while her husband, who worked and lived 
in the town of Denton as a pharmacist, wanted to borrow 
the capital to invest in the homestead. The Great War 
had already started in Europe, and people believed that 
there was money to be made in Montana agriculture. Mrs. 
Weygant apparently won out, but years later, drought and 
low prices forced the family to abandon the homestead.62
Others who remained debt-free had problems. Grover 
McCandless homesteaded on 320 acres of land in eastern 
Fergus County, receiving his patent on the land in August 
1919. McCandless and his wife never mortgaged the land, 
but by the late 1930s, they had given up on eking out a 
living on their homestead and had moved to Lewistown. 
Although it was a lower grade of land suitable only for 
grazing and valued at only a dollar per acre, the 
McCandless parcel had the advantage of access to flowing 
water, including a couple of springs and creeks. The 
McCandlesses had not used their money on improving their 
living conditions as the Gibson family had done. The 
property had a simple one-room frame house, although it 
did have lap siding, a stone foundation, and paper on the 
walls. Though the McCandlesses proved to be frugal
62 Weygant, Rimrock Land, 110-111, 207-211.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
124
homesteaders who shunned debt and had the advantage of 
water on their property, even they were unable to make a 
living on their homestead.63
The plight of Montana farmers like the Clarys and 
the McCandlesses was not unusual during the 1920s and 
1930s; financial problems forced farmers out of business, 
and had been for some time. In 1920, the number of farms 
in Montana peaked at 57,700 and declined thereafter. 
Landholders lost their land and their livelihood. Banks 
lost the principal and much of the interest owed to them, 
and gained in return property that had lost much of its 
value. In the 1910s, the federal government recognized 
that there were problems in the financing of agricultural 
debt and had tried to address some of these problems with 
the creation of Federal Land Banks.64 Had farm prices 
stayed at the levels they were when the Clarys took out 
their mortgages, they might have been able to service 
their debt. Or if the Clarys had taken advantage of a 
revised farm credit system before they got mired in debt, 
they might have survived the downturn in the agricultural 
economy.
Before the turn of the century, the Farmers'
Alliance and the Populist Party recognized the credit
63 Land Use Case Files, Box 14, LUMT 38-22-253.
64 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 3.
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plight of the farmer and lobbied for changes. It took a 
substantial amount of capital to buy land, equipment, 
seed, and livestock, and to survive the first year before 
any harvest could bring in an income. During the 
Progressive Era, some changes were made to alleviate the 
financial problems of farmers. Before legislation in 
1913 changed the regulations, national banks could not 
lend money for farm mortgages, limiting the amount of 
capital available to farmers. State banks did not have 
the capital needed to meet the demand for farm loans, so 
banks and mortgage brokers often sold mortgages out of 
state, for example to insurance companies or individuals. 
Local banks often granted short-term loans for the 
purchase of equipment and materials, but the long-term 
mortgages were sold quickly to maintain capital. It cost 
money for mortgages to change hands, and ultimately, the 
farmer had to pay for it with higher interest rates.55
In 1917, Congress established the Federal Land Bank 
system to provide a cooperative credit system for 
farmers. To address the high cost of borrowing and to 
make more money available to farmers, Congress passed the 
Federal Farm Loan Act of 1916, which established the
65 Ibid.; Mary Wilma M. Hargreaves, Dry Farming- in the 
Northern Great Plains, 1900-1925 (Cambridge: Harvard
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Federal Land Bank system and the private Joint Stock Land 
Banks. Federal Land Bank loans could be used for a 
limited number of purposes connected to agriculture, 
including the purchase of equipment, fertilizer, 
livestock, farm improvements, living expenses, land for 
agriculture, and the payment of taxes and other loans.66 
The Federal Farm Loan Board supervised both kinds of 
banks, although there were distinct differences between 
the two.67
The federal government divided the country into 
twelve districts and set up a Federal Land Bank in each 
district. Montana, Idaho, Washington, and Oregon shared 
a Federal Land Bank, located in Spokane, Washington 
(District 12). Each Federal Land Bank was lent $750,000 
by the federal government, but that loan was retired 
through the gradual purchase of shares by borrowers 
through their local branch of a national farm loan 
association. Every borrower was required to spend 5 
percent of the amount of their loan on Federal Land Bank 
stock. Essentially, the Federal Land Banks were a
University Press, 1957), 521, 528-531, hereafter cited as 
Hargreaves, Dry Farming-, 1900-1925.
66 Farm Credit Administration, The Federal Land Band 
System: How it Operates (Washington, D. C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1955), 1.
67 Olsen et al., "Farm Credit," 198-199.
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cooperative venture, although initially funded and 
regulated by the federal government.68
The land banks were conservative in their lending 
practices. Federal Land Banks, through local national 
farm loan associations, could lend money only to farmers, 
whose land served as collateral. A borrower could only 
borrow up to 50 percent of the appraised value of the 
land and 20 percent of the appraised value of the 
permanent improvements, not to exceed $100 per acre. The 
loans benefited farmers because of their lower interest 
rates, long loan periods, and amortization. Interest was 
set at 6 percent, the period of the loans varied from 
five to forty years, and every loan was amortized so that 
the principal was gradually paid off.69
Farms had to be appraised before a Federal land bank 
loan could be granted. The appraisal price was not 
simply based on the market value of the land, but on its 
earning power as well. This was to correct for the 
problem of inflated or deflated land prices in any one 
year, and to provide a more accurate picture of the 
ability of the farmer to repay the loan. In order to 
take into account farm prices, the Farm Credit 
Administration used price averages for the years 1909 to
68 Ibid., 198-201
69 Ibid., 200-201.
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1914 to determine the earning power of the land.70 The 
average earnings per acre of wheat during this period was 
$18.19, more than three dollars higher than the average 
from 1900 through 194 5.71
Also regulated by the Federal Farm Loan Board, Joint 
Stock Land Banks were privately owned and managed. Joint 
Stock Land Banks could make loans only to farmers and 
land owners, and no stock purchase was required. The 
loans were made directly, not through any local 
association.72
One of the ways the Federal Land Bank system helped 
farmers was to offer them an amortized schedule of 
repayment, so that some of the principal was paid back 
with each interest payment, reducing the amount of 
interest paid.73 Although many farm loans were still 
secured through commercial banks, the competition of 
Federal Land Banks helped bring about lower fees and 
interest rates, and amortization became more common.74
70 Farm Credit Administration, Appraising Farms for 
Mortgage Loans, Circular 13 (Washington, D. C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1935), 4-5.
71 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-5.
72 Olsen et al., "Farm Credit," 204-208.
73 Farm Credit Administration, The Federal Land Band 
System: How it Operates (Washington, D. C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1955), 13.
74 Hargreaves, Dry Farming, 1900-1925, 521, 528-531; 
Olsen et al., "Farm Credit," 198-208; Farm Credit 
Administration, The Federal Land Band System: How it
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Despite the efforts of the federal government, Federal 
Land Banks and Joint Stock Land Banks lagged behind other 
lending sources, such as state and national banks and 
life insurance companies, in the dollar amount lent to 
farmers.75 Even though the land banks helped many 
American farmers, the drop in agricultural prices during 
the 1920s and 1930s proved to be an insurmountable 
obstacle.
The Gooch family in Montana took advantage of the 
relatively new farm loan program in 1919, but they still 
ended up losing their land. In November 1915, the United 
States granted a patent to Walter H. Gooch for 320 acres 
of land in Fergus County, Montana. They built a large 
log cabin (16 by 48 feet) and several outbuildings. Four 
years later, Gooch and his wife, Helen R. Gooch, took out 
a loan from the Montana Joint Stock Land Bank of Helena 
for $2500. The loan was due in 33 years, and Gooch 
agreed to pay 6 percent annual interest.76
In taking out a farm loan in 1919, Gooch and his 
wife may have been optimistic about improving their 
homestead for the future, but it was probably the drought 
that forced them to borrow. Montana wheat and cattle
Operates (Washington, D. C.: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 1955), 1-3.
75 Olsen et al., "Farm Credit," 194-195.
76 Land Use Case Files, Box 8, LUMT 38-22-155.
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prices had continued to climb during the previous decade, 
especially during the war years, and in 1919 and 1920 
respectively, cattle and wheat prices were as high as 
they would be for more than two decades. The average 
number of bushels of wheat per acre harvested had been 
low in 1919, but in 1916, the first year Gooch would have 
harvested any wheat, Montana farmers on average harvested 
more than 19 bushels per acre.77 Gooch probably had only 
30 acres in crop land (15 acres of good crop land and 15 
acres of poor crop land), but he also had 290 acres of 
fair grazing land, from which to earn an income. During 
those first years on his farm, Montana farmers were doing 
well, and similarly, Gooch could have made a reasonable 
profit from his 30 acres, enough to service the debt he 
was taking on, if prices and weather had remained 
favorable. Gooch had had trouble with debt before. In 
1914, the Power Mercantile Company of Helena won a 
judgment against Gooch for $91.50. In 1921, the Goochs 
sold an oil and gas lease to Clermont Oil, Inc. of 
Delaware, for $100 plus one-eighth of any proceeds, but 
no oil or gas was found. The Montana Joint Stock Land 
Bank of Helena assigned the mortgage in 1923 to the First 
Colorado-Wyoming Joint Stock Land Bank of Cheyenne,
77 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 93-94, 108-109.
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which, just four months before the stock market crash, 
changed its name to the Denver Joint Stock Land Bank.78
In 1926, Helen Gooch died, but Walter Gooch 
continued to farm their homestead. By 1935, Gooch could 
not pay the taxes on the land. The following year, he 
could not pay his taxes or the mortgage, so he turned 
over the deed to his property to the Denver Joint Stock 
Land Bank.79
In 1937, Fergus County assessed the former Gooch 
property. The land was valued at $1,340, while the 
improvements on the land were valued at $225, for a total 
of $1,565, but a year later the United States Department 
of Agriculture appraised the land at $815, and the 
current (as opposed to the salvage) value of the 
improvements at $110, for a total of $925. It is not 
clear whether the value of the property decreased by 40 
percent, or whether Fergus County and the United States 
Department of Agriculture had very different ideas about 
land value. In August 1939, the federal government 
purchased the land and its improvements from the Denver 
Joint Stock Land Bank for $885.80
Gooch remained on the land after the Denver Joint 
Stock Land Bank took over the property, effectively
78 Land Use Case Files, Box 8, LUMT 38-22-155
79 Ibid.
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Gooch remained on the land after the Denver Joint 
Stock Land Bank took over the property, effectively 
becoming a tenant farmer on what was his own land. A 
William G. Gooch of Grass Range had a Temporary Use 
Agreement with the federal government to "occupy the 
dwelling and use other such buildings" and to use the 
land "for grazing purposes and for harvesting and 
removing present crops" from 22 September 1939 until 1 
April 1940. Gooch had only 15 acres of alfalfa, a forage 
crop, planted in August 1938; his remaining acreage was 
idle or used for grazing. Essentially, the government 
let them continue to stay on as tenants until after the 
winter was over.81
It was not just farmers who went under in the 1920s 
and 1930s. Banks were not immune to the farm failures, 
and banks in agricultural areas were having difficulties 
as well. The State Bank of Roy closed in 1925, only a 
few days after the Lewis town Democrat-News published an 
article about how prudent farmers were succeeding despite 
some of the earlier economic setbacks. The newspaper 
reported that the bank could not make a profit even with 
careful management and reduced overhead expenses, and 
that the small town of Roy could not support both the 
First National Bank of Roy and the State Bank of Roy.
81 Ibid.
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The surviving bank, like many others, stayed in business 
only briefly after the 1929 stock market crash.82
In late October 1929, as in much of the country, 
heavy withdrawals began to plague the banks in Fergus 
County. On 8 January 1930, the Lewistown Democrat-News 
headline read, "Grass Range Bank Fails to Open Monday, 
Present Depression and Steady Withdrawals Are Cause 
Closing of Oldest Bank in County." The bank was only 
thirteen years old, so apparently none of the Fergus 
County banks had much of a history. According to the 
newspaper, "the bank has been the victim of the present 
depression . . . ." Fergus County bank troubles 
continued. By 20 January 1930, financial difficulties 
forced the Central Bank and Trust in Lewistown to close. 
The next day, the Farmers and Merchants Bank of Winnett 
closed. Two days later, the Central Bank and Trust 
stockholders invested an additional $50,000 into the bank 
to try to reopen it, but shortly thereafter the 
Northwestern Bank and Trust took over the deposit 
liabilities of the bank. The First National Bank of Roy, 
no longer solvent, closed its doors a few days later, and 
in July its assets were sold to J. R. Miller. The
82 Lewistown Democrat-News 10 January 1925, 8 July 1930.
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following January, the State Bank of Moore merged with 
the National Bank of Lewistown.83
There were many efforts to find solutions to the 
problems in the agricultural economy. University of 
Wisconsin agricultural economist Henry C. Taylor believed 
that the economic problems facing farmers were not 
insurmountable and came up with the idea to form a 
company to help tenant farmers become farm owners. In 
1923, Taylor joined with Richard Ely and their former 
student, M. L. Wilson, and with the help of John D. 
Rockefeller. Jr., and the Laura Spelman Rockefeller 
Foundation, established Fairway Farms, Incorporated in 
Montana. Wilson, who was the head of the Rural Economics 
Division of Montana State Agricultural College, managed 
the project. He was well qualified, having earned a 
degree in agriculture from Iowa State College (where he 
had known future Secretary of Agriculture Henry A.
Wallace and his father, Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. 
Wallace) and a graduate degree in economics (studying 
under Ely and Taylor) from the University of Wisconsin.
In addition, Wilson had once homesteaded in Montana and
83 Lewistown Democrat-News 8 January 1930, 21 January 
1930, 22 January 1930, 24 January 1930, 5 February 1930, 
16 January 1931.
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had become Montana's first county agricultural agent in 
1913.84
Fairway Farms was an idealistic experiment to 
correct the problems in agriculture on a small scale. 
Wilson varied farm size, tenant/prospective owner 
selection, and equipment, and experts guided the farmers 
in every way. Purchase contracts eased some of the 
financial struggle. If the project succeeded, then 
efforts could be made to apply the knowledge to 
agriculture on a larger scale. Wilson oversaw the eight 
Fairway farms established in Montana in 1926. The 
experimental farms failed for a variety of reasons, 
primarily drought. Wilson was discouraged at the results 
but remained intent on working to find solutions to the 
economic problems that plagued farmers.85
Other efforts addressed taxes. In December 1931, 
the Grass Range community in Fergus County held a meeting 
to discuss tax problems and to promote solutions.
84 Merrill G. Burlingame and Edward J. Bell, -Jr., The 
Montana Cooperative Extension Service: A History 1893-
1974 (Bozeman: Montana State University, 1984), 28-29,
65-92; Rowley, M. L. Wilsonr 3, 217-235; Lord, Wallaces 
of Iowa, 300-304; Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New World: 
The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1959), 76-77.
85 Ibid.
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Participants drafted resolutions promoting a shift in tax 
burden, land reassessment, reduction in the school 
system, and county consolidation. Although citizens were 
desperate for change, it would be years before the tax 
situation improved.86 Most importantly, none of the 
reform efforts could make it rain more.
The declining agricultural economy during the 1920s 
and 1930s caused problems for Fergus County farmers and 
homesteaders, and the high expectations of the 1910s fell 
with the price of wheat . Many lost their land because 
of tax delinquency or the inability to pay loans and 
mortgages despite earlier banking reforms, and many 
others abandoned their homesteads. County governments 
faced a shrinking tax base while being saddled with more 
land to manage. Banks lost money on bad loans and 
mortgages and also had to try to manage land they could 
not sell. Land appraisals did not keep up with the 
declining agricultural economy, and as a result taxes 
remained unrealistically high.
Much of the economic downturn of the 1920s was not 
due to extraordinary circumstances; rather, it was an end 
to the brief aberration of economic prosperity due to the
86 Lewistown Democrat-News 11 December 1931.
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wartime economy and high rainfall. During the 1920s, the 
market for agricultural commodities contracted, while the 
average annual rainfall declined. The economic problems 
of the 1920s were compounded by drought. The downturn 
was made worse by the financial borrowing that had 
preceded it. Montana farmers, unable to make mortgage or 
other loan payments faced foreclosure or bankruptcy.
Those who failed to pay their taxes lost their land to 
county governments. Many farmers just barely survived 
the 1920s, only to face a greater decline in income 
during the 1930s. Increasing frugality could not solve 
the problems farmers faced due to a lack of rainfall and 
declining world markets. Some kind of intervention was 
necessary for the small Montana farmer to survive. As 
the farm situation worsened, agricultural economists 
across the country worked to find solutions for the 
spiraling agricultural economy.
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Chapter 5
Tha Emerging Land Utilization Movement
Agricultural economists, realizing that the 
agricultural boom during the 1910s was flawed, studied 
the problems farmers faced as the agricultural economy 
declined during the 1920s and 1930s. In addition to 
conducting studies of agricultural commodities, however, 
some agricultural economists broadened their scope to 
look at the underlying problems. Why were so many farms 
being foreclosed upon? Why were so many farmers facing 
bankruptcy? Why were so many farmers unable to pay their 
taxes? What caused the increase in farm tenancy? Were 
land appraisals fair, in light of the economic downturn?
The questions led a growing number of agricultural 
economists to reevaluate land use practices, especially 
in the West, arguing that improper land use was the 
underlying cause of many of these problems, and that land 
utilization (that is, land planning followed by 
appropriate land use), would stabilize the agricultural 
economy. The crusade for land use planning swelled in 
economic circles, but it required additional effort to 
transform those ideas into public policy. In the 1930s, 
land utilizationists instigated the change within 
government. The Land Utilization movement, then,
138
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provided the transition between the unfettered land use 
of the homestead period and the careful land utilization 
that finally became federal policy in the New Deal.1
The field of land utilization did not draw only on 
economics, but also relied on the fields of agriculture 
and geography. Its major proponents were academics with 
Progressive backgrounds who moved into government to 
enact change. The conservation movement of the 
Progressive era had already raised some questions about 
resource protection, enhancement, and use, especially of 
forest, water, and range resources, but no attention was 
paid to agriculture. Progressives were concerned about 
conservation; land utilizationists were concerned about 
land use. The 1890 census showed that there was no 
longer, by the Census Bureau's definition, a frontier 
line in the United States; wilderness was on the wane.
As it declined, Americans began to view the wilderness as 
something to be enjoyed and so preserved, rather than
1 The term "land utilization," although seemingly 
generic, in this work refers to the ideas of appropriate 
and efficient long-term land use developed during the 
early twentieth century. "Use" and "utilization," are 
not always interchangeable. "Utilization" implies 
practical or efficient use, which is why it was chosen by 
agricultural economists. See The American Heritage 
Dictionary of the English Language, 3d ed. (New York: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1992).
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something to be conquered, and so administered. That 
census also influenced historian Frederick Jackson 
Turner, who delivered his pivotal essay "The Significance 
of the Frontier in American History," at the World's 
Columbian Exposition in Chicago in 1893. Wilderness, or 
the frontier, according to Turner, had been the strongest 
influence on the development of the American character 
and institutions. The essay received little attention in 
1893, but it clarified the growing importance of 
wilderness and potential farm land to the country.2
The Land Utilization movement emerged from the 
University of Wisconsin, which was also important in the 
Progressive movement. Around the turn of the century, 
Wisconsin governor Robert La Follette (1901-1906) 
developed the "Wisconsin Idea," which held that 
government should be run with the advice of experts, whom 
he frequently consulted at the nearby university. In
2 See Samuel P. Hays, Conservation and the Gospel of 
Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1959), hereafter
cited as Hays, Conservation. Frederick Jackson Turner, 
"The Significance of the Frontier in American History," 
in The Frontier in American History (New York: Henry
Holt and Company, 1920). Ray Allen Billington, Frederick 
Jackson Turner: Historian, Scholar, Teacher (New York; 
Oxford University Press, 1973), 124-131, hereafter cited 
as Billington, Frederick Jackson Turner; Roderick Nash,
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addition, the University of Wisconsin endeavored to reach 
out to the greater population. It established farmers' 
institutes to disseminate agricultural information and, 
in this country; it pioneered the lecture system known as 
University Extension. President Charles Van Hise, a 
friend and neighbor of Frederick Jackson Turner, thought 
that the university and the state had mutual obligations 
to serve the people of Wisconsin. Toward that end, he 
worked closely with his former classmate, La Follette, 
for reform.3
Also at the University of Wisconsin were several 
agricultural economists who developed the ideas that 
became central to the Land Utilization movement that 
emerged during the late 1910s and 1920s. These experts 
at the university studied farm problems and suggested 
ways to correct those problems. The school became "the 
leading center for stimulating the use of the historical
Wilderness and the American Mind (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1967; rev. ed., 1973), 141-160.
3 Merle Curti and Vernon Carstensen, The University of 
Wisconsin: A History, 1848-1925, 2 vols. (Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1949), 1:711-739, 2:549- 
594; Allan G. Bogue and Robert Taylor, eds., The 
University of Wisconsin: One Hundred and Twenty-Five
Years (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1975),
20-37. For a biography of Van Hise, see Maurice M. 
Vance, Charles Richard Van Hise: Scientist Progressive
(Madison: State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1960).
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and geographical approach in the study of farm economic 
problems." Agricultural economists on the faculty 
included Richard T. Ely and Henry C. Taylor. Although 
both studied land economics and began developing ideas 
about land utilization, it was their student, Lewis C. 
Gray, who devoted his career to land utilization. Indeed 
Taylor, although calling Ely the father of land 
economics, pronounced Gray the "leader of rural land 
economics through most of its history to 1939."4
Lewis C. Gray received his Ph.D. from the University 
of Wisconsin in 1911. He worked closely with Ely and 
Taylor, studying land and agricultural economics, but he 
also took Frederick Jackson Turner's course on the 
History of the West. Both Ely and Taylor may have 
recommended the course to Gray. Turner had studied under 
Ely at Johns Hopkins, and they remained friends; Taylor 
admired Turner and regularly recommended that his 
students take a Turner seminar. There is no direct 
evidence demonstrating Turner's influence on Gray, but 
Turner studied the history of the expansion of settlement
4 Henry C. Taylor and Anne Dewees Taylor, The Story of 
Agricultural Economics in the United States, 1840-1932 
(Ames: Iowa State College Press, 1952; reprint ed.,
Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1974), quotes on
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across the frontier while Gray spent years of his life 
promoting the retraction of settlement. The University 
of Wisconsin influenced Gray's eventual decision to 
devote his career to public service and continued to 
influence Gray's research for decades.5
287, 870, hereafter cited as Taylor and Taylor, Story of 
Agricultural Economics.
5 Turner may not have known or cared about Gray's 
contribution to the field of agricultural economics, but 
Gray did write a history of Southern agriculture. In any 
case, it appears that Gray and Turner did not keep in 
touch over the years. A number of Turner's former 
students are mentioned in the Billington biography, but 
Lewis Gray was not. Although Gray's work reflected the 
influence of Taylor and Ely, it also reflected the 
influence of Turner. America had always had abundant 
available land and natural resources but rapid population 
growth and expansion across the continent threatened that 
abundance. In 1893, Turner pointed out that the 
abundance of land and the American ideal of small-farm 
ownership had been pivotal in the development of the 
nation. Against that background, Gray's idea that not 
all land in America was suitable for cultivation, and 
that land use should adhere to a national plan, seemed 
revolutionary. An important part of Turner's thesis was 
his emphasis on the land limits of the country, but the 
idea of government land planning and control of any 
expansion of settlement might have seemed, to Turner, to 
run counter to the traditional unlimited American 
expansion that he believed was the font of American 
individualism and democracy. Turner did not die until 
1932, but there is nothing to suggest that he had an 
opinion on land utilization theory. Billington,
Frederick Jackson Turner; Richard S. Kirkendall, ''L C. 
Gray and the Supply of Agricultural Land," Agricultural 
History 37(1963):206-208, hereafter cited as Kirkendall, 
"L. C. Gray"; Taylor and Taylor, Story of Agricultural 
Economics, viii.
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Gray began publishing articles about land economics 
and resource conservation in 1913. In an article in the 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, he discussed a variety of 
natural resources, including forest, mineral, and 
agricultural resources, and the many factors influencing 
their use. The article reflected Gray's incipient ideas 
about economics and the efficient utilization of land and 
natural resources.6
The article bridged the gap between the conservation 
movement of the Progressive era and the emerging post- 
Progressive Land Utilization movement. The two movements 
were separated by time and by emphasis but had some ideas 
in common. The official "closing" of the frontier in 
1890, discussed by Turner in his 1893 essay, coincided 
with a developing wilderness cult in America. Beginning 
with the Progressive era, many Americans realized that 
natural resources were limited, and that conservation was 
necessary to ensure the prosperity of future generations 
of Americans. Gray himself, not unlike other 
Progressives, believed that the central issue for 
conservationists and economists was how to balance the
6 L. C. Gray, "The Economic Possibilities of 
Conservation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics 21 
(1913):497-519, hereafter cited as Gray, "Conservation."
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self-interest of the current generation against the 
interests of future generations.7
The rhetoric Gray used was like that of the 
conservation movement of the early 1900s, and it would be 
used in future conservation efforts. One historian noted 
that "although Gray was not an ecologist, he wrote of 
physical limits as an ecologist would of carrying 
capacity, with a constant awareness of land as an actual 
or potential limiting factor in population growth."8 In 
order to preserve resources for future generations, while 
at the same time exploiting them for present use, 
according to Gray, it was important to understand the 
relationship between resource use and depletion, between 
renewable and nonrenewable resources. Geography was 
critical to the equation, because some resources, such as 
water, were abundant and renewable in some areas, but not 
in other areas. Gray argued that agricultural land was 
an exhaustible resource that could be renewed by using
7 Ibid., 497-499; Nash, Wilderness and the American Mind 
, 141-160. See also Linnie Marsh Wolfe, Son of the 
Wilderness: The Life of John Muir (New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf, 1945) and Stephen Fox, The American Conservation 
Movement: John Muir and His Legacy (Madison: University
of Wisconsin Press, 1985) .
8 Tim Lehman, Public Values, Private Lands: Farmland
Preservation Policy, 1933-1985 (Chapel Hill: University
of North Carolina Press), 13.
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scientific agricultural methods; however, there would 
have to be an economic or social demand to renew it. He 
pointed out that "on the frontier, low land values have 
rendered exploitation . . . very profitable," although 
the cost of extracting resources could be high. By 1913, 
then. Gray was already developing ideas that would be 
central to the Land Utilization movement.9
The conservation movement was quintessentially 
progressive, although the Land Utilization movement moved 
beyond it to include a concern for agricultural land and 
comprehensive land planning. For progressives, 
efficiency was the key to wise public policy in many 
areas, and no less so in land management. Progressive 
conservationists in general did not argue for the 
perpetual preservation of resources, but for their 
careful management and use. "Conservation, above all," 
according to historian Samuel Hays, "was a scientific 
movement. . . . Its essence was rational planning to 
promote efficient development and use of all natural 
resources." Gray reflected this attitude in his 1913 
article, and, of course, scientific research and 
efficient use would be fundamental tenets of the Land 
Utilization movement. Since wasting natural resources
9 Gray, "Conservation," 497-499, quote on 503.
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was imprudent but the efficient use of resources was 
desirable, Progressives typically believed it was up to 
experts to conduct the necessary scientific studies to 
permit the wise management of the nation's resources. As 
he would do for a couple of decades in dozens of 
articles. Gray called for a rational federal land 
policy.10 Land utilizationists did not foresee heated 
debates over what constituted "use" and operated under 
the bland assumption that reason would prevail.
By 1919, the post-war economic problems, coupled 
with drought in the West, forced a broader interest in 
land economics among agricultural scientists and would 
eventually compel the emerging Land Utilization movement 
to broaden from its academic base to federal and state 
governmental agencies. Cultivated acreage had expanded 
during the boom of the 1910s, particularly in the arid 
northern Great Plains. As many farmers in that area 
began failing financially during the dust bowl and 
depression years, agricultural scientists began 
questioning the suitability of cultivating arid land.
In the United States Department of Agriculture 
Yearbook of Agriculture, 1919, Secretary of Agriculture
10 Ibid., 497-519; Hays, Conservation, quote on 2.
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Edwin Thomas Meredith recognized that American 
agriculture faced serious problems because of the post­
war contraction in the agricultural economy and because 
of problems with drought, yet he suggested no direct 
action, only urging the prudent use of cultivated land.
He did urge the federal government and agricultural 
colleges to work together to study land use and 
management. Toward that end, Meredith formed a committee 
to help establish an agricultural economics section under 
the Office of Farm Management. The committee included 
Henry C. Taylor, head of the department of agricultural 
economics at the University of Wisconsin, his colleague 
Richard T. Ely, who specialized in land economics, and 
Lewis Gray. Meredith further suggested that the United 
States Department of Agriculture (USDA) cooperate with 
agricultural colleges and experiment stations on a 
variety of projects, including land utilization projects. 
Meredith gave the economists a mandate to study "land 
resources, values, ownership and tenancy, settlement and 
colonization, and land policies."11
11 United States Department of Agriculture, Yearbook of 
Agriculture, 1919 (Washington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office, 1920), 32-38, quote on 37; Kirkendall,
"L C. Gray," 206-208; Gladys L. Baker, Wayne D.
Rasmussen, Vivian Wiser, and Jane M. Porter, Century of
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In 1919, Taylor was named Chief of the Office of 
Farm Management, which three years later was changed to 
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics (BAE). He hired 
Gray to oversee the Division of Land Economics. Another 
former student of Taylor and Ely, Oliver E. Baker, went 
to work for Gray at the USDA. Baker wrote several 
articles on land utilization and, like Gray, emerged as a 
leader in the Land Utilization movement. It seemed for a 
time that the University of Wisconsin dominated 
agricultural economics at the United States Department of 
Agriculture. As a result, Ely and Taylor greatly 
influenced national agricultural economic policy for 
several decades.12 Land utilization was not confined to 
government research agencies, however. In 1920, Richard 
Ely established the Institute for Research in Land 
Economics at the University of Wisconsin to further study 
land utilization.13
Service: The First 100 Years of the United States
Department of Agriculture (Washington, D. C.: Government
Printing Office, 1963), 112-113, 454, 457, hereafter 
cited as Baker et al., Century of Service.
12 Ibid.
13 Two years later it became the Institute for Research 
in Land Economics and Public Utilities, which publishes 
the Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics. In 
1925, Emil Oliver Jorgensen of the Manufacturers and 
Merchants Federal Tax League attacked Ely in his 
polemical False Education in Our Colleges and
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Agricultural economists involved in land utilization 
research not only looked at the current economic problems 
and potential solutions, they went one step further, 
planning for the future. By the 1920s, it seemed 
unlikely that the United States would acquire any more 
territory. At the same time, however, the population 
continued to expand. It became clear, then, that the 
country faced continuing population growth on a finite 
amount of land; hence careful and efficient land use 
would be crucial to the long-term survival and prosperity 
of the country, even with the potential to import natural 
resources.
The post-war contraction in the agricultural markets 
led some Americans to question the merit of unlimited 
expansion of cultivated land. In 1921, Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry C. Wallace designated a Land 
Utilization committee to examine land-use practices in 
the U.S. and to make recommendations on how best to use 
America's land resources. The broad mandate allowed the 
committee comprehensive consideration of the nation's
Universities: An Expose of Prof. Richard T. Ely and His
"Institute for Research in Land Economics and Public 
Utilities” (Chicago; Manufacturers and Merchants Federal 
Tax League, 1925). Taylor and Taylor, Story of 
Agricultural Economics, 848.
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natural resources. Lewis Gray served as chairman of the 
committee and was largely responsible for the subsequent 
article published by the committee in the Agriculture 
Yearbook 1923, "The Utilization of Our Land for Crops, 
Pasture and Forests.” 0. E . Baker served as the
committee secretary and second author on the article.
The annual Agriculture Yearbooks circulated to 
universities, libraries, various agencies, and 
individuals, but more farmers probably read the short 
bulletins and circulars the USDA published.
Consequently, much of the early information in the 
developing field of land utilization probably circulated 
primarily among agricultural economists and scientists, 
not among farmers.14
Gray defined the field of land utilization as "that 
branch of land economics which comprises the study of the
14 L.C. Gray, O.E. Baker, F.J. Marschner; B. 0. Weitz; 
Chapline, W.R.; Shepard, Ward; and Raphael Zon, 
"Utilization of Our Lands for Crops, Pasture and 
Forests," in United States Department of Agriculture 
Yearbook of Agriculture, 1923 (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1924) 415, hereafter cited as 
Gray et al., "Utilization of Our Lands"; Albert Z. 
Guttenberg, "The Land Utilization Movement of the 1920s," 
Agricultural History 50(1988):477, hereafter cited as 
Guttenberg, "Land Utilization Movement"; Baker et al., 
Century of Service, 112-113. See also Russell Lord, The 
Wallaces of Iowa (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company,
1947), hereafter cited as Lord, Wallaces of Iowa.
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land resources of a nation or other geographical unit 
from the standpoint of their economic significance with a 
view to determining for what and how they may be most 
effectively employed.,,1S While there may have been 
debate over what constituted "effectively employed," 
those in the field of land utilization argued for 
efficient long-term land use. Although land could be 
exploited efficiently for short term financial gains,
Gray believed that the careful use of land resources over 
the long-term reduced the harmful effects of a boom and 
bust economic cycle and ultimately prevented human 
suffering. In addition, a farm unit should be large 
enough to support a family. An economist himself, Gray 
stressed the importance of the economist to land 
utilization study, although he believed that many other 
specialists had much to contribute to understanding sound 
land utilization. The general goal of the land 
utilization movement was to use the land as efficiently 
as possible — meaning at its highest economic potential
15 L. C. Gray, "The Field Of Land Utilization," The 
Journal of Land and Public Utility Economics 1(1925):152- 
153, hereafter cited as Gray, "Field of Land 
Utilization."
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for the long term, taking into account land resources, 
human resources, capital, and any national objectives.16
Population estimates added to the complicated 
picture of land use. Initially, Gray, Baker, and others 
believed that the increasing population of the United 
States would require more and more natural and 
agricultural resources, that more farm land would be 
necessary, and that higher yields from farm land would be 
required, as well. They recommended, among other things, 
the careful matching of crops to appropriate soils, again 
stressing the importance of wise land use for the needed 
higher yields. Gray and Baker believed it was necessary 
to increase the future supply of agricultural products 
for an ever increasing population, arguing that a land 
use policy, dictated by agricultural science and 
economics, could achieve a rational balance between 
production and the demands of population growth. Toward 
that end, both suggested wise and efficient land use, 
increasing the intensity of agriculture, reducing waste, 
increasing imports and decreasing exports, as well as a 
changing of diets to include more grains and less meat. 
According to their 1923 estimate, the United States,
16 Ibid.
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which had a population of about 105 million in 1920, 
ultimately could support a maximum population of 350 
million.17
Because of the growing population, Gray worried 
about the potential scarcity of farm land as the per 
capita amount of farm land continued to decrease. He 
believed that the agricultural depression of the early 
1920s was an aberration, as was the overproduction for 
world export during the Great War. The increased value 
of farm land in the 1920s, according to Gray and his 
colleagues, was not an aberration caused by higher 
wartime prices. In fact, they believed that the scarcity 
of farm land was driving land prices up, and that in the 
long-term it would continue to do so.18
According to Gray, land settlement patterns had to 
be altered, because no high quality virgin land remained 
in the public domain for settlers to homestead. He 
further castigated the boosters and land speculators who 
lured people to settle in areas unsuitable for 
cultivation and declared that "experience has shown that
17 Gray et al., "Utilization of Our Lands," 461-506; 0.
E. Baker, "Land Utilization in the United States: 
Geographical Aspects of the Problem," Geographical Review 
13(1923):1-26, hereafter cited as Baker, "Land 
Utilization."
18 Ibid., 433-451.
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with sufficiently strong selling methods it is possible 
to find buyers for land entirely unsuitable for farming." 
The problem was not just forcing unsuitable land use, it 
was timing as well: "Settlement activity is always most
extensive at times when agriculture is 'booming,' " he 
wrote, when land, livestock, machinery, and reclamation 
costs are high. Settlers in large numbers borrow large 
amounts to develop farms, "only to be compelled shortly 
to enter a period of depression under a heavy load of 
indebtedness."19 In early articles, Gray blamed boosters 
and land speculators for enticing too many people to 
settle on submarginal land,20 and by 1930 he warned: "By
an adequate policy of supplying information to 
prospective settlers a large number would be directed to 
favorable rather than to hopeless situations, and land 
companies and private reclamation enterprises would find 
it advisable to cooperate with the Government in 
developing a sound program of reclamation and 
settlement. "21
19 Ibid., 503.
20 Gray did not like the use of the word "submarginal, 
because the problem was not with the land, it was with 
the land use. L. C. Gray, "Federal Purchase and 
Administration of Submarginal Land in the Great Plains," 
Journal of Farm Economics 21(February 1939):123.
21 L. C. Gray, "Classification of Public Lands," 
Documentary Material on the Inter-American Conference on
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These settlement patterns and practices caused 
overexpansion of agriculture when little or no expansion 
was necessary, and ultimately caused lower farm prices. 
Gray and his colleagues in the USDA Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics asserted that with careful land 
planning, agricultural prices could remain stable and 
profitable — ostensibly benefiting the entire economy, 
but primarily helping those who were already established 
in agriculture.22 Because they had easier and cheaper 
access to transportation and had more consistent 
rainfall, Eastern and Midwestern farmers would benefit 
more from any restrictions in agricultural expansion.23
Population estimates were just part of the land 
utilization assessment. Land had to be inventoried and 
classified according to its most viable use, that is, how 
it could be used economically for the long term. John 
Wesley Powell had urged a classification of the public 
domain, in part to control settlement, believing that 
only land that could viably support a family should be 
homesteaded, but he failed to gain Congressional support
Agriculture, Forestry and Animal Industry (Washington, D.
C.: Government Printing Office, 1930), 80, hereafter
cited as Gray, "Classification."
22 Gray et al., "Utilization of Our Lands," 503-506.
23 Guttenberg, "Land Utilization Movement," 478.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
157
for his proposal. Similar Progressive era efforts also 
failed.24 Armed with various land studies, Gray 
continued to argue for a comprehensive federal land use 
policy as a way to stabilize the agricultural economy.
In September 1930, at the Inter-American Conference on 
Agriculture, Forestry, and Animal Industry in Washington,
D. C., he urged the classification, according to economic 
potential, of the 190 million acres of land still in the 
public domain in the 48 states. Gray maintained that, 
despite efforts of the United States Geological Survey, 
there had been no adequate system of land classification. 
Since much of what had once been the public domain had 
been transferred to private owners, he favored an 
economic classification of private land as well as of the 
remaining in the public domain. The federal government 
had no power to classify private land, but he hoped that 
some control could be exerted by developing a "policy of 
education and reacquisition." Gray especially sought the 
economic classification of submarginal lands, largely in 
the semiarid west, in order to find the most feasible use 
of that land. However, real assessment of the country's
24 Powell, Report; John Opie, The Law of the Land: Two
Hundred Years of American Farmland Policy (Lincoln:
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natural resources did not take place until the desperate 
conditions of the 1930s forced change.25
Gray broadly categorized the nation's 1.9 billion 
acres as either cropland, pasture land, or forest, but 
within those categories he considered the aridity or 
humidity of the region, an important factor in estimating 
productivity. In 1919, about 43 percent of the land area 
in the United States was pasture land, 25 percent was 
cultivated land, and about 25 percent was forest land. 
About 6 percent of the land was either urban, desert, 
marsh, or roads. Some categories were further divided. 
Farmland, for example, was classified as arid or humid 
because such land in humid areas could support more 
people and animals than an equal amount of land in the 
arid regions.26
Gray and his colleagues assessed the current use of 
land, especially land used for or suitable for 
agriculture, but they made careful distinction between 
land suitable for agriculture, and land that could be 
suitable for agriculture with improvements such as 
clearing, drainage, or irrigation. Much of Montana, of
University of Nebraska Press, 1987), 146-152, hereafter 
cited as Opie, Law of the Land.
25 Gray, "Classification," 80.
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course, fell into the latter category. Gray and his 
colleagues estimated that in 1919 there were about 1.7 
million acres of irrigated farm land in Montana, but that 
a total of 6 million acres was irrigable, although at a 
high cost. While more land could be irrigated if 
necessary, the cost involved would make new reclamation 
projects impractical unless crop prices rose above 
certain levels. Otherwise, according to Gray, 
reclamation was a waste of money and human resources.27 
The task of land-use planners, then, was to figure out 
what land could profitably produce certain crops with the 
least capital investment. Land unsuitable for 
cultivation should be put to a more appropriate use, such 
as grazing. On the other hand, they also had to 
anticipate that population growth and the inevitable 
increased demand for food that might require the 
cultivation of marginal land.28
Although agricultural land was their principal 
subject, Gray and his colleagues were also concerned with
26 Gray et al., "Utilization of Our Lands," 415-433.
27 This view of reclamation has been discussed by 
scholars in various forums, but particularly notable is 
Marc Reisner's Cadillac Desert: The American West and
Its Disappearing Water (New York: Viking, 1986) .
28 Ibid., 415-433.
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other natural resources, such as timber and minerals, and 
included them in their broad land utilization assessment. 
It was just as important to assess the nation's other 
natural resource needs as it was to assess the demand for 
food. In every case, land was the principal component of 
production, and land planning and management was, 
therefore, the central goal.29
Following World War I, foreclosures, bankruptcies, 
and tax sales forced many farmers into tenancy, often on 
the same land they had once owned. Land utilizationists 
believed there was a link between land use and tenancy, 
and consequently, many studied farm tenancy. Gray and 
his colleagues in the CJSDA Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics published an article, "Farm Ownership and 
Tenancy," in 1923 in which they argued that farm tenancy 
was an important as a step toward farm ownership 
(although they later backed away from that idea). 
Otherwise, tenancy hindered wise land use because the 
need to produce the most from the land quickly in a brief 
period forced tenants to consider only short-term 
management instead of long-term management of resources. 
To resolve some tenancy problems, land utilizationists
29 Ibid., 461-506.
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recommended fair leasing arrangements to encourage land 
ownership.30
Lewis Gray and 0. E. Baker often ended articles with 
a call for a national land utilization plan, especially 
for agriculture. In the 1920s there was no coordination 
among federal agencies on land use policy. The Bureau of 
Reclamation, for example, did not work with the United 
States Department of Agriculture in planning reclamation 
projects to increase agricultural land. Gray and Baker 
believed that this wasted resources and harmed 
agriculture in the long run. Any expansion of 
agricultural land should be done according to a plan, in 
relationship to the increasing population. Recognizing 
that the United States was part of a world market, Baker 
thought that agricultural land use should be planned with 
knowledge of the world agricultural situation, as well, 
not just with the domestic situation alone.31
Interest in the Land Utilization movement outside 
the Bureau of Agricultural Economics waxed and waned with
30 L. C. Gray, Charles L. Stewart, Howard A. Turner, J.
T. Sanders, and W. J. Spillman, "Farm Ownership and 
Tenancy, " in United States Department of Agriculture 
Yearbook of Agriculture, 1923 (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1924), 507-600.
31 Kirkendall, "L C. Gray," 207-210; Baker, "Land 
Utilization," 23-26; L. C. Gray et al., "Utilization of 
Our Lands," 497-506.
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the price of wheat, even though Gray, Baker, and Ely 
continued their efforts. After devoting ninety-one pages 
to the topic in 1923, the USDA Yearbook of Agriculture, 
1924 ignored it. That year, wheat prices were back up to 
$1.24, up more than 35 percent from the previous year, 
but wheat prices began dropping again after 1925. As the 
agricultural economy worsened, interest in a land 
utilization plan increased. Another important factor in 
the sudden decline in interest in land utilization may 
have been the death of Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. 
Wallace in 1924. Wallace wielded political influence 
that his successor did not.32
Gray argued that broad goals had to be defined : 
commensurate with the political and economic objectives 
of the nation, but he castigated the national land policy 
(or the lack of one) that permitted speculators to 
exploit unsuspecting prospective farmers. He further 
criticized policies that did not take into account 
national natural resource needs for the long-term.
Gray's concern, then was that the field of land
32 Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-5; Paul K. Conkin, 
Tomorrow a New World: The New Deal Community Program
(Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1959), 78,
hereafter cited as Conkin, New World.
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utilization provide information so that educated choices 
in national land use could be made.33
Gray believed that if land use were left entirely up 
to individuals and the market, there would be a wholesale 
squandering of resources with no thought for the future. 
For example, he believed that the timber consumption of 
the United States was greater than could be supplied for 
the long-term. If enough land were devoted to timber 
needs, then Gray believed there would not be enough for 
grazing or cultivation. In other words, the finite 
amount of land in the United States required critical 
planning so that future needs of the country and its 
growing population could be met. The tendency of 
agriculture to over-expand was due to poorly thought out 
land policies such as the Homestead Act, as well as the 
greed of speculators, developers, and settlers. This 
overexpansion hurt the United States economically, 
threatened future economic security, and ignored the 
overall land needs of the country. Gray indirectly 
criticized the Bureau of Reclamation for poorly thought 
out reclamation plans. Elsewhere, he would continue to
33 Gray, "Field Of Land Utilization," 152-155.
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blast that organization for lack of attention to national 
agricultural planning.34
The CJSDA's interest in the economic viability of 
land as a measure of its suitability for settlement led 
to clashes with the people who promoted settlement in the 
arid western U. S., including the Department of the 
Interior's Bureau of Reclamation. The Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics' idea of a national land policy 
based on economics, the environment, and common sense 
essentially ran counter to the Bureau of Reclamation idea 
of irrigating western lands for agriculture at virtually 
any price. Gray envisioned keeping agriculture where it 
was most efficient, in the East and Midwest, while the 
Bureau of Reclamation obviously favored its growth and 
expansion in the West. Gray had many supporters; the 
addition of more agricultural land would only decrease 
agricultural prices for established farmers as it 
increased the surplus of agricultural products. Western 
promoters, of course, supported the Bureau of Reclamation 
and its head, Elwood Mead. Although Gray and Baker had 
initially believed that the nation's population growth 
would require much more agricultural land, their later
34 Ibid., 152-156.
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estimates reflected a lower rate of growth. Their 
opposition, including John Haw of the Northern Pacific 
Railroad, rejected their revisions claiming that more 
agricultural land was necessary to feed the growing 
population. Mead also deplored the unplanned settlement 
of the West and its accompanying homestead failures and 
believed the nation needed land planning. But Mead 
wanted small irrigated farms out West, not more grazing 
land. Gray wanted to restrict the expansion of 
agriculture; Mead wanted to expand agriculture. The 
power struggle between USDA and the Bureau of Reclamation 
continued for years as bureaucrats debated over how to 
define efficient use and the needs of the country.35
Over time, land utilizationists realized that 
economic studies should be integrated with studies of 
social problems, and they gradually shifted their 
concerns to include broader social issues as well as
35 Opie, Law of the Land, 114-119, 140; Donald Worster, 
Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and Growth of the
American West (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985);
Kirkendall, "L C. Gray," 206-209; Conkin, New World, 78. 
See also James R. Kluger, Turning on Water with a Shovel: 
The Career of Elwood Mead (Albuquerque: University of 
New Mexico Press, 1992). Although Mead faced some 
contention in Washington, he was well respected across 
the West. After his death, the Lewistown Democrat-News 
published an editorial about him entitled "Friend of the 
West." Lewistown Democrat-News 26 January 1936.
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economic and environmental interests.36 They realized 
that unproductive land did not pay the taxes that 
supported local governments, but that those governments 
still had to run schools, build roads, and provide other 
services. The homestead boom had lured many settlers to 
the northern Great Plains, and services had to be 
provided for them. While the price of wheat was high, 
their taxes paid for the services, but as agricultural 
prices declined, and land values followed, tax income 
declined. Furthermore, as counties acquired tax 
delinquent land, their tax bases diminished. Land 
settlement policies had encouraged wide dispersal of the 
population, which in turn required a wider dispersal of 
governmental services, adding to the high cost of 
government, and ultimately causing higher taxes. For a 
land utilization program to work, societal concerns would 
have to be a part of that program. To save both money 
and continue services, county governments might have to 
consolidate, or schools might have to consolidate.37
36 Guttenberg, "Land Utilization Movement," 481.
37 Roland R. Renne, Montana Farm. Taxes, Montana 
Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin no. 286 
(Bozeman: Montana Agricultural Experiment Station,
1934); Roland R. Renne, Montana County Organization, 
Services, and Costs, Montana Agricultural Experiment 
Station Bulletin no. 298 (Bozeman: Montana Agricultural
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Gray realized that the government needed to consider 
both the social and land use problems. He pointed out 
that the federal government lacked the power to directly 
control land use, but there was one way to accomplish the 
goal of wise land use. In order to correct social 
problems as well as land use problems, Gray and other 
land utilizationists suggested that the federal 
government purchase submarginal land, relocate families, 
and "readjust" the land use. If the government removed 
people from poor agricultural land and relocated them to 
areas with a greater population density, where the land 
and the economy could support a higher number of people, 
many expensive services would not be needed in the 
hinterland.38
After studying and working together for years, the 
community of agricultural economists was a relatively 
close-knit group. In 1929, several traveled together on 
the ship Leviathan to attend an international conference 
on agricultural economics in England. They spent days on
Experiment Station, 1935); Proceedings of the National 
Conference on Land Utilization (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1932), 58-67, hereafter cited 
as Proceedings of the National Conference.
38 Gray, "Classification," 80; Proceedings of the 
National Conference, 58-67.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
168
the ship playing deck sports, gathering for meals to 
discuss economics. Among those who traveled together 
were Henry Taylor and 0. E. Baker, both proponents of 
land utilization, and Henry A. Wallace, the son of the 
late Secretary of Agriculture Henry C. Wallace, and 
himself a future Secretary of Agriculture. Taylor and 
Baker had an opportunity to influence someone who would 
be an important agricultural policy maker.39
The economy continued to worsen during 1930 and 
1931. In the latter year in Montana, only 47 percent of 
the wheat planted was harvested. The acreage that was 
harvested produced only an average of 6.6 bushels per 
acre, down dramatically from the 25.5 bushels per acre 
produced in 1915, and the wheat that was harvested 
brought only $.50 per bushel. It could not get much 
worse for Great Plains farmers. In 1931, each acre of 
wheat planted in Montana earned only $1.58. Fifteen 
years earlier, each acre planted had earned $26.66.40 By
39 Lord, Wallaces of Iowa, 283-292; Proceedings of the 
International Conference of Agricultural Economists 
(Oxford: Agricultural Economics Institute for the 
International Association of Agricultural Economists, 
1929).
40 The statistics are for all wheat (spring and winter); 
1916 was the first year to have statistics on the number 
of acres planted. Montana Agricultural Statistics, 4-5.
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1931, agricultural economists, policy makers, and 
representatives of farm groups began to refer to the 
situation as an "emergency."41
Land utilization theory seemed to offer some 
solutions for agricultural problems, but it needed wider 
acceptance, more research, and some publicity, so Lewis 
Gray and Nils Olsen, the Chief of the Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, convinced Secretary of 
Agriculture Arthur M. Hyde to sponsor a "National 
Conference on Land Utilization," in cooperation with the 
Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities. In 
sponsoring this conference and using it as a means to 
generate ideas on how to address the problems facing 
agriculture, Hyde was also protecting his agency's 
interest in controlling agricultural policy at a time 
when it faced opposition from the Bureau of Reclamation 
and the Federal Farm Board.42
More than 350 people attended the conference, held 
in November in Chicago. Forty-two papers were presented 
by academics, governmental scientists and bureaucrats, 
both state and federal, and representatives from farm
41 Proceedings of the National Conference, 249.
42 Kirkendall, "L C. Gray," 210; Proceedings of the 
National Conference, iii.
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organizations. Representatives from railroads, banking 
organizations, insurance companies, and chambers of 
commerce attended the conference as well. The Associated 
Press, the National Broadcasting Company, and other 
members of the press covered the conference.
Agricultural universities and colleges across the country 
sent delegates.43
R. A. Pearson, President of the University of 
Maryland and Chairman of the Executive Committee for the 
Association of Land Grant Colleges and Universities, 
opened the conference with a jeremiad predicting dire 
consequences if the country did not work to conserve 
natural resources. He urged conference participants to 
work toward conservation of what he believed was the most 
valuable natural national resource: land.44 An elderly
Richard Ely was surrounded by former students at the 
conference. Believing that many of his economic land 
planning ideas, and those of his students, were nearing 
fruition, he addressed the conference. "For years, 
however, I was a voice crying in the wilderness . . . .
43 Proceedings of the National Conference, iv, 240-251.
44 Ibid., 1-2.
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Now, as I look at this program of this 3-day conference,
I feel that I am in sight of the promised land."45
L. C. Gray sketched out some solutions in his paper, 
"Some Ways of Dealing With the Problems of Submarginal 
Land." Although Gray was an important thinker in the 
broad Land Utilization movement, he was spending most of 
his time on the submarginal land problems. He 
recommended readjustments in taxes and an end to the sale 
of tax delinquent land. He wanted to relocate families 
and begin rural zoning for the evacuated areas, to 
consolidate land into economically viable units, to 
modify local infrastructure such as school district 
boundaries and road locations, and to consolidate local 
governments. Gray then urged the public acquisition of 
three kinds of submarginal land: 1) land that was tax
delinquent and unsuitable for private use or otherwise 
advantageous for public acquisition, 2) land whose 
acquisition would increase the efficiency of (reduce the 
need for) public services such as roads and schools, and 
3) land which, when acquired, would help fill out a 
previously acquired parcel so that it would become 
economically viable. In addition, Gray wanted to prevent
45 Ibid., 126.
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arable land from becoming submarginal, or submarginal 
land from being cultivated. He said the homestead system 
tempted people "to undertake to establish farms or 
grazing units on lands that will scarcely support a jack 
rabbit, that 14,532 original homestead entries were made 
in 1930, though it is doubtful if there is a section of 
unallotted or unreserved land in the public domain 
capable of supporting a family."46 Gray thought the 
government should buy back submarginal land from its 
owners and should undertake research and education to 
prevent a recurrence of these problems.47
The influence of Lewis Gray was obvious in the 
conference's conclusions and recommendations. The 
recommendations summarized the problems, pointing to the 
federal land policies that urged the conveyance of public 
domain land to individuals without concern for the 
economic viability of the land, and called for 
cooperation between federal, state, and local agencies in 
policy making to promote the wise use of all land, public 
and private, as well as the conservation of land 
resources for both the present and the future. The 
conference made eighteen specific recommendations. The
46 Ibid. , 65.
47 Ibid. , 58-67.
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first was that the grazing lands that were part of the 
public domain be organized and administered by a federal 
agency. One urged the protection of watersheds. Another 
urged classifying and inventorying of land according to 
soil type and potential economic value. Homesteading on 
the public domain should be permitted only after land 
classification, and only then on lands which were 
economically viable as farmsteads, not on marginal or 
submarginal land. Land developers should be licensed and 
regulated to prevent unethical conduct and the unwise use 
of land.48
The central concern of the conference was the 
development of a program to deal with marginal and 
submarginal land: land inappropriate for cultivation,
cut-over forest land, and marginal grazing land. The 
recommendations pointed out, as Lewis Gray had, that the 
unproductive land should be converted to an appropriate 
use, so that it could contribute to the economy and the 
local tax base. If possible, land use should be changed 
without government acquisition, but that should be a done 
as a last resort. Historically, government acquisition 
of land had been approved for only a limited number of
48 Ibid., 240-242, 246.
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reasons, none of which included implementing a federal 
land use policy. A government buy-back program, if it 
came to that, could remove from private ownership land 
that should never have been cultivated in the first 
place, land that because of too sparse a population did 
not pay its own taxes for government services, forest 
land, or land subject to serious erosion if farmed any 
longer. Programs that already purchased land for 
watershed protection and for reforestation could be 
enhanced.49 A program to buy back agricultural land and 
increase the public domain, then, was a radical change 
from earlier land purchase policies.
The conference sought to rein in the power of the 
Bureau of Reclamation by recommending that it finish only 
projects already underway, and that no new reclamation 
projects be started unless an increased need for 
agricultural products (because of an increasing 
population) justified bringing additional land under 
cultivation. Elwood Mead, the head of the Bureau of 
Reclamation, spoke in defense of reclamation at the 
conference, essentially saying that there would be no 
civilization or development in the West without
49 Ibid., 243-245, Opie, Law of the Land, 140-150; Lord, 
Wallaces of Iowa, 308-312.
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reclamation to provide water for irrigation, electric 
power, and other uses. According to Mead, reclamation 
brought development and people, who in turn purchased 
goods, adding to the nation's economy and helping the 
railroads. He predicted that Hoover Dam would help draw 
millions of people to the Southwest. Mead, like Gray, 
wanted to improve rural life. He had worked to develop 
planned rural communities in Australia and wanted to do 
the same in the United States. According to Mead, 
reclamation was the way to help rural Americans.50
Delegates did not limit the recommendations to those 
directly dealing with land. They also proposed that 
states reduce expenditures (by consolidating county 
governments if necessary), and change their revenue 
sources from property taxes to income taxes. They further 
recommended the federal coordination of farm credit 
agencies, such as federal land banks and joint stock land 
banks, in an effort to bring about wiser land use.51
Finally, the conference participants recommended two 
avenues for furthering the cause of land utilization.
50 Ibid., 243, 17-23; Conkin, New World, 43-45; Opie, Law 
of the Land, 114-119, 140; Worster, Rivers of Empire; 
Kirkendall, "L C. Gray," 206-209. See also Kluger, 
Turning- on Water with a Shovel .
51 Proceedings of the National Conference, 242-243.
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First, the United States Department of Agriculture should 
set up regional land utilization conferences, and 
secondly, two committees should be established to help 
formulate policy: a national land use planning committee
and a national advisory and legislative committee on land 
use.52 The following year Rexford Tugwell, a member of 
presidential candidate Franklin Roosevelt's "Brain 
Trust," met with M. L. Wilson, a supporter of land 
utilization and an author of a pamphlet on the 
conference. Perhaps a new administration could help 
implement many of the ideas of the Land Utilization 
movement.53
The rhetoric of the land utilization movement seemed 
radical at the time, with calls for a national land use 
policy, federal reacquisition of much of the arid plains, 
and the castigation of unrestrained private land 
development, and to some, Lewis Gray sounded like a 
revolutionary as he urged greater government control over 
the natural resources of the country. Yet Gray did 
recognize the property rights of individuals.
52 Ibid., 246-247.
53 Lord, Wallaces of Iowa, 308-312. See also William D. 
Rowley, M. L. Wilson and the Campaign for the Domestic 
Allotment (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1970).
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Land utilization emerged as an important field 
because of the economic and environmental problems of the 
1920s and continued to grow in significance because of 
the increasing problems that agriculture faced during the 
1930s. Gray and others furthered the cause of land 
utilization by publishing scholarly articles and by 
promoting it through his work in the United States 
Department of Agriculture. They urged the adoption of a 
national land-use policy, a comprehensive plan that would 
use knowledge of the environment, agricultural science, 
and economics to determine the most efficient use of the 
available land. Ultimately, it took the combination of 
economic and environmental problems of the 1930s to bring 
about any national land policy. Land utilization 
proponents had the opportunity to see some of their ideas 
come to fruition, when the movement became part of the 
New Deal under Franklin Roosevelt and the land 
utilization ideas were put into action. Once in practice 
in the United States, the land utilization movement would 
lead to the retirement from cultivation of hundreds of 
thousands of acres of submarginal land during the 1930s.
The Land Utilization movement ultimately led the 
transition toward land use planning in the United States. 
But even though the message of land utilization had
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permeated the community of agricultural scientists, it 
took more time to trickle out to the hinterland. Several 
reporters attended the National Conference on Land 
Utilization, but there was no mention of the conference 
in the Lewistown Democrat-News. A couple of months after 
the conference, the message finally began reaching those 
it most affected: the farmers. At an annual farm
program in Fergus County, Montana, in early 1932, 
Agricultural Extension Service officials discussed Land 
Utilization with local farmers.54 And even though the 
ideas of land utilization began to seep through the 
entire agricultural community, from economists to policy 
makers to farmers, the transformation of those ideas into 
policy would take even more time.
54 Lewistown Democrat-News 13 February 1932.
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Chapter 6
Tha Homestead Movement in Reverse:
The New Deal Land Utilisation Program
The problems of American farmers were obvious, 
especially on the Great Plains, but the solutions to 
those problems were not so obvious. The National 
Conference on Land Utilization held in Chicago in 
November 1931 brought together a broad spectrum of 
participants to discuss solutions to those problems. 
Previous efforts in land utilization had been confined to 
studies and reports; however, because the conference 
included policy makers, there was some optimism for 
implementation. Despite the approval of recommendations 
for change by conference delegates, including an 
endorsement for the federal purchase of submarginal 
lands, it would take more time for the new policies to 
take effect. In early 1933, M. L. Wilson believed that 
"public opinion on land utilization [was] 
crystallizing."1 The anticipated change came during 
Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal with the implementation 
of a land utilization program. Federal land utilization
1 M. L. Wilson, "A Land Use Program for the Federal 
Government," Journal of Farm Economics 15(April 
1933):217, hereafter cited as Wilson, "A Land Use 
Program."
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essentially reversed the homestead movement as the 
government began buying back failed homesteads on 
submarginal land. Land utilization, then, represented a 
dramatic shift in federal land policy.
The economic problems of the 1920s persisted in the 
1930s; farmers across the country continued to suffer 
from prolonged depression and drought. Although much of 
the country had been in depression only a few years, 
farmers had been having economic problems since the early 
1920s. Even while land economists discussed land 
utilization in Chicago, the agricultural downturn 
continued. Farmers in Montana had no money to buy food 
and were going hungry. In one small farming community in 
Fergus County, the Red Cross distributed 4,000 pounds of 
beans during December, 1931.2 During the summer 
following the National Conference, wheat farmers in 
Montana harvested about 85 percent of the acreage they 
had planted, up from the 47 percent harvested in 1931, 
and the average yield per acre more than doubled to 13.6 
bushels per acre, but the average price of wheat bottomed
2 Lewistown Democrat-News 6 December 1931.
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out at $.35 per bushel, the lowest annual average on 
record in Montana.3
As the crisis deepened, the comprehensive planning 
ideas of land utilization seemed a panacea for 
agriculture's problems and political support developed. 
Both the Republican and the Democratic party platforms in 
1932 included land utilization planks.4 Specifically, 
Republicans supported national land use planning, as well 
as the federal purchase of land unsuitable for 
agriculture. Democratic candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt, 
as governor of New York, had started a land use planning 
program in the state and supported national land use 
classification and planning as a way to prevent the 
economic difficulties that farmers faced. He believed 
that a combination of industry and agricultural land use 
readjustment would restore rural economies.5 His 
inaugural address on 4 March 1933 reflected his
3 The statistics on wheat production begin in 1873, when 
11 acres of wheat were harvested, producing 20 bushels 
per acre at a price of $.98 per bushel. Montana 
Agricultural Statistics Service, Montana Agricultural 
Statistics, State Series 1867-1991 (Helena: Montana 
Department of Agriculture, 1992), 4-6.
4 L. C. Gray, "The Social and Economic Implications of 
the National Land Program," Journal of Farm Economics 
18(May 1936):258.
5 Wilson, "A Land Use Program," 218-219.
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commitment to land planning, suggesting that Americans 
"endeavor to provide a better use of the land. . . . "6
Roosevelt offered the country a "New Deal,” and as 
part of that New Deal he signed the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act on 12 May 1933, establishing the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration (AAA) and 
implementing emergency relief measures in an effort to 
give farmers the purchasing power they had had during the 
years 1909-1914. Short-term relief, such as agricultural 
subsidies and reduction of acreage planted, was followed 
by long-term reform to prevent future agricultural 
disasters, economic and environmental.7
Government intervention in the agricultural economy 
through the AAA was not always popular with the 
electorate (or the courts), although it did help farm 
prices and farmers. By late 1933, even Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry A. Wallace said he was "disillusioned 
about the virtues of laissez faire," but he believed 
"that this is an age of unpleasant alternatives." One of
6 Lewistown Democrat-News 6 March 1933; Franklin D. 
Roosevelt, Nothing to Fear: The Selected Addresses of
Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1932-1945, ed. by B. D. Zevin 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), 15.
7 Theodore Saloutos, "The New Deal in the Great Plains," 
Agricultural History 43(1969):346-347.
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those unpleasant alternatives, according to Wallace, was 
the Agricultural Adjustment Act. Wallace hoped for 
"social discipline” among farmers (which he defined as "a 
willingness to modify individual behavior for the larger 
purposes of society”), but he believed that significant 
changes in agriculture could not be made "without the use 
of the centralizing power of the Federal Government."8 
At the same time, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture 
Rexford G. Tugwell actively promoted the use of the 
federal government to rescue agriculture, believing that 
the federal government would exert control over public 
land and privately held land, in order to control 
productivity.9
Under President Roosevelt and the New Deal, national 
land planning began in earnest as the support for 
stronger government intervention grew. Following the 
recommendations of participants at the 1931 National 
Conference, the USDA had established two committees to 
formulate a national land policy, but they were short-
8 Henry A. Wallace, "The Farmer and Social Discipline" 
Journal of Farm Economics 16 (January 1934): quotes on
1, 2, 8.
9 Rexford G. Tugwell, "The Place of Government in a 
National Land Program," Journal of Farm Economics 16 
(January 1934):55.
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lived. Once in office, Roosevelt set up a National 
Planning Office under the Public Works Administration, 
but in June 1934, he replaced that office with the 
National Resources Board (NRB), which superseded the 
earlier committees on national land policy. The NRB 
coordinated and supervised natural resource inventorying 
and planning efforts within the federal government. 
Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes chaired the board, 
which included Secretary of Agriculture Henry Wallace and 
other cabinet members, as well as Federal Emergency 
Relief Administrator Harry Hopkins. Lewis Gray worked on 
the staff of the National Resources Board as the Director 
of the Land Section, headed the AAA Land Policy Section, 
and served on the National Land Planning Committee.
After years of leading the Land Utilization movement,
Gray was finally in a position to implement some of its 
ideas.10
Hugh H. Bennett, the Chief of the Soil Erosion 
Service, and M. L. Wilson both served on the National
10 Proceedings of the National Conference on Land 
Utilization (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1932), 246-247, hereafter cited as Proceedings of 
the National Conference; Paul K. Conkin, Tomorrow a New 
World: The New Deal Community Program (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1959), 80, hereafter cited as 
Conkin, Tomorrow a New World.
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Land Planning Committee as well.11 Wilson would be best 
known for his New Deal domestic allotment program for 
farmers, but his ideas on land use mirrored those of 
Lewis Gray's. Both men believed that the federal 
government needed to study land use, inventory and 
classify land, encourage rural zoning, and purchase 
submarginal land.12
In late 1934, the National Resources Board submitted 
to the President A Report on the Matronal Planning and 
Public Works in Relation to Natural Resources and 
Including Land Use and Water Resources with Findings and 
Recommendations. Subsequent to the initial Report, the 
National Resources Board issued eleven supplementary 
reports that provided more detail on various resource 
issues. The National Resources Board Report looked much 
like an expanded version of previous land utilization
11 National Resources Board, A Report on the National 
Planning and Public Works in Relation to Natural 
Resources and Including Land Use and Water Resources with 
Findings and Recommendations (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1934), iv, 8, hereafter cited 
as National Resources Board, Report.
12 Merrill G. Burlingame and Edward J. Bell, Jr., The 
Montana Cooperative Extension Service: A History 1893-
1974 (Bozeman: Montana State University, 1984), 28-29,
65-92; William D. Rowley, M. L. Wilson and the Campaign 
for the Domestic Allotment (Lincoln: University of
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papers, with assessments of natural resources, population 
growth, and future land use needs. The Report echoed the 
land utilization lament that some previous land use had 
been inefficient, causing loss of resources, manpower, 
and capital, while allowing a few people to profit from 
the misuse of the land.13 Just after its publication, M. 
L. Wilson reviewed the Report for the annual meeting of 
the American Farm Economic Association in Chicago in 
December 1934. Like many in his field, he hoped the 
document would be used to change land policy.14
In general, the National Resources Board report 
castigated the "laissez faire" attitude toward land use, 
citing both the destruction of the nation's resources and 
devastation of people's lives. In a bold step away from 
the American emphasis on individualism, the board 
suggested that "our national democracy is built upon the 
principle that the gains of our civilization are 
essentially mass gains and should be administered for the 
benefit of the many rather than the few; our priceless
Nebraska Press, 1970), 3; Wilson, "A Land Use Program," 
217-235.
13 National Resources Board, Report, v-vi.
14 M. L. Wilson, "The Report on Land of the National 
Resources Board," Journal of Farm Economics 17(February
1935):39-50, hereafter cited as Wilson, "Report."
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resources of soil, water, minerals are for the service of 
the American people, for the promotion of the welfare and 
well-being of all citizens." More dramatically, the NRB 
threatened to challenge the American tradition of 
unrestrained private ownership of land when it suggested 
that,
It is obvious, since most of our better lands 
are in private ownership, that a program for 
adjustments in land use must affect and reckon 
with the prevailing system of private 
ownership. . . . But private property in land 
carries within itself certain characteristics 
which have jeopardized both the private and the 
public welfare. In order to survive, many 
private interests are compelled to take a 
short-time exploitive point of view. In an era 
of competitive logging and destructive fires, 
the lumberman who wishes to practice 
conservative forestry may find his markets lost 
to less scrupulous competitors who encounter 
lower costs. Likewise, the farmer who wishes 
to adopt a system of farm management designed 
to eliminate serious erosion may find himself 
caught in the network of competitive handicaps 
through increased costs or decreased immediate 
income. . . . Changing social conditions 
require a reconsideration and redefinition of 
the limits which the state must impose to 
protect not only the public interest, but also 
private interests as well.
Although it seemed like a call for collectivism, the 
Report suggested that strong measures were necessary to 
protect the individual.15 This represented an important 
change in the idea of individual rights than earlier
1S National Resources Board, Report, 8, quotes on v, 
154-155.
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federal policy. Instead of protecting the individual 
from interference, the federal government was advocating 
the protection of the public from the individual.
According to the National Resources Board, and many 
land utilizationists, the cultivation of submarginal land 
was the root problem that led to bankruptcy, foreclosure, 
farm abandonment, tax delinquency, and more problems. 
Although there had been much discussion about removing 
submarginal land from cultivation, the NRB report was the 
first to identify and map areas of submarginal 
agricultural land which should be retired from 
cultivation. The NRB realized that a large scale, long­
term program had to be established. It classified 
454,200 farms on 75,345,000 acres (117,727 square miles, 
or an area roughly four-fifths the size of the State of 
Montana) as submarginal in 1935 and began making plans 
for the federal repurchase of part of that land. The 
land purchase program, named the Land Utilization 
Program, was to add acreage to national and state 
forests, wildlife refuges, national and state parks, and 
Indian reservations, was to help states buy land in an 
area of tax delinquent land to "square out" (fill out) a 
block of tax delinquent land, and, most importantly, was 
to retire submarginal land from cultivation and convert
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it to grazing or other more appropriate use. At a 
recommended rate of about 5 million acres annually, it 
would take about fifteen years to retire the whole 75 
million acres. The NRB report recommended that the land 
purchases or any change in land use be voluntary, and 
that owners be compensated.16
While much of the submarginal land was in the Great 
Plains, there was submarginal land throughout the 
country. Southern crop land suffered from erosion and 
years of growing cotton or tobacco. Cut over land in the 
Great Lake states was not suited for cultivation, but 
many were trying to farm it. A little more than one- 
fourth of the submarginal land in the United States was 
cultivated, just under one-half was grazed, and the 
remainder was wooded or had farm buildings on it. The 
National Resources Board estimated the value of the 
submarginal land at $682,090,000, or about $9 per acre, 
but the allocated $25 million dollars would buy only a 
fraction of the acreage proposed. The National Resources 
Board noted, however, that in purchasing the poorest
16 Ibid., 2-3; National Resources Board, Maladjustments 
in Land Use in the United States, Supplementary Report, 
Part VI (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
1935), 49, hereafter cited as National Resources Board,
Ma ladjustments.
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lands first, they would get more acreage per dollar in 
the early stages of the federal buy-back. The board 
suggested that the federal government retain title to 
lands acquired but leave the administration to the best 
suited state or federal agency.17
Agricultural economists believed that a submarginal 
land purchase program would bring long-term reform to the 
Great Plains. However, the federal laws that transferred 
the public domain into private hands had forced a 
checkerboard ownership on the Great Plains, which made it 
difficult to acquire large parcels of land. Railroads 
received every other section for several miles parallel 
to their tracks, causing a broad checkered corridor along 
routes. Federal and state land disbursements under the 
homestead laws, then, made it difficult for any one 
person to own many adjacent sections of land. This 
checkerboard land ownership pattern prevented ranchers 
from acquiring several contiguous parcels. Parts of the
17 National Resources Board, Maladjustments, 49; C. F. 
Clayton, "Program of the Federal Government for the 
Purchase and Use of Submarginal Land," Journal of Farm 
Economics 17(February 1935) :59, hereafter cited as 
Clayton, "Program of the Federal Government;" H. R.
Tolley, "The Program Planning Division of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration," Journal of Farm 
Economics 16 (October 1934):582-508, hereafter cited as
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northern Great Plains were more suited to grazing than to 
cultivation, but small farmers could not just switch to 
grazing because the homestead laws required claimants to 
cultivate the land in order to receive the patent for the 
land. Furthermore, the 160 acres (or after 1909, 320 
acres) granted to homesteaders could support only a few 
head of cattle, not enough to generate adequate income to 
support a family. Some ranchers took advantage of 
abandoned homesteads, but that offered no permanence. 
Others tried to lease additional land, but the leases 
were short, so there was no way to plan for the future. 
And ranchers who had short leases had no interest in 
maintaining the range for the long-term, and so 
overgrazed their leaseholds.18
The National Resources Board realized that the 
problem required more than the retirement of submarginal 
farm land. Land policies had to be changed in such a way 
that settlers would not be encouraged to begin farming 
submarginal lands. Boosters, land promoters, and state 
and local governments had encouraged settlement without
Tolley, "Program Planning;" National Resources Board, 
Report, 183-184.
18 L. C. Gray, "Federal Purchase and Administration of 
Submarginal Land in the Great Plains," Journal of Farm
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regard for the carrying capacity of the land, and by the 
1920s, all of the public domain that reasonably could 
have been homesteaded and farmed had been taken up. 
Consequently, the NRB planners suggested withdrawing 
remaining federal lands from homestead entry. They 
argued that settling people on poor land inevitably would 
lead to more people on relief and a host of other 
problems, even if it was simply delayed by a few good 
years. Between 40 and 60 percent of the homesteads taken 
up after 1909 had been relinquished or canceled, and even 
many of those that made it to full entry were later 
abandoned. Nevertheless, people continued to homestead. 
In the year ending 30 June 1934, the federal government 
recorded nearly eight thousand original entries. The NRB 
also suggested that settlement on submarginal state land 
should be discouraged by using a variety of instruments, 
such as tax incentives or federal assistance, to 
influence rural settlement and development.19
One decisive step toward national comprehensive land 
and natural resource planning was the proposal to have 
one board coordinate land use and natural resource
Economics 21(February 1939):123-131, quote on 123, 
hereafter cited as Gray, "Federal Purchase."
19 National Resources Board, Report, 184-189.
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planning among all federal agencies. Instead of having 
every agency advancing a separate land use plan, one 
coordinated effort could be made. As for the legal basis 
for national land planning, the report pointed out that 
the United States had absolute control of all land 
(through eminent domain), and it did not back away from 
the possibility of using that control. Ironically, at 
the same time the New Deal was adding many new agencies, 
which made it more difficult to coordinate planning.20
Gray, as Director of the Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration Land Planning Section, heavily influenced 
national land planning. The National Resources Board 
helped him by recommending that his section be made 
permanent so that one agency could guide all aspects of 
federal land acquisition, management, research, and use, 
in order to avoid duplication.21
The National Resources Board made detailed 
recommendations in the areas of land, water resource, 
mineral resource, and public works planning, not unlike 
those that land utilizationists had been promoting for 
more than a decade. With the publication of the report,
20 Ibid., v-vi; Tim Lehman, Public Values, Private Lands: 
Farmland Preservation Policy, 1933-1985 (Chapel Hill: 
University of North Carolina Press).
21 Ibid., 2-3.
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Lewis Gray's land utilization ideas secured a broader 
audience and finally shaped national policy, if only 
because the serious economic and environmental problems 
of the 1930s required bold efforts. The board 
optimistically believed that once the recommendations 
were in place, many land use problems would be corrected. 
The NRB recognized that maladjustments in land use caused 
"human destitution, losses in capital and dissipation of 
the land resource.1,22 With research, coordination, and 
planning, the board believed, flooding and erosion, for 
example, could be reduced while land and water resources 
were developed. Long-range planning for natural 
resources would allow for conservation and development.
In addition, the board believed that the United States 
could "eliminate the use of land incapable of affording a 
minimum standard of living, develop agricultural 
production on the most suitable soils only, and aid in 
raising the standards of living in many agricultural 
regions.1,23
The National Resources Board divided the country 
into regions in order to focus on major land-use 
problems. Every state had submarginal land, but most of
22 National Resources Board, Maladjustments, quote on 1.
23 National Resources Board, Report, 2.
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the land under consideration for federal purchase was 
located in the arid West, especially on the Great Plains. 
The Western Great Plains region included the western two- 
thirds of North Dakota and South Dakota, the panhandle of 
Nebraska, southwestern Kansas, and most of Montana, 
Wyoming, Colorado, and New Mexico east of the Continental 
Divide. Essentially, the region stretched from near the 
97th meridian west to the Rocky Mountains.24
The NRB identified several factors that had led to 
problems in the western Great Plains. Farmers either had 
not adjusted their farming practices to the arid climate, 
or they had used faulty dry farming methods. Homestead 
units were too small to support a family. Rainfall 
fluctuated widely, which occasionally meant bumper crops, 
but often meant crop failure. The reduction of 
vegetative cover from overgrazing and cultivation led to 
serious erosion problems. Additional environmental 
problems, such as hail and insects, reduced the 
profitability of farming on the western Great Plains. To 
better adjust to the environment, the board suggested 
switching from farming to ranching in the more arid part 
of the region, and increasing the size of the farm units
24 Ibid., 6-10, 31-32, quote on 31.
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to allow a mixed use with more land devoted to ranching 
than farming.25
The degradation of the plains was obvious. One 
participant at the annual meeting of the American Farm 
Economic Association in 1934 stated that "the 
Government' s program to acquire poor land and to convert 
that land to uses for which it is better adapted is a 
recognition of the fact that the physical resources 
available for the creation of a new public domain are 
sadly deteriorated from the condition which characterized 
the original public domain."26 This represented a 
critical change in federal land policy. Instead of 
trusting the individual landowners and the market to 
properly maintain land, the federal government was taking 
responsibility to reacquire, rehabilitate, and maintain 
land.
Once the land was purchased, the National Resources 
Board would seek to convert the submarginal land to 
grazing, forest, or recreational use. In the past, local 
governments and individuals converted some abandoned 
farms to other uses, but the board planned to do it more 
systematically and on a much larger scale. In addition
25 Ibid., 6-10, 32, quote on 6-7.
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to rehabilitating the new federal domain, however, the 
board suggested that the federal government should 
restore state-owned submarginal land as well.
Part of the problem was the definition of 
submarginal land. Lewis Gray did not like the word 
"submarginal" because most land had some economic 
potential; it was only a matter of using land 
appropriately. Gray pointed out that the intent of the 
federal submarginal land purchase program was to change 
the use to which land was put, not to remove it from use 
entirely. Broadly, land was to be defined by soil 
fertility, though other factors influenced the 
"submarginal" designation, including rainfall, erosion, 
distance from markets, and population density.27 Arthur 
Hyde, Secretary of Agriculture under President Hoover, 
discussed the definition of "submarginal" land in his 
talk at the 1931 Conference on Land Utilization. "The 
economic definition of submarginal land is a slippery, 
elusive thing. The definition from a social point of 
view is simple enough. It is land on which no farmer, 
however skillful, can support a decent standard of
26 Clayton, "Program of the Federal Government," quote 
on 57-58.
27 National Resources Board, Maladjustments, 13.
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living. It is the old, old, tragic story of someone 
trying to get bread out of a stone.”28
Clearly, federal responsibilities would not end with 
the purchase and rehabilitation of old homesteads. They 
would extend to the resettlement of families as well.
The National Resources Board recommended that the land 
buy-back proceed at a pace that would allow for the 
orderly resettlement of displaced families by "local 
quasi-public corporations." Families would be resettled 
as close as possible to their communities, and not across 
state lines.29
Because the areas with submarginal land usually had 
little employment to offer, resettlement was a problem. 
And in these same areas, foreclosures, bankruptcies, and 
farm abandonment had reduced population densities and 
reduced the tax base. Local governments already had 
difficulties providing services to such areas. In one 
Montana project area, 40 percent of the elementary 
schools had fewer than 10 pupils per school.
Agricultural economists projected an annual savings for
28 Arthur M. Hyde, "Developing a National Policy of 
Land Utilization," in Proceedings of the National 
Conference, 31.
29 National Resources Board, Report, 183-184, quote 
on 183.
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local government of $60,000 if 1000 families could be 
relocated.30 The NRB sought, then, to relocate people, 
to "effect a balance between the population and the 
land." Other problems stemmed from the extreme poverty 
of many farm families who worked submarginal land, and 
had problems feeding, clothing, and housing their 
families. They often lived in shacks with too few rooms, 
no running water, no telephones, and no electricity.31
The Great Depression caused demographic changes in 
the United States as rural and urban workers sought work 
or subsistence. Some New Deal policy-makers believed 
that the unemployed urban workers could become self- 
sufficient if they had subsistence homesteads; others 
believed that for farmers and farm laborers, industry 
provided the answer. The National Resources Board 
recommended that there not be any major efforts at moving 
the urban unemployed into commercial agriculture, 
although there were New Deal efforts at settling people
30 John H. Haggerty, Public Finance Aspects of the Milk 
River Land Acquisition Project (LA-MT-2), Phillips 
County, Montana, Land Use Planning Publication No. 18-a 
(Washington, D. C.: United States Department of
Agriculture Resettlement Administration, 1937).
31 National Resources Board, Maladjustments, 16, 17, 
quote on 13.
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on subsistence plots and establishing rural industrial 
centers.32
In the recommendations of the National Resources 
Board, Lewis Gray won, in part, the battle with Elwood 
Mead in the Bureau of Reclamation. The board recommended 
that old reclamation projects be completed before any new 
reclamation projects were developed, and that any new 
reclamation projects first be approved by the Departments 
of Agriculture and Interior. The emphasis, according to 
the board, should be on small irrigation projects.33
The federal government then, was restricting the 
expansion of agricultural land. This represented a major 
change in federal policy. The country's founding fathers 
had envisioned a democratic republic of small independent 
farmers, an image that lingered long after the 
development of corporate farming. And for decades the 
federal government had encouraged the settlement and 
cultivation of the public domain, through land sales and 
homestead acts, to encourage that republican ideal. The 
curtailment of agricultural expansion countered that 
entrenched ideal.
32 National Resources Board, Report, 2-3; See Conkin, 
Tomorrow a New World.
33 National Resources Board, Report, 3-4.
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Lewis Gray believed that the inventory of national 
resources by the National Resources Board was an 
important national land use plan because several local 
organizations as well as state and federal agencies 
managed to cooperate with each other to complete work on 
it. But in order for federal land planning to work, 
interagency communication and cooperation had to occur. 
Federal agencies did not necessarily work well together. 
The Department of the Interior and the Department of 
Agriculture had a long history of disagreements. The 
latter believed that it should house the Bureau of 
Reclamation because reclamation involved agriculture, 
while the former believed that it should house the Forest 
Service. During the New Deal, Secretary of Agriculture 
Henry A. Wallace and Secretary of the Interior Harold 
Ickes each fought to maintain his agency's power. The 
Department of the Interior, however, dominated federal 
policies in the West.34
34 James R. Kluger, Turning- on Water with a Shovel: The
Career of Elwood Mead (Albuquerque: University of New
Mexico Press, 1992), hereafter cited as Kluger, Elwood 
Mead ; Richard Lowitt, The New Deal and the West 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), hereafter
cited as Lowitt, New Deal ; Lewis C. Gray, Land Planning, 
Public Policy Pamphlet No. 19 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1936), 12, hereafter cited as Gray, Land 
Planning.
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Under Roosevelt, efforts to implement land 
utilization projects and start a submarginal land 
purchase program began even before the creation of the 
National Resources Board. In 1933, the Special Board of 
Public Works recommended establishing such a program, and 
the federal government began setting up a submarginal 
land purchase program, funded with $25 million from the 
Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA). The 
acquired land was to be used to expand Indian lands, 
create recreation areas or wildlife refuges, or to be 
converted to grazing lands or national forests. Work 
Relief funds would pay for the appropriate development of 
the purchased lands. The new Land Utilization Program 
proposed to purchase ten million acres of submarginal 
farm land in forty-five states, mostly in the Great 
Plains, where the acquired land was to be converted from 
wheat farming to grazing.35
35 Phil Hooker, "Chronology of the Land Utilization 
Program," Unpublished Manuscript , United States 
Department of the Interior Bureau of Land Management, 
Montana State Office, Billings, Montana, 1941, 3-4, 
hereafter cited as Hooker, "Chronology;" H. H. Wooten,
The Land Utilization Program, 1934 to 1964 , Agricultural 
Economic Report No. 85(Washington, D. C.: USDA Economic
Research Service, 1965), 5-6, hereafter cited as Wooten, 
Land Utilization Program ; Clayton, "Program of the 
Federal Government," 58-59.
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In early 1934, the AAA underwent a reorganization as 
the agency looked toward long-range agricultural reform, 
not just relief. As part of the changes, the Program 
Planning Division was established. Under that division, 
the Land Policy Section was established. Although the 
section had a variety of functions, it generally worked 
to determine the most appropriate use for land and find 
ways to encourage adjustments to land use.36
The Land Policy Section of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, under the direction of Lewis 
Gray, started the trial program to acquire and 
rehabilitate land for agricultural purposes, but other 
federal agencies (the National Park Service and the 
Bureau of Indian Affairs in the Department of Interior, 
and the Biological Survey in the Department of 
Agriculture) were responsible for other lands appropriate 
for development under those agencies. With the help of 
state and local agencies, the federal planners defined 
the boundaries of individual projects. The program was 
to include resettlement of the farm families affected by 
the land purchases, so that they would have some means of 
support. State Rural Rehabilitation Corporations were
36 Tolley, "Program Planning," 582-508.
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responsible for resettlement of displaced farm 
families.37
Lewis Gray, describing the initial program, 
explained that field offices worked with regional 
directors to set up the procedure for the assessing and 
the optioning of property, but that the final plans had 
to be sent to Washington for approval from the FERA 
administrator before funds were allocated. Gray noted 
that there were problems because of the "loose form of 
organization," especially because resettlement was under 
yet another agency, the Division of Rural Rehabilitation 
of the FERA, and that there was no central control. In 
order for the program to work, the Regional directors of 
the land program and state emergency relief 
administrators had to work together closely. Later 
critics of the program noted the same problems.38
In July 1934, FERA Director Harry L. Hopkins placed 
J. S. Lansill in charge of both land acquisition and 
resettlement, through the Rural Rehabilitation Division.
37 Gray, Land Planning, 31-32; Hooker, "Chronology," 3-8; 
Wooten, Land Utilization Program, 5-8, 82; Clayton, 
"Program of the Federal Government," 60.
38 Gray, Land Planning, 32; Lawrence Westbrook, "The 
Program of Rural Rehabilitation of the FERA," Journal of 
Farm Economics 17(February 1935);89-100, hereafter cited 
as Westbrook, "Program of Rural Rehabilitation."
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Under that agency, the Land Utilization Program proposed 
250 projects and received approval for 206, with 
negotiations in progress to acquire nine million acres. 
Despite the plans to rescue farmers on submarginal land, 
the FERA withdrew part of the funds allocated for land 
purchase so that they could be used for direct relief. 
Because of problems with the authority to purchase land, 
the Land Utilization Program failed to get underway for 
several months.39
By the end of 1934, there were 64 agricultural 
demonstration projects totaling nearly 6 million acres 
under consideration by the Land Policy Section. The 
average option price per acre was $5.42, less than the 
prices being offered for recreational and waterfowl 
projects, but more than the estimated $3.60 price being 
offered for lands for Indian projects. The government 
had to have an FERA-approved option on the land before 
the end of the fiscal year (June 30, 1935), in order to 
commit the funds, so federal employees had to work 
quickly.40
39 Hooker, "Chronology," 8; Wooten, Land Utilization 
Program, 9-10, 82.
40 Clayton, "Program of the Federal Government," 60-62.
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On 30 April 1935, Roosevelt issued Executive Order 
7027, creating the Resettlement Administration, and 
appointed Rexford G. Tugwell head of the new agency. The 
Resettlement Administration reported to Secretary of 
Agriculture Henry A. Wallace but maintained some 
independence within the department. The President then 
issued Executive Order 7028 which transferred the Land 
Utilization Program and personnel to that new agency. 
Lewis Gray left the Land Policy Section of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Administration to become Director 
of the Land Utilization Division in the Resettlement 
Administration. The transferred division was given $48 
million for land purchase and another $18 million for 
development, and made plans to purchase more than 20 
million acres for $105 million. At the time of the 
transfer, the federal government had purchased 178,755 
acres at an average cost of $7.75 per acre, but one year 
later, the government had purchased 1,744,342 acres at an 
average cost per acre of $4.47.41
41 Hooker, "Chronology," 3-8; Wooten, Land Utilization 
Program, 5-8, 15-27, 10-12, 83; Dan Fulton, Failure on 
the Plains: A Rancher's View of the Public Lands Problem
(Bozeman: Big Sky Books, 1982), 109; Gray, Land
Planning, iii, 33; L. C. Gray, "Land Utilization," 
Resettlement Administration First Annual Report 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office,
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The resettlement of poor farmers raised many 
concerns, and the transfer of the Land Utilization 
Program reflected the interest of the government in 
addressing those concerns. Once their land had been 
sold, many families had nowhere to go and little money to 
finance their efforts at relocation because they received 
little for their land because it was submarginal. These 
farm families required extra assistance for resettlement, 
so that they would not be left homeless or relocate to 
other submarginal land.42 The Land Utilization Program 
had tried to relocate families in the vicinity of or at 
least in the same state as their home, but that was not 
always possible.43
The federal government offered resettlement 
assistance. By early 1939, the federal government bought 
land from 10,000 families. About 7,700 families 
resettled without government help, the remainder with 
government assistance. Some had difficulty resettling 
successfully because of advanced age, poor health, or 
lack of knowledge and experience. The Land Utilization 
Program did give many older farmers the opportunity to
1936), 21.
42 Hooker, "Chronology," 15-27; Wooten, Land Utilization 
Program, 10-12, 83.
43 Westbrook, "Program of Rural Rehabilitation," 99.
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leave farming; on the purchased lands, forty percent of 
the male heads of households were over fifty years old.44 
Many of those who accepted federal help had to do so for 
a long period. Often, they had to be retrained. 
(Irrigation, for example, required knowledge as well as 
constant upkeep.) Some abandoned fanning altogether and 
found other employment.45
Gray argued that over the long term it would be 
cheaper to buy land outright from farmers than to 
subsidize their family farms. The federal purchase of 
submarginal land should lead to the "gradual permanent 
retirement of the lean acres" which should achieve "the 
elimination of rural slums, . . . conservation of soil 
resources, and a better grouping of rural population in 
the interest of more efficient and economical local 
government. "46
The federal land purchases and relocation programs 
depended on the close cooperation of several federal
44 Wendell Lund, "Bought Out by the Government," in Land 
Policy Review 2 (May-June 1939):22-30.
45 Paul H. Landis, "Probable Social Effects of Purchasing 
Submarginal Land in the Great Plains," Journal of Farm 
Economics 17(August 1935):513-521.
46 L. C. Gray, "Research Relating to Policies for 
Submarginal Areas," Journal of Farm Economics 16 (April 
1934):298-303, quote on 301.
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agencies. For example, some public domain was managed by 
the Land Utilization Program, forcing the Department of 
the Interior and the Department of Agriculture to work 
together. Coordination was hampered by constant change 
as the Land Utilization Program shifted from agency to 
agency in the New Deal. In part because of this, the 
land purchase program was floundering by 1936. Roosevelt 
ordered the reorganization of the submarginal land 
purchase program four times in two years, which made the 
consistent application of a single strategy all but 
impossible.47 Furthermore, while the New Deal was trying 
to move people off marginal farms, more than half a 
million new farms were started in the US from 1931 to 
1936, most of them on submarginal land. As economist 
Noble Clark critically noted, "It is a grim joke that for 
every family the federal government has laboriously moved 
off submarginal land at least five new families have 
moved onto poor lands." Without land use planning and 
control, and local residents' support of that control, 
the submarginal land purchase program could not achieve 
much.48
47 Hooker, "Chronology," 3-8; Wooten, Land Utilization 
Program, 5-8.
48 Clark, "Discussion," 274-280, quote on 277.
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Still, the early program did succeed in getting many 
people off of poor farm land, despite the unchecked 
movement to the contrary. Between 1934 and mid-1937, the 
Land Utilization Program ran 98 agricultural adjustment 
projects, 30 Indian land projects, 32 wildlife refuge 
projects, and 46 recreation projects, totaling 9,149,000 
acres. About two-thirds of that acreage was for 
agricultural adjustment projects.49
In the late spring and summer of 1937, dust clouds 
from the Great Plains settled on Washington, D. C., 
convincing lawmakers of the seriousness of the drought 
out West. In July of 1937, the Land Utilization Program 
achieved some stability and funding when the United 
States Congress passed the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act 
and President Roosevelt signed it into law. The act was 
"To create the Farmers' Home Corporation, to promote more 
secure occupancy of farms and farm homes, to correct the 
economic instability resulting from some present forms of 
farm tenancy, and for other purposes." Toward that end, 
the act provided for loans to tenants, sharecroppers, and 
other farm laborers for the purchase of farms and items
49 Wooten, Land Utilization Program, 11; W. M. Russell, 
"Development of Land Use Adjustment Project," United 
States Department of Agriculture Bureau of Agricultural
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related to the business of farming. Land Utilization was 
one of the "other purposes" of the act, addressed in 
Title III.50
Under Title III, the Secretary of Agriculture was
authorized and directed to develop a program of 
land conservation and land utilization, 
including the retirement of lands which are 
submarginal or not primarily suitable for 
cultivation, in order thereby to correct 
maladjustments in land use, and thus assist in 
controlling soil erosion, reforestation, 
preserving natural resources, mitigating 
floods, preventing impairment of dams and 
reservoirs, conserving surface and subsurface 
moisture, protecting the watersheds of 
navigable streams, and protecting the public 
lands, health, safety, and welfare.51
Under all incarnations of the Land Utilization Program
the federal government hired local workers, many through
the WPA, as laborers to rehabilitate the repurchased
land. Some were hired to do the work on land they had
sold to the government. Development aided the displaced
farmers and contributed to the local economy.52
The federal government was to buy or to accept the
transfer of "submarginal land and land not primarily
suited for cultivation" from individuals or local
Economics Land Policy Circular June 1937:10 -14, 
hereafter cited as Russell, "Development."
50 Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act, 50 Stat. 522 (1950), 
522, hereafter cited as Bankhead-Jones.
51 Ibid., 525
52 Wooten, Land Utilization Program, 18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
212
governments. Once acquired, the Department of 
Agriculture was to figure out what the land could most 
efficiently be used for, and then develop it according to 
its potential. Development included small flood control 
projects, such as building terraces and ditches to 
control runoff or building stock water ponds. In 
addition, the program reforested cut-over land and re­
seeded grazing land. The idea was to make the 
submarginal land economically productive in the future, 
generating revenue from the sale of timber, logging 
permits, turpentine leases, grazing fees, hunting and 
fishing leases, and other recreational uses. Once 
developed, the federal government would pay the counties 
one-fourth of the net revenues to make up for some of the 
taxes lost when private land converted to federal land.53
Even though the Title III of the Bankhead-Jones Farm 
Tenant Act had broad support, its backers cut short the 
funding. Congress appropriated $10 million for the 
fiscal year ending 30 June 1938 to pay for Title III land 
purchases, but the act stipulated that not more than $20 
million would be appropriated for each of the next two 
fiscal years. Apparently a cap on funding was not
53 Bankhead-Jones, 526; Russell, "Development," 10 -14.
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necessary. Congress actually appropriated only $5 
million in each of these years, far below the maximum 
amount.54 By the end of June 1938, nearly 2.5 million 
more acres had been purchased, bringing the Land 
Utilization Program total to just under 8 million acres. 
Plans were underway to acquire another 2 million acres, 
much of it on the Great Plains.55
Submarginal land purchases prior to the passage of 
the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act had been started and 
funded by executive order, and the Secretary of 
Agriculture continued those land utilization projects 
already underway. But the old program had acquired 
submarginal land for forests, wildlife refuges, or for 
recreation areas, as well as for agricultural 
development. Under Title III, submarginal land 
acquisition was to be purchased solely for the 
development of agricultural land. Furthermore, the 
Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act ordered the development of 
land conservation and utilization projects on a 
continuing basis. The program, after several years,
54 Bankhead-Jones, 526; Wooten, Land Utilization 
Program, 12.
55 Wooten, Land Utilization Programr 13.
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seemed to have achieved a measure of permanence.56 Under 
the pre-Bankhead-Jones land use adjustment projects, the 
federal government purchased 3,656,000 acres in the Great 
Plains, not counting land that was used for wildlife 
refuges, Indian uses, and recreation. Under the new 
program, in 1938, the Secretary of Agriculture authorized 
41 new projects or extensions of old projects, totaling 
another 2,321,000.57
In September 1937, because the activities of the 
Resettlement Administration had broadened over the years, 
Secretary of Agriculture Wallace ordered the name changed 
to the Farm Security Administration. In addition to 
resettlement, Wallace charged the Farm Security 
Administration with administering Titles I, II, and parts 
of IV, of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act. At the 
same time, he transferred the Land Utilization Program, 
governed by Title III and parts of Title IV to the Bureau 
of Agricultural Economics. Resettlement Administration 
Assistant Administrator Lewis Gray again followed the 
Land Utilization Program to a new agency and became the 
Assistant Chief in charge of Land Utilization. After
56 Bankhead-Jones, 530; Hooker, "Chronology," 33; Wooten, 
Land Utilization Program, 83-84.
57 Gray, "Federal Purchase," 126-127.
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being shuffled around New Deal agencies, Lewis Gray's 
program had returned to its birthplace.58 The program's 
transience reflected continual fine-tuning as problems 
surfaced, but the maintenance of Gray and a core group of 
employees reflected Roosevelt' s commitment to the ideas 
of land utilization. Nevertheless, budget restraints 
prevented full implementation and suggested that, 
although New Dealers saw land utilization as the answer 
to many agricultural problems, it was not their top 
priority. The shifting of the Land Utilization Program 
from one agency to another did hamper efforts, although 
there was consistency in personnel. Despite the 
bureaucratic problems, the ideas of land utilization 
persisted.
By late 1937, work had begun on new land use 
projects in the Great Plains, authorized by the Bankhead- 
Jones Farm Tenant Act. The United States Department of 
Agriculture Land Policy Circular noted that "emphasis in 
the land use program will be placed upon the Great Plains 
region where droughts and dust storms have made land 
depletion and human poverty particularly serious."
58 United States Department of Agriculture, Farm Security 
Administration, Division of Land Utilization, Land Policy 
Circular September 1937:7.
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Several areas were under consideration, but the 
initiation of a project depended upon the willingness of 
landowners to sell their land at the appraised value. A. 
G. Black, Chief of the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 
stressed the importance of local cooperation, because the 
federal buy back alone could not fix all of the problems 
on the Great Plains. While the preference was for 
project development where there- was strong local 
approval, it was important that local farmers and 
ranchers show an interest in a variety of measures, 
including cooperative grazing, the development of soil 
conservation districts, rural zoning, and tax changes.59
There were several projects approved in the northern 
Great Plains, including the Milk River, Musselshell, and 
Lower Yellowstone projects by early 1938. The Milk River 
Project in northeastern Montana was one example of 
rehabilitation and development of submarginal land 
purchased under the Land Utilization Program. The 
federal government purchased almost a million acres in 
Blaine, Phillips, and Valley Counties (the former two 
border Fergus County on the northeast), converting it to
59 United States Department of Agriculture, Bureau of 
Agricultural Economics, "Work on Land Use Program Starts 
in the Great Plains," Land Policy Circular, December 
1937:1-2, quote on 1.
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grazing use. Buildings and fences that could not be used 
were torn down and the land converted to grazing. 
Agricultural economists expected that grazing leases 
would bring in $40,000 per year, one-fourth of which 
would go to local governments.60
Although the Land Utilization Program had achieved 
some permanence with the passage of the Bankhead-Jones 
Act, and it seemed that the Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics was a logical home for the program, the 
Secretary of Agriculture moved it, and the accompanying 
personnel, again in late 1938, to the Soil Conservation 
Service, where it remained until it was dismantled in the 
early 1950s, just as the next severe drought cycle 
affected the Great Plains.61 World War II interrupted 
the Land Utilization Program, and by 1943, land purchases 
had been halted, except for a few pieces of land to fill 
in gaps in existing federal land ownership.62
Although not covered by the submarginal land 
purchase programs, cooperative grazing was an important 
part of readjusting land use in the northern Great
60 Russell, "Development," 12.
61 Hooker, "Chronology," 38-41; Wooten, Land Utilization 
Program, 83-84.
62 Wooten, Land Utilization Program, 14.
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Plains. Unlike the submarginal land purchase program, 
cooperative grazing started at the lowest level — with a 
group of individual ranchers — but the idea spread among 
land utilization proponents as a way to make those former 
homesteads available to ranchers. As planned, private 
individuals and cooperative grazing associations leased 
lands purchased under the Land Utilization Program, but 
the federal government controlled land use by placing 
restrictions on the lease to prevent overgrazing. 
Federally purchased submarginal land in the western Great 
Plains was interspersed with state owned land, railroad, 
and other private land, making it difficult for 
individuals to lease any sizable acreage. Cooperative 
grazing associations were able to lease much of the 
checkerboard land, including the federally purchased 
submarginal land, creating larger grazing units and 
stabilizing land prices and use.63
Cooperative grazing efforts began in Montana during 
the 1920s, in response to the problems ranchers had 
buying and leasing enough contiguous land for enough 
years to earn a living. The Montana Legislature 
incorporated the first, the Pumpkin Creek-Mitzpah Grazing
63 Gray, "Federal Purchase," 127-129.
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District, in 1927. The organization, like subsequent 
cooperative grazing districts, was a nonprofit business 
that leased and bought land. Members of the grazing 
districts received grazing permits but had to follow 
rules based on the carrying capacity of the range. By 
1931, the Lewis town Democrat-Mews reported that the 
Pumpkin Creek-Mizpah Grazing District was profitable, 
allowing ranchers to lease better pasture at a lower 
price. Ranchers, through the organization, worked 
together to improve the range and its water resources.
The Pumpkin Creek-Mitzpah Grazing District proved to be 
successful, so the 1933 Montana Legislature established 
rules for incorporating cooperative grazing associations. 
In 1935, the legislature also established a State Grazing 
Commission and gave it authority over grazing 
districts.64
The United States Congress recognized the importance 
of the cooperative grazing districts and passed 
legislation addressing many of the issues concerning
64 M. H. Saunderson and N. W. Monte, Grazing Districts in 
Montana: Their Purpose and Organization Procedure,
Montana Agricultural Experiment Station Bulletin no. 326 
(Bozeman: Montana Agricultural Experiment Station,
1936), 3-5, hereafter cited as Saunderson and Monte, 
Grazing Districts; Lewis town Democrat-News 24 February 
1931.
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ranchers on the plains. Grazing districts were seen as 
the democratic way to return land to grazing while 
consolidating land holdings. The Taylor Grazing Act, 
sponsored by Colorado Congressman Edward T. Taylor, 
passed in June 1934, a few months before the National 
Resources Board report was published.65
The Taylor Grazing Act ended one era and began 
another. It marked the end of the homestead era, as it 
closed the public domain to homesteading.66 But it 
reopened a rehabilitated public domain (new and old) for 
leasing to ranchers, usually at below market prices. 
Ranchers benefited from the government regulation that 
improved the range and regulated its use. With carefully 
planned land-use, the grazing economy could be 
stabilized. The legislation was not without problems, 
however, because it lacked measures to ensure 
enforcement.67
65 Ibid., 6-8. The Taylor Grazing Act actually severely 
curtailed homesteading.
66 The federal government allowed some very restricted 
homesteading for a few years, and continued to allow 
homesteading in Alaska.
67 Lowitt, New Deal, 64-80. See also E. Louise Peffer, 
The Closing of the Public Domain: Disposal and 
Reservation Policies, 1900-50 (Stanford, California: 
Stanford University Press, 1951), hereafter cited as 
Peffer, The Closing of the Public Domain.
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The passage of the Taylor Grazing Act in 1934 
implied that the good farm land had already been taken 
upf as land utilizationists had suggested for many years, 
and that further homesteading would not do any good.
Land not suitable for homesteading would be organized 
into grazing districts, presumably with controls to 
prevent overgrazing. The Taylor Grazing Act was 
significant because "it reversed the previous land policy 
of providing open use to all comers to one of restricted 
use and management."68 With the act, and subsequent 
supporting measures, the federal government ended its 
long policy of encouraging settlement of the public 
domain. Furthermore, the Taylor Act marked an important 
shift in the perceived best use of land. After decades 
of encouraging the expansion of land under cultivation 
federal policy changed, recognizing that in much of the 
arid West, grazing was a more appropriate use of land 
resources.
The New Deal Land Utilization Program represented a 
major shift in public policy. After decades of policies 
that converted much of the public domain to private 
ownership, the federal government began buying back that
68 Gray, Land Planning, 11; Lowitt, New Deal, 64-66, 
quote on 65.
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land and converting into a new public domain. The 
submarginal land purchase program had several goals, 
including readjusting land use, erosion control and 
prevention, improvement of rural living conditions, 
reduction of local government costs, and encouragement of 
rural land use planning.
The program was not without problems. It was moved 
and restructured several times to correct a variety of 
problems, but the shifting of personnel had to have 
affected the program's overall success even while 
correcting specific problems. Lewis Gray, director of 
the program, provided some measure of stability. From 
1933 to 1946, the Land Utilization Program purchased over 
37,000 parcels, about 11.3 million acres, an average of 
just over 300 acres per parcel. The average per acre 
price was about $4.40. The $47.5 million spend on land 
purchased made up only part of the Land Utilization 
Program expenditures. Between 1933 and 1954, the federal 
government spent another $102.5 million for appraising, 
title clearance, and development. In the entire program, 
75 percent of the families residing on land that was sold 
to the federal government relocated themselves, without
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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government assistance. The total cost of the program, 
then, was about $150 million, or about $13.50 per acre.69
The federal government acquired more land in the 
northern Great Plains than in any other region, nearly 
one-half of the acreage purchased (more than 5.6 million 
acres), but only about 15 percent of the original goal of 
more than 75 million acres.70 In an article assessing 
New Deal expenditures in each of several regions, Leonard 
Arrington noted that the mountain states, including 
Montana, averaged the highest amount spent per capita, 
$716.30, including loans, relief programs, and reform 
programs such as the Land Utilization Program.71
Under Franklin Roosevelt, many of the ideas of the 
Land Utilization movement came to fruition. Unfettered 
settlement of the public domain ended with the passage of 
the Taylor Grazing Act. But more significantly, the 
implementation of the Land Utilization Program reversed 
the homestead movement by purchasing those failed 
homesteads and creating a new public domain, representing 
a bold move away from nineteenth-century land policies.
69 Wooten, Land Utilization Program, 17-18.
70 Ibid.
71 Leonard Arrington, "The Sagebrush Resurrection: New 
Deal Expenditures in the Western States, 1933-1939," 
Pacific Historical Review, 52:1-16.
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Instead of encouraging settlement of the public domain, 
the federal government worked to remove families from 
land that by the 1930s was considered "submarginal."72
The new policies signified a deeper shift in the 
role of government as the government relinquished its 
trust of individual landowners to protect and maintain 
the country's land resources. The federal government had 
begun to see the land resources as important to the 
collective well-being of the country which had to be 
protected from exploitation by the individual.
72 While E. Louise Peffer discussed the end of the 
homestead movement and the acquisition of federal land 
during the 1930s as well as the politics and issues 
concerning use of the public domain, she does not discuss 
the Land Utilization Program in The Closing of the Public 
Domain. John Opie discusses only briefly the federal 
purchase of land during the 1930s in The Lav of the Land: 
Two Hundred Years of American Farmland Policy (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1987). In The Public 
Lands: Studies in the History of the Public Domain,
edited by Vernon Carstensen (Madison: University of
Wisconsin Press, 1962) does not mention the federal 
purchase of land during the 1930s.
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Chapter 7
The Land Utilisation Program Implemented
While policy makers in Washington debated the future 
of agriculture, the sources of problems with agriculture 
had become obvious to many on the northern Great Plains. 
By the mid-1930s, most Montanans realized that the 
prosperity of the 1910s would not return, and that there 
had been fundamental flaws with the homestead boom. In 
an editorial in 1935, the Lewxstown Democrat-News noted, 
"It was cultivating land that never should have been put 
under the plow and close grazing of range lands paved the 
way for excessive soil erosion and severe dust storms 
when lack of moisture made huge tracts of ground dry and 
powdery."1 A later editorial outlined the predicament of 
farmers, stating that during the last fifteen years, "the 
situations of a great majority of our farmers have grown 
progressively more critical. Tens of thousands of them 
have lost their places and hundreds of thousands have 
been plunged into a morass of debt. . . . "2 Montana 
farmers, in a desperate situation, welcomed federal
1 Lewistown Democrat-News 14 January 1935.
2 Ibid., 4 June 1935.
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reform as implementation of a land utilization program 
began.
The intent of a land utilization program was to 
rescue farmers from hopeless situations on submarginal 
land and to change the land use to maximize its 
productivity over the long term. During the first few 
years, the land purchase program was essentially 
experimental. Agricultural economists and scientists 
worked to correct decades of land misuse, while rural 
sociologists proposed remedies for some of the social 
problems farm families faced. Lewis Gray and other Land 
Utilization Program officials worked with state 
scientists and planners to delineate the submarginal land 
purchases and plan for the resettlement of displaced 
farmers. In Montana, federal officials worked with the 
Montana Agricultural Experiment Station at Montana State 
College in Bozeman. Although the planning seemed 
relatively removed from those who were most affected, 
residents of some submarginal areas did petition for 
inclusion in the program.3
3 Brian Q. Cannon noted the use of petitions in Remaking 
the Agrarian Dream: New Deal Rural Resettlement in the
Mountain Nest (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico
Press, 1996), 11.
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Land planners designed land utilization projects in 
central and eastern Montana. A project near the Milk 
River proposed to buy land in Phillips, Blaine, and 
Valley counties, north and east of Fergus County, while a 
project along the Yellowstone River planned to purchase 
land in Yellowstone County. Another project was planned 
for Custer, Prairie, Dawson, Fallon, and McCone counties. 
(Fergus County Agent W. H. Jones resigned in 1935 to take 
a job as the district manager for that project.) Yet 
another project was planned for Musselshell, Petroleum, 
Golden Valley, and Wheatland counties. The Central 
Montana Land Use Adjustment Project was entirely in 
Fergus County.4
By 1934, the federal government had hired William B. 
Johnson to run the Land Utilization Program office in 
Lewistown, which was located above the Judith Theater 
downtown. Even though a submarginal land purchase 
program had not been started in Fergus County, Johnson 
had plenty of work to do, helping ranchers set up grazing 
districts which could lease the federal land once
4 After all of the rhetoric about retiring submarginal 
land on the Great Plains, the first New Deal land 
purchases in Fergus County were actually along the 
Missouri River, when the federal government began buying 
land for the Charles M. Russell National Wildlife Refuge
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purchases had been completed and improvements made. In 
the fall of 1934, the Fergus County Grazing Association 
No. 1 filed incorporation papers in Helena, the first of 
several cooperative grazing associations.5
Cooperative grazing associations bought, leased, and 
exchanged lands in order to consolidate enough holdings 
to support large-scale cattle ranching. Once organized, 
cooperative grazing associations consolidated holdings 
and leased land for long periods to offer stability for 
ranchers. Eventually, Fergus County had several 
cooperative grazing districts organized by the state 
grazing commission, including the Fergus # 1 Association, 
Indian Butte, Crooked Creek Association, Petroleum Fergus 
(in both Petroleum and Fergus Counties), Three Buttes, 
and Flatwillow Association.6
Once the Land Utilization Program identified and 
received approval for a project, it sent federal 
employees to the area to begin setting up a local office
in June 1935. Lewistown Democrat-News 30 September 1934, 
11 January 1935, 25 March 1935, 22 July 1935.
5 Ibid., 26 October 1934.
6 M. H. Saunderson, R. B. Haight, E. M. Peterson, and Rex 
E. Willard, An Approach to Area Land Use Planning, United 
States Department of Agriculture, Resettlement 
Administration Land Use Planning Publication No. 16,
March 1937 [Washington, D. C.], 44-45, hereafter cited as 
Saunderson et al., Land Use Planning.
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and informing land owners about the program. Options had 
to be signed, land had to be assessed, and titles had to 
be cleared before the actual transfer of land to the 
government. Once a purchase area had been identified, 
the location was supposed to be kept secret until the 
options had been signed, in order to avoid land 
speculation. At least initially, officials tried to sign 
up 90 percent of the landowners in the project area 
before the purchases were made.7
Nothing prevented a land owner from selling several 
parcels of non-contiguous land — they just had to be sold 
as separate tracts. The records indicate that the 
Central Montana Land Use Adjustment Project purchased 230 
tracts of land in Fergus County (more than 700 parcels 
had been submitted for consideration) from 163 
applicants. Parcels averaged about 335 acres apiece in 
size. Although most landowners sold only one parcel, 
some sold several. Union Central Life Insurance Company 
sold seven parcels to the federal government, more than 
any other institution or individual, but the Board of 
County Commissioners of Fergus County was close behind, 
having sold six parcels. Two individuals, Herbert Beck
7 Lewistown Democrat-News 22 October 1934.
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and Steve Ghezzo, each sold five parcels to the
submarginal land project in Fergus County.8
A wide variety of individuals and institutions sold 
their land to the federal government through the Land 
Utilization Program. Among the institutions were banks, 
Federal land banks, real estate companies, insurance 
companies, and county governments. The type of 
individual varied greatly as well, in part because the 
land had been in flux since the 1920s. As a result, not 
all of the land was owned by the prototypical 
homesteader, eking a living from the land, although some 
of the landowners fell into that category.
Herbert Beck sold five parcels totaling 800 acres to
the federal government, more than half of which he had 
managed to acquire since 1928. While Beck may have been 
a shrewd rancher/businessman, he did not always act 
within the law. In 1934, Beck was found guilty of 
"running" John McVey's cattle off their range and 
"mutilating" them, but his fine was only $25. The charge 
did not affect Beck's standing in the community, because
8 The average size was based on a 10 percent sample of 
the files for Fergus County, Montana. Land Use Case 
Files, 1934-1953, Records of the Bureau of Land 
Management, Montana, Record Group 49, National Archives, 
Rocky Mountain Region, Denver, Colorado, hereafter cited 
as Land Use Case Files.
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a year later he was named a Director of the Indian Butte 
Grazing District.9 Merle Groene, an attorney and a state 
representative, was listed as one of the landowners who 
sold land to the federal government, but he may have 
acted only as an intermediary. He and his wife were not 
poor farmers, but instead had sufficient income to own a 
summer home on Spring Creek.10 Michael A. Hickey served 
as president of the Fergus County Grazing Association No. 
1 before he sold his parcel to the Land Utilization 
Program. Hickey also served on the Taylor grazing 
district board, along with Ralph Jenson, who sold more 
than 2600 acres to the government.11
Several estates sold land to the federal government, 
relieving widows and children of unprofitable real 
estate. Carl Noble homesteaded in Fergus County in 1910, 
leaving only to serve in the army in World War I. He 
died in 1934, leaving his wife and two small children to
9 Land Use Case Files, Box 25, LUMT 38-22-476A; Box 26, 
LUMT 38-22-476B, LUMT 38-22-476C, LUMT 38-22-478; Box 27, 
LUMT 38-22-485; Fergus County Clerk of Court, Deed 
Records 129:39, 127:476, 497, 131:141, 134:171; Lewistown 
Democrat-News 3 October 1934, 17 October 1934, 13 
September 1935.
10 Land Use Case Files; Lewistown Democrat-News 9 June 
1935, 4 November 1934.
11 Lewistown Democrat-News 26 October 1934,
28 August 1935.
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try to make a living from the land, but the submarginal 
land purchase program allowed them to sell out to the 
government. Mildred Munroe, newly remarried, sold her 
submarginal land to the Land Utilization Program and in 
doing so, shed the property that was the site of the 
murder (in self-defense) of her horse thief ex-husband by 
her hired man.12
Much of the agricultural land in Montana that the 
federal government bought back during the 1930s and early 
1940s had been homesteaded or purchased during the 1910s. 
About 30 percent of the sellers were in fact the original 
landowners or their spouses. Another 6 to 10 percent 
were related to the original landowner. But 60 percent 
of the original owners or their kin had sold out or were 
forced out earlier.13
The submarginal land purchase program had two main 
goals. The primary goal was to readjust land use, while 
the secondary goal was to help beleaguered farmers or 
their widows, or others who found themselves trapped on 
their land. That the first goal took precedence is clear
12 Land Use Case Files, Box 7, LUMT 38-22-95; Lewistown 
Democrat-News 5 January 1934, 23 August 1935, 27 August 
1935; Fergus County Clerk of Court, Deed Records 135:294.
13 These numbers are derived from a 10 percent sample of 
the Land Utilization records for Montana. The federal
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because many businesses such as banks and insurance 
companies — as well as individuals — who were not in dire 
financial straits, took part in the program.
The federal government paid for the expenses 
involved in the land purchases, including fees for 
abstracts, surveys, certificates of title, and 
conveyances. If there were unpaid taxes or other liens 
on the property, the U.S. government paid the liens and 
deducted them from the purchase price. The federal 
government granted Gottfrid Johanson a patent on a 
homestead in Fergus County in 1915. He and his wife,
Anna Johanson, eventually acquired 520 acres. They 
worked to improve the land, drilling wells, digging 
reservoirs, building a nice four-room house with a 
concrete foundation and linoleum floors, a barn, and 
various other structures on the property. They paid off 
all the debts acquired but had trouble paying their 
taxes. Consequently, the federal government paid them 
only $2372.10 of the $2800 purchase price for the 
property; the remainder went to Fergus County to pay back 
taxes.14
land utilization program in Montana purchased 487 parcels 
between 1934 and 1953. Land Use Case Files.
14 Ibid., Box 1, LUMT 38-22-4.
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Once landowners signed an option with the federal 
government, the land title had to be cleared before the 
government could complete the purchase. Abstract 
companies charged between $75 to $150 for one abstract 
and profited from the government work. Sometimes the 
abstract cost more than the parcel was worth. When the 
federal government purchased one of Ralph Tait's parcels, 
it paid $150 for the abstract, but only $90 for the 
land.15
In the case of a title that was not clear, the 
property could be acquired by condemnation, but 
participation in the Land Utilization Program was 
completely voluntary. According to Lewis Gray, "It is 
not intended that persons shall be forced to sell their 
farms under duress of eminent domain proceedings; rather 
it is expected that the offer of fair value for the farm, 
plus the necessary assistance in resettlement, will 
induce the farmer to sell through the prospect of greater 
economic opportunities."16 Often a quitclaim, a legal 
renunciation of any claim of land ownership, took care of 
title problems, but occasionally condemnation was 
necessary. A tract owned by Mary Angela Peterson had
15 Ibid., Box 12, LUMT 38-22-224.
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such title difficulties and had to go through 
condemnation. Consequently, her purchase was not 
finalized until late 1944, years after others sales to 
the Land Utilization Program had been completed.17
Although banks profited from high interest loans to 
homesteaders during the land boom on the northern Great 
Plains, the subsequent bust caused many banks to fail 
completely, including Fergus County banks in Lewistown, 
Roy, Grass Range, Moore, and Winnett.18 Even the banks 
that survived struggled. When farmers failed to pay 
their mortgages, banks foreclosed and acquired land that 
was frequently not worth the money they had lent on it. 
Sometimes banks could find tenants to farm the land, but 
it was difficult to recoup their losses. Many believed 
the Land Utilization Program would help the banks recover 
the principal on their loans gone bad, but the price the 
federal government paid for the land made that, in most 
cases, unlikely.
John Sears, accompanied by his wife Jean Sears, had 
homesteaded in northern Fergus County during the boom.
16 Lewis C. Gray, Land Planning', Public Policy Pamphlet 
No. 19 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1936), 27.
17 Land Use Case Files, Box 16, LUMT 38-22-284.
18 Lewistown Democrat-News 10 January 1925, 8 January 
1930, 21 January 1930, 22 January 1930, 24 January 1930,
5 February 1930, 8 July 1930, 16 January 1931.
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In 1918, they mortgaged their 350 acres to the Federal 
Land Bank of Spokane for a $2100 bank loan, which had a 
low annual interest rate of 5 ^ percent and was amortized 
over more than thirty years. In 1919, the Sears deeded 
the property to Abraham and Dora Row for the assumption 
of the mortgage. Later that year, the Rows borrowed an 
additional $1043.65 at 10% interest from the partnership 
of T. W. Reeves and L. W. Day and another $345 at 10% 
interest from the First National Bank of Winifred. Like 
many other farmers in the late 1910s and early 1920s, the 
Rows gradually sank deeper and deeper into debt. The 
Rows paid the latter loan but failed to pay the other two 
loans, and the land eventually ended up in the possession 
of the Federal Land Bank of Spokane. The bank held onto 
the land for more than a decade but sold it in December 
1939 to Harry and Pearl McDonald for much less than it 
had invested in the property. The McDonalds, in turn, 
sold the property to the federal government in July 1940, 
for $565, about $1.60 per acre, much less than the more 
than $8 per acre the bank had invested in the property.19 
Although the Land Utilization Program may have helped the 
banks by purchasing unprofitable land, the banks suffered 
great losses from their bad loans.
19 Land Use Case Files, Box 17, LUMT 38-31-536.
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A few managed to profit from the buy-back program by 
purchasing land at a low price and reselling it to the 
federal government. Mary Angela Peterson had purchased 
her property (which was originally homesteaded by Charles 
A. Peterson, who probably was a member of her family) for 
$108 in 1937. She sold it to the government a few years 
later for $680. In 1935, Dale and Angela Miller bought a 
320 acre tract from Fergus County for $160. Five years 
later, the Millers sold the property to the federal 
government for $450.20 Most landowners did not make any 
kind of a profit from selling their land to the Land 
Utilization Program, however, Peterson and the Millers 
were unusual cases.
The purchase price offered by the federal government 
for buy-back lands was not negotiable. The landowners 
had to accept the assessment of the value of the land, 
improvements, and any timber or minerals on it.
Appraisers compiled detailed information and included in 
the appraisal a map of the tract and its various classes 
of land, as well as the location of buildings, fences, 
wells, and reservoirs.
20 Ibid., Box 16, LUMT 38-22-284; Box 30, 
LUMT 38-22-522B.
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Federal appraisers used soil types to classify land 
according to its economic potential.21 Crop land had 
four grades, while grazing land had five grades. Because 
the program sought to rehabilitate submarginal land, it 
generally purchased poorer grades of land. The next to 
lowest grade of grazing land (G—4) accounted for almost 
half of the land purchased in Fergus County. Some 
parcels had portions that were judged suitable for 
cultivation, but most of the land was suited only for 
grazing. The average purchase price for G-4 grazing land 
in Fergus County was about $1.17 per acre, while the best 
crop land (C-2) cost nearly $5 per acre. It accounted 
for only about 5 percent of the land purchased.22
According to Resettlement Administration land use 
planners, 640 acres of first grade dry farm land could
21 Although it was not the classification system used by 
the Land Utilization Program, the National Resources 
Board established a classification system that 
categorized farm land into five classes, according to its 
physical productivity. Montana had no first or second 
grade farm land, and only about 7.3 million acres that 
were classified as "fair." More than 85 million acres of 
Montana land were classified as being poor or unfit for 
cultivation. National Resources Board, A Report on the 
National Planning and Public Works in Relation to Natural 
Resources and Including Land Use and Water Resources with 
Findings and Recommendations (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1934), 127.
22 These statistics were based on a 10 percent sample of 
the files. Land Use Case Files.
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support a family, 960 acres of second grade dry farm land 
could sustain a family, while 1280 acres of third grade 
dry farm land could sustain a family under certain 
conditions. Fourth grade farm land could not support 
cash grain crops. First and second grade grazing land 
could support a family on grazing, but third and fourth 
grade grazing land would require communal use so that 
fence and water costs could be kept low. Fifth grade 
grazing land was not to be converted to private use.23 
By those land classification standards, none of the farms 
purchased in Montana by the Land Utilization Program 
could be considered economically viable for a family.
The assessed removable improvements included houses, 
barns, granaries, chicken coops, sheds, and fences. 
Assessors assigned these two values, on-site and salvage, 
but the federal government always paid the higher value, 
despite plans to remove buildings and fences. The 
appraisals listed condition, age, and size of buildings, 
and anything else that might increase a property's value. 
Many of the buildings were listed as "old" and in "fair" 
or "poor" condition, and added little value to the 
parcel. An old three-room log house added $35 to one
23 Saunderson et al., Land Use Planning, 28-30.
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parcel's assessed value, but the salvage value was only 
$15. An old barn was worth $20, but if moved or torn 
down it was worth half as much. One and one-half mile of 
fence in poor condition was valued at $40, but as salvage 
was worth $30. The Gottfrid and Anna Johanson house, 
though 17 years old, was nicer than most houses purchased 
by the Land Utilization Program. It had a concrete 
foundation, lap siding, four rooms, papered walls, and 
linoleum floors, but no indoor plumbing, and was valued 
at $516 in situ, but only $172 if salvaged.24
Like the Johnson homestead, the Brady parcel was 
another seemingly prosperous homestead purchased by the 
Land Utilization Program. The Land Utilization Program 
appraised the Anna Stofer Brady parcel in 1938. About 
180 acres of the parcel had potential for cultivation and 
was estimated to be worth from $2 to $4 per acre. The 
remaining 140 acres were only suited for grazing, but 
were valued at $2 per acre. The parcel included several 
nonremovable improvements, including two wells and three 
reservoirs, although by the late 1930s none were in good 
condition. Like the Johanson homestead, the Brady farm 
had a four-room house but it was in poor condition. It
24 Land Use Case Files, Box 16, LUMT 38-22-284; Box 4,
LUMT 38-22-71; Box 8, LUMT 38-22-155; Box 30, LUMT 38-22-
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had once been a comfortable frame home, with a shingle 
roof, drop siding, plaster walls, wood floors, and a 
stone foundation. The Bradys also had a granary, a lean- 
to garage, a chicken coop, a barn with a lean-to, and a 
root cellar and several miles of fence. The value of the 
Anna Stofer Brady parcel in northeastern Fergus County 
decreased dramatically from the 1920s to 1939, when the 
federal government bought her 320 acres. She originally 
homesteaded the land with first husband Martin Stofer, 
who died in 1923. Probate records revealed that the land 
and its improvements were valued at $8,000 in 1923. By 
1937, the land was appraised at $1,535, while the 
improvements were appraised at $500, for a total of 
$2,035. A year later, the Division of Land Acquisition 
appraised the property at $910.50 and its improvements at 
$298.80, for a total value of $1209.30, a drop of just 
over $825 (41 percent) from the previous year, and nearly 
$6,800 (a loss of 85 percent) from the mid-1920s.25 
While the price the federal government paid for the Brady 
parcel may have been a fairly assessed price, it 
represented a loss to Anna Stofer Brady.
522B, Box 1, LUMT 38-22-71.
25 Ibid., Box 18, LUMT 38-22-322.
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Some homesteaders complained that the appraisals 
were unfair. The federal government granted a homestead 
patent on 320 acres in Fergus County to Charles A. 
Peterson of Roy, Montana, in 1917. Peterson and his wife 
sold the farm five years later. After a succession of 
owners, a foreclosure, and a tax sale, Mary Angela 
Peterson acquired the homestead, returning it to the 
family of the original homesteaders. She and her husband 
Frank Peterson signed options for the federal government 
to purchase three parcels of land, but they were 
apparently unhappy over the price they were offered.
Frank Peterson complained to United States Senator Burton 
K. Wheeler in 1938 about "unfair" land assessments. He 
believed that after homesteaders and farmers had worked 
to improve their land for more than two decades they 
should receive a higher price that reflected their labor. 
The labor homesteaders had put into the land, however, 
had been in exchange for receiving virtually free land 
from the federal government, so further compensation 
would have meant paying the homesteaders twice for their 
labor. Peterson considered it " a deep and cruel plot to 
get these lands," because owners of submarginal land had 
no real choice but to sell their land to the federal
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government or lose it to the county government for back 
taxes.26
Many of the properties purchased by the Land 
Utilization Program in the late 1930s were appraised a 
year or two before the federal appraisal and purchase, 
presumably by their respective county appraisers. Nearly 
all of these local appraisals were for significantly more 
money than were the Land Utilization Program appraisals 
that followed a year or so later. While it appears that 
property values continued to drop through the late 1930s, 
as did the price of wheat, it is not clear that property 
values dropped so dramatically in one year. Frank 
Peterson's concerns may have been justified. A 
comparison of the Fergus County (for 1937) and the 
federal (most were in 1938) land assessments shows that 
the latter was less than half the dollar amount than the 
former. But the USDA believed that the land it was 
acquiring was submarginal — essentially land that should 
not be cultivated — so the land was worth less to the
USDA (as grazing land) than to those who believed that it
could be cultivated (even though cultivation had 
failed) .27
26 Land Use Case Files, Box 16, LUMT 38-22-284.
27 Land Use Case Files.
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There were undoubtedly other factors involved in the 
discrepancies between the 1937 and 1938 appraisals. In 
the 1910s, during the agricultural boom, higher property 
values reflected the increased demand for agricultural 
products and the period of higher rainfall on the 
northern Great Plains. After prices peaked and began 
falling, it took time before property values reflected 
the changes, in part because people expected the rain 
(and the prosperity) to return. Furthermore, the 
discrepancy in property values reflected the intrinsic 
purposes of the appraisals. Each county appraised land 
in order to assess taxes — the higher the land value, the 
higher the taxes and the more income for the county. The 
federal government assessed the value of the land so it 
could make a purchase offer to the owner, and the lower 
the land appraisal value, the lower the offer. On the 
other hand, the federal government did, however, estimate 
the salvage value of movable improvements on the land as 
well as the in situ value of those improvements, offering 
the higher in situ price to landowners when it made an 
offer.
Many Montana farmers had been unable to improve 
their living conditions. Years after acquiring the land
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they were not living like Anna Stofer Brady or Gottfrid 
and Anna Johanson, but were living in shacks. About 60 
percent of the parcels purchased by the Land Utilization 
Program had houses, but they tended to be small, poorly 
constructed buildings, many with tarpaper siding and no 
foundation. Fewer than one-fifth of the houses had 
cellars. Only about 40 percent had any foundation, but 
over half of those with foundations had stone or rock 
foundations; many had wooden or log foundations. Seven 
percent of the dwellings had dirt or sod on their roof. 
The original sod roofs may have been replaced over the 
years or new houses may have been built by the time the 
government acquired the land. Most of the houses had lap 
siding, although 14 percent were built of logs, like the 
Weygant cabins. About 29 percent of the dwellings had no 
interior finish on the walls, but the remainder had 
composition board, paper, plaster, wall board, boards, or 
wainscoting. All of the houses had some kind of wood 
floor such as pine or fir. None of the dwellings had any 
"fixtures," which evidently meant plumbing. The houses 
averaged about 392 square feet, a little less than 20 by 
20 feet. Most (about 43 percent) had two rooms. About 
one-third had from three to five rooms, but one-quarter 
had only one room. There was no relationship between the
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status of the farmer (owner-operator or tenant) and the 
size or number of rooms. The housing descriptions 
indicate that most of these farmers lived in very modest, 
often old housing, many in the same housing built by the 
original homesteader to satisfy the residency 
requirement.28
A 1934 survey of Montana farm homes reflected the 
same austerity. During the first few decades of the 
twentieth century, most Montana farmers lived frugally, 
carefully guarding their earnings and denying themselves 
some of the amenities many others enjoyed. Less than 20 
percent of the homes had cold running water, about 11 
percent had hot and cold running water. That water did 
not necessarily have a place to go. About 10 percent had 
lavatories; only 13 percent had bath tubs. Less than 4 
percent had septic tanks. About 17 percent of the homes 
were connected to electric lines, while another 7 percent 
had either gas lighting or their own electric power 
system. Most had only a coal or wood stove for heat and 
cooking. Only 27 percent had any refrigeration, 
principally ice boxes. This survey found that houses
28 These numbers are derived from a 10 percent sample of 
the Land Utilization records for Fergus County, Montana. 
The federal land utilization program in Montana purchased 
487 parcels between 1934 and 1953. Land Use Case Files.
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averaged about nearly five rooms in size, while the 
Montana farm homes purchased by the Land Utilization 
Program averaged about two rooms. The houses on land 
purchased by the federal government were clearly more 
Spartan than other Montana farm homes, reflecting the 
inability of the land to support a family.29
Some of the houses described by the federal 
assessors had been empty for several years. Late in 1931 
the editors of the Lewistown Democrat-News described the 
abandoned homestead buildings dotting the Montana 
landscape, writing, "We have observed hundreds of wind­
blown buildings which, in their tenantless condition, 
present pictures of indescribable desolation. . . .
During those booming years from 1905-1915, thousands of 
these homes, now unoccupied, were built in this state.
In all parts of this country are people who . . . had 
dreamed of a home . . ., only to be compelled to confess 
failure in the face of impossible obstacles."30
By the time the Land Utilization Program purchased 
the land, most owners had already resettled themselves 
elsewhere without the help of the federal government.
29 Lewistown Democrat-News 9 March 1935; Land Use 
Case Files.
30 Lewistown Democrat-News 30 November 1931.
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Among the land owners were banks and institutions from 
out of state that owned land (8 percent) and obviously 
did not reside on it, but there were only about 8 percent 
of the parcels owned by individuals who lived out of 
state. For example, Thomas Shanklin homesteaded on 632 
acres in Fergus county during the mid-1910s, and the 
federal government granted him a patent in 1920. He 
lived frugally, building only a two-room shack, a shed, 
and a barn. In 1924 he had to borrow $600 money to 
continue farming but was unable to repay the loan until 
the federal government purchased his homestead. By the 
time federal appraisers assessed his property in 1938, 
Shanklin had moved to Marshalltown, Iowa, without federal 
assistance. Another 8 percent of the landowners lived in 
Montana, but outside of Fergus County. Morris Rasmussen 
was living on his homestead near Roy, Montana when his 
property was assessed by federal appraisers in 1938, but 
by the time the sale was completed he had moved to 
Shonkin, just west of Fergus County. The remaining 75 
percent remained in Fergus County at least until sales 
were completed.31
31 These numbers are derived from a 10 percent sample of 
the Land Utilization records for Montana. Land Use Case 
Files, Box 33, LUMT 38-22-546.
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After acquisition, the federal government allowed 
the previous owner or tenant to remain on the property 
for a few months under a Temporary Use Agreement. This 
gave people a chance to harvest any remaining crops or to 
graze cattle; it often let people stay through the 
winter. More than one-third of the parcels purchased for 
the Central Montana Land Use Adjustment Project in Fergus 
County granted Temporary Use Agreements, but they did not 
necessarily have someone living on the land. Only about 
15 percent of the parcels had someone living on the 
property. Very few were families with children. Carl 
Noble's brother and sister-in-law, Purdy and Mary Noble, 
and their four children remained on their 785 acres of 
land for a few additional months to harvest crops already 
planted. The Gooch family also received permission to 
remain on land they had lived on for two decades. In 
1919, Walter Gooch borrowed money from the Montana Joint 
Stock Land Bank (which became the Denver Joint Stock Land 
Bank), but were unable to repay the loan and in 1936 the 
bank became his landlord. In August 1939, the federal 
government bought the land and gave William Gooch
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(presumably Walter Gooch's son) a Temporary Use 
Agreement, which allowed him to stay.32
There seemed to be widespread support for the Land 
Utilization Program. One economist wrote that the 
program had "almost universal public approval."
Americans thought it was a "means of relieving human 
distress" and "an opportunity to save the public treasury 
from pouring millions of dollars annually into the 
support of farming where farming ought not to be 
practiced.1,33 Fergus County citizens who attended a 
planning committee meeting sponsored by the Fergus County 
Extension Office endorsed the federal land purchase 
program.34 The Montana Farmers Union also supported the 
submarginal land purchases and adopted a resolution to 
that effect at their meeting in Lewistown in October 
1935.35 Many ranchers supported the program because it 
would mean more available land for grazing leases. For 
example, the Flatwillow Cooperative Grazing Association, 
located in southern Fergus County, unanimously supported
32 Ibid., Box 6, LUMT 38-22-94; Box 8, LUMT 38-22-155.
33 Noble Clark, "Discussion." Journal of Farm Economics 
18 (May 1936);274, hereafter cited as Clark, Discussion."
34 "Report Agricultural Planning Fergus County Sept. 1, 
1938," Montana State University Agricultural Extension 
Office for Fergus County, Lewistown, Montana.
35 Lewistown Democrat-News 20 October 1935.
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the submarginal land purchase program and wrote to 
government officials urging them to include their 
district in the program.36 As the program geared up in 
Montana in 1934, federal officials reported that there 
was "less difficulty in persuading people to move from 
submarginal land" than they had expected. But a few 
months later, local and state officials expressed 
"dissatisfaction with the progress" of the submarginal 
land purchase program, as they failed to comprehend the 
bureaucratic paperwork required to complete the land 
sales.37
Even large land owners, such as Ralph Jenson, 
supported the submarginal land purchase program and sold 
land to the federal government. Jenson was not 
interested in divesting himself of more than four 
sections of land so that he could retire; rather, it was 
the most financially expedient means by which he could 
continue ranching. After he sold his acreage to the 
federal government, the grazing association could then 
lease the land, and Jenson could graze his cattle on it, 
but avoid tax payments. Jenson argued that grazing
36 Ibid., 10 August 1935.
37 Ibid., 22 October 1934, 27 March 1935.
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districts would also better control overgrazing, which 
would eventually increase profits.38
In mid-1935, progress on the submarginal land 
purchase program stalled, but supporters immediately 
rallied to the program. Montana Representative Roy Ayers 
and several western Congressmen called on Rexford 
Tugwell, urging him to authorize the submarginal land 
purchases, most of which would be in the West. Ayers 
hoped that the purchases would enable farmers to relocate 
while helping increase available grazing land, aiding 
ranchers. Montana Senator Burton Wheeler also supported 
the program and worked with Ayers on legislation.39
The enthusiasm for the resettlement aspect of 
submarginal land purchases overwhelmed some federal 
officials in Montana. In response to some 
misunderstanding, the Montana state director of the 
Resettlement Administration stated that, "Rural 
Resettlement, as herein referred to, means that at some 
time in the future, farmers living on unproductive dry 
land may be given financial assistance by the federal 
government, together with an opportunity to relocate on
38 Ibid., 15 September 1935; Land Use Case Files, Box 40, 
LUMT 38-22-662; Fergus County Clerk of Court, Deed 
Records 129:37, 129:43, 131:369, 134:101.
39 Lewistown Democrat-News 13 July 1935, 23 July 1935.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
253
more productive soils . . . ." He urged restraint 
saying, "There is no need of becoming over enthusiastic 
concerning the resettlement phase of this program" 
because assistance was limited to those who had sold 
their submarginal land to the government and had to move. 
He gave little hope to Montana farmers, saying that "It 
is absolutely a waste of time for you to write your 
congressman in Washington, or anyone else, asking that 
they assist you in being relocated.”40
Not everyone in Montana was happy about the federal 
land purchases and subsequent federal management of the 
land. Frank Peterson had complaints about the program, 
although apparently he cashed his checks. Dan Fulton, a 
rancher in eastern Montana and a severe critic of federal 
land policy, published a book in 1982 detailing his 
complaints over a half-century. Fulton, from Ismay (now 
called Joe), in Custer County, criticized all federal 
employees and programs, including land utilization 
supporter M. L. Wilson.41 Wilson had outstanding 
credentials, having farmed, homesteaded in Montana,
40 Ibid., 10 February 1936.
41 Custer County just touches the edge of Garfield 
County, the location of the Freemen and Justus Township. 
Although many Montanans welcomed the federal aid during 
and since the 1930s, Fulton reflected the same anti­
government attitude as the Freemen.
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earned several degrees, and worked as a county 
agricultural agent, before becoming Assistant Secretary 
of Agriculture. Despite Wilson's qualifications, Fulton 
sarcastically referred to him as an ’ "agricultural 
expert" ' and blamed him for both a jack rabbit 
infestation and an increase in the coyote population, 
since "the rabbits ate the cornfields and the coyotes 
killed the lambs. "42
Fulton had further complaints to make. Although the 
land buy-back program helped ranchers, rancher Dan Fulton 
believed the New Deal programs were inept and biased 
against livestock raisers. Fulton owned 18,800 acres of 
land (nearly 30 sections) , and although he had problems 
during the 1930s, he was able to acquire more land, while 
others were going under. He resented being turned down 
for a Federal Land Bank loan because the land was in a 
submarginal land purchase area.43 According to Fulton, 
"the planners had already decided that the ranch my 
father came to in 1890, . . . and on which for forty
42 Dan Fulton, Failure on the Plains: A Rancher’s View
of the Public Lands Problem (Bozeman: Big Sky Books,
1982), 55-56, hereafter cited as Fulton, Failure.
43 Ibid., 101-102.
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years he had more than paid his way, . . . was 'sub­
marginal, 1 and not eligible for a loan."44
Dan Fulton disliked the New Deal, Franklin 
Roosevelt, and the Land Utilization Program. He resented 
government efforts to regulate land use, but did not 
appear to reject any of financial assistance. He later 
wrote about his encounter with personnel who dealt with 
the submarginal land purchase:
. . . The man from the Miles City land buying 
office came and told me all our land had been 
appraised. We had not been contacted before by 
them, had made no request for appraisal, and 
didn't' even know an appraisal had been made, 
although we had heard rumors of bureaucratic 
activity, and those autos with white license 
plates were everywhere in those years.
Tell us what land you want to sell so we can 
prepare the options,' he said. I asked about 
the basis for the appraisals, and was reassured 
that the appraisals were 'correct' because they 
had been done by 'experts.' He told me, 'All 
we want to know is what land do you want to 
sell.'
Then I asked him about the appraisal of a 
couple of specific tracts of land. From his 
list he verbally gave me the appraisal price.
. I didn't want to sell out and leave the 
country, but there might have been some 
disconnected outer-margin tracts I would have 
sold, or if the price was high enough I might 
have considered selling the whole works.
Fulton thought the price "ridiculous" and refused to 
sell, believing that the program did not favor ranchers.
44 Ibid., 106.
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Although the purpose of the Land Utilization Program was 
not to favor ranchers or farmers, ranchers did reap the 
benefits of increased availability of improved grazing 
land.45
Sherman Johnson worked for the Land Utilization 
Program in the Great Plains, but left government service 
during the late 1930s. He argued that the Land 
Utilization Program in Montana was not without problems. 
In the 1937 article, "Land Readjustments in the Great 
Plains," Sherman Johnson noted that in an area once 
largely in private ownership but now changed largely to 
public domain, any remaining private owners in the area 
would be likely to profit from close proximity to the 
grazing lands that become public domain.46 So it would 
be ranchers, like Dan Fulton, who would benefit from the 
purchase and rehabilitation of the land.
Years after land utilizationists first proposed the 
retirement from agriculture of submarginal land, the 
program was put in place in central Montana. The idea 
had seemed simple enough, but the implementation was 
quite complex. Reams of paperwork had to be completed
45 Ibid., quotes on 108-109.
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before land could be purchased, and it took thousands of 
dollars in wages and expenses to purchase thousands of 
dollars worth of land. Despite the paperwork involved, 
Montanans were generally receptive to the government-led 
reform. There were a few detractors, but the flow of 
federal money into Montana was generally welcomed.
46 Sherman E. Johnson, "Land Use Readjustment in the 
Northern Great Plains" The Journal of Land and Public 
Utility Economics 13(1937):153-162, quote on 159.
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Chapter 8 
Tha Results
In 1937, FDR submitted to Congress the report, The 
Future of the Great Plains, which made recommendations 
for land use readjustment in that region. As Roosevelt 
pointed out, "The problem is one of arresting the decline 
of an agricultural economy not adapted to the climatic 
conditions because of lack of information and 
understanding at the time of settlement and of 
readjusting that economy in light of later experience and 
of scientific information now available."1 The Land 
Utilization Program, through the purchase of submarginal 
agricultural land and the conversion of that land to 
grazing, contributed to the stabilization of the 
agricultural economy in Fergus County. Although land 
utilizationists sought widespread land planning, 
stabilization of the agricultural economy was an 
important product of better land planning and appropriate 
land use. Land utilization efforts meant to correct the 
severe economic and environmental problems that American
xGreat Plains Committee, The Future of the Great Plains 
(House Executive Document No. 144, 75th Cong., 1st sess., 
serial 10117, 1937), iii.
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farmers faced during the 1920s and 1930s. Those problems 
began to abate during the early 1940s as Montana wheat 
prices and yield began increasing. Increasingly, 
domestic concerns gave way to concerns about world war. 
Land acquisition under the Land Utilization Program 
slowed during World War II and stopped by 1946, after the 
Program had purchased 11.3 million acres of submarginal 
land — far short of the 75 million acres proposed for 
purchase.
In Fergus County, during the late 1930s and early 
1940s, the Land Utilization Program (under the authority 
of the Bankhead-Jones Farm Tenant Act) purchased nearly 
80,000 acres of submarginal agricultural land, about 3 
percent of the total land in the county, and more than 12 
percent of the crop land in Fergus County.2 The Central 
Montana Land Use Adjustment Project, as it was called, 
was in the second largest submarginal land purchase area 
in the nation, second only to the Milk River Project in
2 This is an estimate based on a 10 percent sample of the 
files for Fergus County, Montana. Land Use Case Files, 
1934-1953, Records of the Bureau of Land Management, 
Montana, Record Group 49, National Archives, Rocky 
Mountain Region, Denver, Colorado, hereafter cited as 
Land Use Case Files. In 1996, the Bureau of Land 
Management reported that it owned 96,309.35 acres of Land 
Use (Land Utilization) land in Fergus County. The 
additional land was acquired after 1945.
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nearby Blaine, Phillips, and Valley Counties.3 Under 
the various federal agencies, the Land Utilization 
Program acquired over two million acres of land in 
Montana, more than in any other state and nearly 20 
percent of the total land acquired across the entire 
nation.4
Many historians agree that World War II helped ease 
the country out of the Great Depression but there is 
disagreement on the contribution of New Deal programs 
toward that goal. The Land Utilization Program 
implemented during the New Deal sought to correct 
problems in agriculture with land planning and land use 
readjustment. A careful examination of several economic 
factors in Fergus County, then, may serve as a fair 
measure of the success of the Land Utilization Program.
If the program was successful, even on a small scale, 
Fergus County should have seen improvement in many areas.
One of the principal concerns of the Land 
Utilization movement was land use planning, and as
3 Mary W. M. Hargreaves, Dry Farming in the Northern 
Great Plains: Years of Readjustment, 1925-1990
(Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992), 116.
4 H. H. Wooten, The Land Utilization Program, 1934 to 
1964, Agricultural Economic Report No. 85. (Washington, 
D. C.: USDA Economic Research Service, 1965), 74-75.
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President, Franklin Roosevelt supported planning efforts. 
Like most other counties across the nation, Fergus County 
established an agricultural planning board in 1935 to 
voluntarily coordinate various aspects of agriculture 
with numerous agencies, such as the Soil Conservation 
Service, the Farm Security Administration, the Forest 
Service, the Bureau of Agricultural Economics, the Rural 
Electrification Administration, and the Agricultural 
Adjustment Administration, and it also involved dozens of 
local citizens on numerous committees. Lewis Gray had 
envisioned such a program and promoted such planning 
efforts. The organization remained active for several 
years and enjoyed brief success. Thirty different (very 
small) communities had representatives on the board. The 
planning board was instrumental in preparing recommended 
land use maps, and in initiating soil surveys. It 
promoted rural electrification, worked with the Civilian 
Conservation Corps on soil conservation projects, 
organized grazing districts, and started various other 
agricultural projects. Although the idea of a county 
land planning organization involving many people at the 
grassroots seemed to be a land use planner's dream, the 
additional bureaucracy that it created may have impeded 
improvement. For example, in 1939 alone the board and
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committees had 54 meetings. Of the many committee 
members listed in the 1941 report, only one person, 
Michael A. Hickey, had sold land to the federal 
government under the Land Utilization Program, perhaps an 
indication that many of those who sold out left the 
county or left agriculture.5
The Fergus County Agricultural Planning Board 
recognized the county's land use problems and stated, 
"Grazing gave way to crop farming on most of the level 
land as the homesteaders moved in but recently the trend 
has been to revert to grass much of the land which was 
plowed." An early county agent had drafted a very 
generalized county soils map in 1914 showing that much of 
the county was more suited to grazing. The planning 
board used the same map in 1941 to show "the inability of 
some land to support cash grain farming."6 The board 
realized the problems inherent with the cultivation of 
arid land and supported the submarginal land purchase 
program to readjust land use. The report stated that 
"The Land Purchase program has helped many farm families
5 Fergus County Agricultural Planning Board, Preliminary 
Land Use Report: Fergus County, Montana (Lewistown: 
Fergus County Agricultural Planning Board, 1941), 12, 
hereafter cited as Planning Board, Land Use Report.
6 Ibid., quotes on 17.
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recover some of their resources from submarginal land, 
thus permitting them to use this money to re-establish 
themselves in a better location.”7
The establishment of local land planning committees 
was an important part of Lewis Gray's land utilization 
efforts, and in 1935, 47 of Montana's 56 counties had 
planning committees, including Fergus County. By 1940, 
two-thirds of the nation's counties had such committees. 
Although this part of the land utilization effort was 
more pervasive than others, many of the committees 
disappeared after major proponents Lewis Gray and Henry 
A. Wallace left the United States Department of 
Agriculture in 1941. The committees' decline may be 
attributed to the departure of Gray and Wallace, but also 
to the American entrance into World War II.8
In 1976, Mary W. M. Hargreaves evaluated the land 
use planning efforts of the 1930s and found some 
disagreement and dissatisfaction among those involved.
In Montana for example, as planners discussed the
7 Ibid., quote on 3.
8 Donald Worster, Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in the
1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 192;
Mary W. M. Hargreaves, "Land-Use Planning in Response to 
Drought: The Experience of the Thirties," Agricultural
History 50(1976):561-582, hereafter cited as Hargreaves, 
"Land-Use Planning."
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purchase of submarginal land for land use readjustment, 
citizens in Fallon, Flathead, and Valley Counties worried 
about the loss of tax base, despite economic studies that 
showed the counties' portion of grazing fees would easily 
make up any lost revenue. Reclamation projects and land 
use readjustment projects, which respectively increased 
and decreased land under cultivation, caused additional 
conflicts. When planners recommended increasing the 
minimal farm size, they drew complaints that this would 
favor larger commercial farms over small family farms. 
Small farmers, relocated in Flathead County, Montana, had 
difficulty securing Agricultural Adjustment 
Administration allotments. Hargreaves on the other hand, 
did note some planning successes, for example, in the 
cooperation between the Association of Land Grant 
Colleges and the United States Department of Agriculture. 
Ultimately, American entrance into World War II changed 
planning priorities, and in 1942, Congress failed to 
continue funding for some of the agricultural planning 
efforts.9
Although the agricultural land planning efforts were 
generally well-received in the Great Plains, perhaps
9 Hargreaves, "Land-Use Planning," 561-582.
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because of the involvement of citizens and local 
agencies, there were those who disliked federal 
involvement. In her study of Kansas farmers during the 
Great Depression, Pamela Riney-Kehrberg suggested that 
the government reports often blamed the farmer for the 
agricultural problems in the 1930s and thus engendered 
opposition. On the contrary, land utilizationists tended 
to blame federal policy and boosters for the agricultural 
problems on the northern Great Plains. According to land 
utilizationists, farmers had been lured to homestead on 
submarginal land — land that by definition should not 
have been farmed. Many factors that determined the 
economic success of a farm were out of the hands of 
farmers, such as rainfall and unrealistic tax 
assessments. And it was precisely because farmers had 
little influence over some factors that land 
utilizationists sought comprehensive land planning 
efforts, not because the government believed the farmers 
were unfit as Riney-Kehrberg has suggested. The 
cooperative nature of the land planning won over many 
farmers.10
10 Pamela Riney-Kehrberg, Rooted in Dust: Surviving
Drought and Depression in Southwestern Kansas (Lawrence: 
University of Kansas Press, 1994), 130-131.
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Land utilizationists, concerned about the increasing 
rate of farm tenancy, had looked for ways to increase 
farm ownership. They believed that landowners had more 
of an interest in long-term land use and would be less 
likely to exploit resources for the short-term.11 During 
the 1920s, land utilization supporters Henry C. Taylor, 
Richard Ely, and M. L. Wilson had established the Fairway 
Farms project in Montana to show how farmers could manage 
to purchase their own farm (under ideal conditions), but 
the early experimental effort failed and farm tenancy 
rates continued to increase. Land utilizationists 
realized that fundamental changes had to be made to 
remedy the growing problem. The Fergus County 
Agricultural Planning Board, in noting the rise of farm 
tenancy, found it due to "homesteading too small units; 
homesteading land for wheat production which should never 
have been plowed; over valuation of land during the 
settlement period; decrease in yields due to drought, 
insects, loss of soil, and the natural decrease in yields 
from virgin soil production; and economic trends in the 
value of agricultural products during the years since
11 In his book, The Suitcase Farming Frontier: A Study
in the Historical Geography of the Central Great Plains 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), Leslie
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homestead days."12 If those were the problems causing 
high rates of farm tenancy, then the purchase of land 
that should never have been plowed by the Land 
Utilization Program should have helped correct part of 
the problem.
Farm tenancy rates went up during the 1920s and 
continued to rise during the 1930s (see Figure 14). In 
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Figure 14. Farm Tenancy in Fergus County and 
Montana.13
Hewes found that resident farmers were less likely to 
exploit resources for the short-term.
12 Planning Board, Land Use Report, quote on 20.
13 United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, United States Census of Agriculture, 1925 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1927),
3:30-47, 81-129, hereafter cited as Census of 
Agriculture, 1925; United States Department of Commerce, 
Bureau of the Census, Fifteenth Census of the United 
States, 1930: Agriculture (Washington, D. C.:
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percent, but that number more than doubled to 27.1 
percent five years later, and peaked in 1935 at 35.8 
percent. The Fergus County rates followed the same 
general trend state-wide trend in Montana, although the 
latter peaked eight percentage points below, indicating 
the seriousness of the problem in Fergus County during 
the 1920s and 1930s. Fergus County's tenancy rates 
declined slightly by 1940, and by 1945 reached 16.5 
percent. Farm tenancy is no longer seen as the problem 
it was during the 1920s and 1930s-many farmers lease land 
to increase their landholdings, but the tenancy rate has 
leveled off. In 1987 Montana had a farm tenancy rate of
Government Printing Office, 1932), 2(3):115-169, 
hereafter cited as Census, 1930; United States Department 
of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, United States Census 
of Agriculture, 1935, Second Series, (Washington, D. C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1936), 2(3):796-812, 
hereafter cited as Census of Agriculture, 1935; United 
States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
United States Census of Agriculture, 1945 (Washington, D. 
C.: Government Printing Office, 1946), 1(27):1-120,
hereafter cited as Census of Agriculture, 1945; United 
States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, 
United States Census of Agriculture, 1954 (Washington, D. 
C.: Government Printing Office, 1956), 1(27):1-11, 42-
93, hereafter cited as Census of Agriculture, 1954;
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the 
Census, United States Census of Agriculture, 1987 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1989),
1(26):1-15, 142, 18, 190, 226, hereafter cited as Census 
of Agriculture, 1987.
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12.9 percent, not far from Fergus County's rate of 14.6 
percent.14
Using farm tenancy as an indicator of the short-term 
success of either the Land Utilization movement or the 
Land Utilization Program, then there was a measure of 
success. The submarginal land purchase program 
contributed to the decline in the farm tenancy rate by 
purchasing land from some landlords, such as banks, 
insurance companies, investors, and county governments, 
although it eventually leased that land on a long-term 
basis to grazing associations. The federal government 
readjusted the land use of the parcels in Fergus County 
and much of the Great Plains to grazing, so land was 
removed from cultivation. The federal government leased 
most of the newly acquired land on the Great Plains to 
grazing districts. But ranchers developed grazing 
districts (Montana's grazing districts served as models 
for the rest of the country), not land utilizationists. 
Ironically, even though the Land Utilization Program 
reduced the amount of leased cultivated land, the federal 
government became a grazing landlord. The United States 
Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service
14 Ibid.
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managed to acquire land for several years, but turned it 
over to the Bureau of Land Management under the 
Department of the Interior in the mid 1950s.
By 1941, Fergus County had seven cooperative grazing 
districts utilizing the public domain, the new public 
domain, state and county land, and private land to 
provide long-term leases to area ranchers.15 The Land 
Utilization Program removed unneeded buildings and 
fences, reseeded much of the grazing land to crested 
wheatgrass, built stock tanks and reservoirs, and worked 
to control erosion before turning the land over to 
grazing districts. While the land utilizationists did 
not engineer grazing districts, they supported their use 
and believed that the districts would ensure proper land 
use (grazing) and prevent the land from being cultivated 
during the next wheat boom. All of the land acquired by 
the Land Utilization Program in Fergus County remains 
grazing land, under the management of the Bureau of Land 
Management.
A graph of the amount of pasture land in Fergus 
County illustrates how grazing acreage increased during 
the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s, but has leveled off and
15 Planning Board, Land Use Report, 12.
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remained relatively stable since then (see Figure 15).
The increase during the 1920s and 1930s probably resulted 
from farmers abandoning the cultivation of land in favor 
of grazing because of drought. The federal purchase of 
submarginal land and its conversion to grazing land 
during the very late 1930s and early 1940s can be seen as 
well. The Land Utilization Program, had a direct effect 
on this increase.15
Fergus County Pasture Land
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Figure 15. Fergus County Pasture Land.17
16 Census of Agriculture, 1925 , 3:30-47, 81-129; Census, 
1930, 2(3):115-169; Census of Agriculture, 1935,
2(3):796-812; Census of Agriculture, 1945, 1(27):1-120; 
Census of Agriculture, 1954, 1(27):1-11, 42-93; Census of 
Agriculture, 1987, 1(26):1-15, 142, 18, 190, 226.
17 Ibid.
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There were other problems that land utilizationists 
wanted to correct as well. In order to increase the 
economic viability of farms, they sought to increase farm 
size. In order to adequately support a family, 
farm/ranch units in the arid West needed to be larger 
than the homestead laws had allowed. One way to increase 
the average farm size would be to consolidate 
landholdings. While the submarginal land purchase 
program did not consolidate individual private 
landholdings, it did purchase land (and sometimes trade 
for land) in a designated area to create a large federal 
landholding that could be leased for the long-term to 
area grazing associations. However, by buying up 
nonviable farms, the federal Land Utilization Program 
reduced the number of small farms and did (statistically) 
increase the size of farms and ranches. In 1930, the 
number of farms in Fergus County peaked at 2,073, 
dropping to 1,999 five years later. The number continued 
to decline, dropping to 1,486 in 1945. As the number of 
farms in Fergus County decreased, the average farm size 
increased. In 1925, the average farm size was about 610 
acres, but it increased about by 200 acres during the 
next five years. In 1940, the average farm size reached
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1,165 and continued to climb (see Figure 16) ,18 Changes 
in farm size, then, moved in the direction proposed and 
promoted by land utilizationists.
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Figure 16. Number of Farms and Average Farm Size in 
Fergus County, 1925-1950.19
Farm size continued to increase while the number of 
farms increased. By 1987, the average farm size in
18 The current Fergus County boundaries were set in 1924, 
so some statistical comparisons over time, such as number 
of farms, would not be valid using data before 1924. The 
federal census considers farms, ranches, and combinations 
of the two as "farms" unless otherwise stated. Census of 
Agriculture, 1925 , 3:30-47, 81-129; Census, 1930,
2 (3):115-169; Census of Agriculture, 1935, 2(3):796-812; 
Census of Agriculture, 1945, 1(27):1-120; Census of 
Agriculture, 1954, 1(27):1-11, 42-93; Census of 
Agriculture, 1987, 1(26):1-15, 142, 18, 190, 226.
19 Ibid.
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Fergus County reached 2,558, just two acres short of what 
John Wesley Powell had recommended more than a century 
before in his famous report to Congress. The number of 
farms in Fergus County dropped to 838 by 1987, about one- 
fifth of its high in 1920 (see Figure 17) .20 This also
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Figure 17. Number of Farms and Average Farm Size 
in Fergus County.21
may signal the increase in corporate farms and a 
reduction in family farms, resulting in something the
20 Ibid.; John Wesley Powell, Report on the Lands of the 
Arid Region of the United States With a More Detailed 
Account of the Lands of Utah (Washington: Government 
Printing Office, 1878) 18-24.
21 Census of Agriculture, 1925 , 3:30-47, 81-129; Census, 
1930, 2(3):115-169; Census of Agriculture, 1935,
2(3):796-812; Census of Agriculture, 1945, 1(27):1-120; 
Census of Agriculture, 1954, 1(27):1-11, 42-93; Census of 
Agriculture, 1987, 1(26):1-15, 142, 18, 190, 226.
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land utilizationists had not contemplated. In urging the 
increase in farm size, many small farmers were pushed out 
of business. Yet it was the family farm that the land 
utilizationists sought to improve.
Land utilizationists sought an increase in the 
average farm size, but they hoped that any increase in 
farm size on the arid Great Plains would be accompanied 
by mixed use or an increase in the amount of grazing 
land. Since the submarginal land by definition was 
unsuitable for cultivation, land utilizationists believed 
that livestock grazing, in combination with the 
cultivation of some crops, would provide the best income 
over the long term. In 1925, Fergus County had about
446,000 acres of crop land. That number fluctuated in 
the 1930s, and by 1945 there were nearly 530,000 acres of 
crop land in the county (see Figure 18). The trend, 
however gradual, was upward. Between 1945 and 1987, the 
acreage of crop land in Fergus County had climbed to more 
than 650,000.22 Land utilization efforts, then, 
including the purchase of submarginal land, failed to 
decrease the amount of land under cultivation in Fergus 
County.
22 Ibid.
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Figure 18. The Amount of Crop Land in Fergus County.23
There has, however, been some crop diversification 
in Fergus County. Although the amount of land under 
cultivation increased, the amount of acreage devoted to 
wheat decreased. In 1920, farmers planted more than
344,000 acres of wheat in Fergus County. In 1937 there 
were 326,000 acres of wheat in the county. By 1945, that 
number had dropped to about 214,000 acres. This drop may 
reflect federal land use readjustment through the 
purchase of some submarginal parcels in Fergus County.
But the decline in the acreage of wheat planted may be
23 Ibid.
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explained by an increase in the practice of setting aside 
acreage for summer fallow, which allows a parcel of land 
to "rest" for a year between crops. Nevertheless, there 
was a trend away from wheat, which had been the most 
lucrative grain crop, toward other crops. The trend away 
from wheat and toward diversification continued. By 
1991, there were only 153,000 acres devoted to wheat in 
Fergus County (see Figure 19) .24
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Figure 19. Wheat Acreage in Fergus County.25
24 Unpublished agricultural records for Fergus County, 
from the Montana Agricultural Statistics Service, Helena, 
Montana, hereafter cited as Montana Agricultural 
Statistics Service records.
25 Ibid. During the New Deal, the federal government 
gave American farmers wheat allotments in exchange for 
subsidies, so the decline in wheat acreage during those 
years reflects that federal involvement.
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The reduction of wheat acreage away from a single 
cash crop toward diversification allowed for better long­
term management of land resources. The increased use of 
summer fallow reflected a greater acceptance of 
scientific farming practices but also allowed for better 
resource management. By not using the same land year 
after year for wheat production and by placing land in 
summer fallow, Fergus County wheat farmers improved their 
production. Furthermore, wheat production per acre 
gradually increased as the difference between the acreage 
of wheat planted and the acreage of wheat harvested 
diminished. Fergus County wheat production averaged 
about 16 bushels per acre during the 1920s, 11 bushels 
per acre during the 1930s, but nearly 21 bushels per acre 
between 1940 and 1945. Improved machinery and wheat 
strains contributed to production improvements as well. 
Land utilizationists had sought efficiency in production 
by adjusting land use according to the environment. They 
believed that by matching crops to soils, yields could be 
increased, although few would have predicted the increase 
in Fergus County wheat yield. By the 1980s, average 
yield in Fergus County had climbed to nearly 29 bushels 
of wheat per acre (see Figure 20) .26 The trends toward
26 Ibid.
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diversification away from wheat, increased use of summer 
fallow, and increased production may reflect the 
influence of land utilizationists, but only indirectly 
can be related to the removal of submarginal land from 
cultivation.
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Figure 20. Fergus County Wheat Yield Per Acre.27
During the drought and depression of the 1930s, the 
federal government worked to limit agricultural 
production, but during the 1940s, the government called 
for an increase in agricultural production, concerned 
about wartime needs. The return to full production in 
the 1940s seemed counter to the land utilization efforts 
of the 1930s, but land utilizationists believed that land
27 Ibid.
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was an important resource that should be used in a manner 
beneficial to the nation — and during World War II, as 
earlier during World War I, full production was 
presumably beneficial to the nation.
Land utilization proponents wanted to counter the 
boom and bust cycles in agriculture. Rain, increased 
yield, and reduced acreage in wheat helped wheat 
production and prices recover. The return of war, World 
War II, also helped wheat markets and the dollar value 
per acre of wheat increased during the early 1940s. The 
price of wheat remained fairly stable until the early 
1970s, when it began fluctuating widely (see Figure 21). 
Although some of the improvements can be attributed to 
the efforts of the Land Utilization Program, the war 
obviously positively influenced the agricultural 
recovery.
There were other factors that concerned land 
utilizationists. They realized that land assessments for 
taxes needed to be adjusted to reflect the long-term 
production capability of the land, rather than the value 
of the land in one particular year. Assessments of land 
value made during years of higher than average rainfall 
were unrealistic during years of lower than average
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Figure 21. Fergus County Earnings Per Acre of 
Wheat.28
rainfall. Consequently, land assessments for tax 
purposes proved to be a significant problem for farmers 
in the 1920s and 1930s, as land values declined and 
reassessments lagged. Inability to pay taxes (and other 
bills) forced many farmers to abandon their land to the 
county. Between 1928 and the mid-1940s, Fergus County 
acquired 1,587 parcels of land totaling 362,527 acres, 
about 13 percent of all of the land in the county. In 
mid-1940, the county still owned 1,316 of those parcels, 
a total of 289,303 acres. The Land Utilization Program
28 Ibid.
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reduced those numbers by a small amount when it purchased 
six parcels of submarginal land from Fergus County. It 
would take greater efforts to improve the county 
government's land problems.29 By the mid-1940s, tax 
reform was underway, changing the way land was 
classified, assessed, and taxed. The Fergus County 
Agricultural Planning Board, itself a product of land 
utilization efforts, made the recommendations for the tax 
changes. By the 1960s, assessments of land for tax 
purposed were based on a twenty-year history of the 
productivity of a particular parcel, not unlike what the 
land utilizationists had proposed.30
Land utilizationists realized that the population 
would have to shift as cultivated land was converted to 
grazing land, either by homesteader abandonment or by the 
federal purchase. Depopulation of the Great Plains was 
an important result of the economic difficulties during 
the 1930s, but it was not necessarily a result of the 
Land Utilization Program. Montana led the trend of rural 
depopulation, being the only Great Plains state to lose 
rural population during the 1920s. Between 1920 and
29 Planning Board, Land Use Report, 45-49.
30 Interview with Jim Ridgeway, Fergus County Tax 
Assessor's Office, Lewistown, Montana, 8 April 1997.
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1940, Montana lost about 15 percent of its rural 
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Figure 22. Montana Farm Population, 1920-1945.32
even more dramatic losses, losing nearly 40 percent of 
its farm population between 1925 and 19 4 5 . 33 By 1970, 
the Montana farm population had dropped to 90,000, down 
from 228,000 in 1920.34 As mechanization improves, fewer 
farm workers are needed to maintain farms, even though 
the amount of acreage under cultivation has increased.
31 Carl Frederick Kraenzel, The Great Plains in 
Transition (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1955), 
161, hereafter cited as Kraenzel, Great Plains.
32 Ibid.
33 Census of Agriculture, 1925, 3:30-47, 81-129; Census 
of Agriculture, 1945, 1(27):1-120.
34 Montana Agricultural Statistics Service, Montana 
Agricultural Statistics, State Series 1867-1991 (Helena: 
Montana Department of Agriculture, 1992), 3.
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Consequently, the rural depopulation of Montana 
continues.
Lewis Gray and other land utilizationists realized 
that land use affected society as well as the economy.
For example, rural depopulation caused a decline in the 
number of students in rural schools. In 1935, Fergus 
County had twenty-four schools with five or fewer 
students, but four years later that number had climbed to 
thirty-eight. The enrollment in rural Fergus County 
schools during that same period declined by about 42 
percent. Consequently, Fergus County closed 23 percent 
of its rural schools.35 Land utilizationists recognized 
that rural depopulation would require a consolidation of 
governmental services. In turn, the reduced cost of 
services would be reflected in a lower tax rate, again 
helping farmers. School consolidation and closure, then, 
was a natural consequence of land use readjustment. (The 
reverse was true during the homestead boom.) School 
consolidation, then, was a necessary result of the rural 
depopulation recommended by land utilizationists.
While land utilizationists wanted the federal 
government to acquire and readjust land use on 75 million
35 Planning Board, Land Use Report, 50-53.
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acres of land, they put little thought into the 
resettlement of the people involved. The federal Land 
Utilization Program was vaguely connected to federal 
resettlement efforts; most people who sold their 
submarginal land to the federal government chose to 
resettle themselves. None of the participants in the 
Central Montana Land Use Project accepted federal 
resettlement help because none was offered; most 
resettled themselves in the area.36 The resettlement 
efforts across the country did not enjoy much success.
In a recent history of New Deal resettlement in the 
mountain states, Brian Q. Cannon showed that the federal 
government had a difficult time placing settlers on 
productive land and, consequently, the efforts were not 
self-supporting and suffered significant financial 
losses.37
Land utilization efforts, especially the purchase of 
submarginal land, helped change agriculture in Fergus 
County, Montana. Land planning efforts, if short-lived,
36 Land Use Case Files, 1934-1953, Records of the Bureau 
of Land Management, Montana, Record Group 4 9, National 
Archives, Rocky Mountain Region, Denver, Colorado, 
hereafter cited as Land Use Case Files.
37 Brian Q. Cannon, Remaking the Agrarian Dream: New
Deal Rural Resettlement in the Mountain West 
(Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1996).
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helped farmers deal with the wide variety of problems 
they faced during the Great Depression. As recommended 
by land utilizationists, some cultivated land was 
converted to grazing land, wheat acreage diminished, and 
farms got bigger and more diversified. But as the Land 
Utilization Program geared up in Fergus County during the 
late 1930s and early 1940s, the drought ended and World 
War II began —  both influencing the agricultural economy. 
Consequently, it becomes more difficult to ascertain the 
influence of the program, although certainly the ideas of 
the land utilizationists had taken hold in the 
agricultural community.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Chapter 9 
Conclusion
The New Deal dramatically changed federal land 
policy in an effort to correct the problems inherent in 
earlier policies. The Great Depression forced the 
change, as erosion ruined farmland and as farms collapsed 
into financial ruin. Although federal land policy 
affected the entire country, the Great Plains was of 
great concern to policy makers because of the drought, 
but also because of other problems caused by plowing up 
submarginal land — land that could not consistently raise 
crops. Historically, land use practices on the northern 
Great Plains were not suited to the arid environment. 
Federal land laws, such as the Homestead Act which 
required cultivation of the land, all but guaranteed that 
land on the plains would not be put to its best use.
Under the New Deal, the federal government made dramatic 
changes to land policy in an effort to make Great Plains 
agriculture (grazing and cultivated) more sustainable.
Few historians have written about the federal Land 
Utilization Program. Donald Worster criticized the 
program as a failure because it did not achieve the broad 
goals of the Land Utilization movement. Yet the program
287
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was significant to the development of federal land policy 
because it reversed decades of policy that worked to 
alienate the public domain, not reacquire it.1
Although the federal government fell far short of 
purchasing the proposed 75 million acres of land, it did 
purchase more than 11 million acres; most of that acreage 
was on the Great Plains. The Central Montana Land Use 
Project purchased less than 100,000 acres in Fergus 
County, Montana, only about 3 percent of the county's 
area. In much of the Great Plains, most of the 
reacquired acreage was rehabilitated and converted to 
grazing land, which the Department of the Interior Bureau 
of Land Management now leases to various ranchers. In 
Fergus County all of the land was converted to grazing 
land. After being managed by the United States 
Department of Agriculture Soil Conservation Service for 
several years, it was turned over to the Bureau of Land 
Management, which still manages the land.
1 See Donald Worster's Dust Bowl: The Southern Plains in
the 1930s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979};
Paul W. Gates, History of Public Land Law Development 
(Washington, D. C.: Government Printing Office, 1968);
E. Louise Peffer, The Closing- of the Public Domain: 
Disposal and Reservation Policies, 1900-50 (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 1951); and John
Opie, The Law of the Land: Two Hundred Years of American
Farmland Policy (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1987).
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Although the area purchased was small, the federal 
program targeted areas in that county that had 
significant land use problems and did influence land use 
over the long-term, although the results are not clear 
cut. World War II boosted the agricultural economy soon 
after the conclusion of many of the land purchases, 
blurring the factors involved.
Land utilizationists believed that part of the 
answer would be larger farms (so that a farm/ranch could 
support a family), and the farms gradually have, in fact, 
grown larger and larger, but as farms got larger, the 
actual number of farms decreased. The number of farms in 
Fergus County dropped by more than four-fifths between 
1920 and 1987. Accompanying the increase in farm size is 
the loss of the family farm, which the land 
utilizationists had hoped to help. Despite efforts to 
reduce the amount of tilled land, actual acreage under 
cultivation has increased, although the land defined as 
cultivated may not be planted every year and may remain 
fallow.
Frederick Jackson Turner wrote about the 
significance of the closing of the frontier in his 1893 
essay, "The Significance of the Frontier in American 
History," but the frontier did not actually close until
with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the New Deal changed land policy in the 1930s.2 Turner 
was correct in the importance of the individual on the 
frontier, but with the closing of the frontier, the 
community became more important. Consequently, the 
federal government began looking at the land, not the 
individual farmer. Although the purchase of submarginal 
land and readjusting its land use was not the only 
example of the government taking the land into account 
(for example, the Soil Conservation Service mapped land 
and implemented conservation projects), it proved to be 
more significant in its scope. Essentially, the 
reacquisition of public domain had become necessary to 
protect the greater good of the community from the abuses 
of individual citizens. So instead of the individual 
citizen being responsible for any land abuse, the federal 
government made itself responsible for reparation.
This deeper issue involves the struggle between 
those who support the rights of the individual and those 
who support the rights of the larger community. After 
the land had been rehabilitated and had become 
economically viable again (as grazing lands), many
2 Frederick Jackson Turner, "The Significance of the 
Frontier in American History," in The Frontier in 
American History (New York: Henry Holt and Company,
1920) .
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Westerners wanted the land to be removed from federal 
control and sold to individuals, believing that 
individuals can better oversee the care of the land.
The land utilizationists of the 1920s and 1930s 
conducted studies, analyzed statistics, and applied the 
best science of the day to the problems facing 
agriculture. But many of their key recommendations had 
been made a half-century earlier by a government 
scientist who recognized the fundamental essence of the 
West — its aridity — and realized that adaptation was 
necessary: John Wesley Powell. Although Powell's
prescience has long been discussed by historians, it is 
important to note that the Land Utilization movement was 
necessary because Congress ignored Powell's 
recommendations. Because Powell failed to influence 
federal land policy, the problems inherent in that policy 
eventually surfaced and required drastic federal action.
Powell understood something that most of his 
nineteenth centuries contemporaries did not, that the 
lack of water characterized and defined most of the West, 
and that its inhabitants' culture, institutions, 
agriculture, and industry would have to adapt to that 
aridity. His 1878 Report on the Lands of the Arid Region
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of the United States With a More Detailed Account of the 
Lands of Utah made recommendations to Congress for 
changes in federal land policy. Perhaps had Congress 
followed Powell's suggestions, the environmental and 
economic problems the West suffered through in the 1920s 
and 1930s might have been avoided. Fifty years after 
Powell published his report, and after much study by land 
utilizationists, the federal government began to 
implement some of his ideas.3
In his Report of 1878, Powell assessed in general 
terms the economic potential of the West, a region he 
defined as the American territory lying west of the 
hundredth meridian, where rainfall dropped to below an 
annual average of twenty inches. (Powell believed that 
the twenty-inch isohyet was the limit of successful 
agriculture without irrigation.) That region, according 
to Powell, made up nearly half of the continental United 
States.4
3 For a brief summary and assessment of Powell's legacy, 
see Thadis W. Box, The Arid Lands Revisited — One Hundred 
Years Since John Wesley Powell (Logan: Utah State
University, 1978).
4 John Wesley Powell, Report on the Lands of the Arid 
Region of the United States With a More Detailed Account 
of the Lands of Utah, House Executive Document No. 73,
45th Cong., 2d sess., serial 1805 (Washington:
Government Printing Office, 1878), 1-4, 46-56, hereafter
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Powell brought to bear a fresh and unconventional 
perspective on the Western environment and its potential 
for settlement. His Report called for drastic changes in 
settlement and agricultural practices that had been 
successful in the more humid eastern regions of the 
country. Powell's Report was a jeremiad, a warning to 
Congress of dire consequences if humid land-use practices 
were imposed on the arid west beyond the hundredth 
meridian.5
Nearly fifty years before land utilizationists 
insisted on the detailed classification of land in terms 
of its economic potential in the United States, Powell 
broadly classified the arid western lands as either 
suitable for growing timber, for grazing, or for 
cultivation of crops, with or without irrigation. Powell 
believed that most of the public domain in the West would 
be appropriate for grazing, with smaller amounts in the 
other two categories, but he recognized that mineral and 
coal lands should also be so classified. Land 
classification, he insisted, had to be followed by
cited as Powell, Report. The best book on Powell is 
Wallace Stegner's Beyond the Hundredth Meridian: John
Wesley Powell and the Second Opening of the West (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, 1953), hereafter cited as Stegner, 
Beyond the Hundredth Meridian.
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federal regulation in order to reduce land fraud and 
misuse.6
Powell also realized that rainfall tended to be 
erratic in the West. "Many droughts will occur; many 
seasons in a long series will be fruitless; and it may be 
doubted whether, on the whole, agriculture will prove 
remunerative."7 The timing of rainfall was critical as 
well. Rain during the growing season was more important 
to successful agriculture than rain during the winter. 
Powell understood that west of the hundredth meridian 
agriculture was not impossible without irrigation, but 
could not be consistently profitable without it.8
Powell realized that rainfall was not the only way 
to get water to crops. Irrigation in areas with access 
to mountain streams and rivers could provide farmers with 
a dependable source of water, but irrigation had serious 
potential in only a small part of the arid West.9 In 
general, irrigation required either massive capital or




9 Powell's assumptions about irrigation predated the 
massive exploitation of fossil water. For a study of the 
development of pump irrigation, see Donald E. Green's 
Land of the Underground Rain: Irrigation on the Texas
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cooperative labor or both. Settlers without the capital 
could not afford to irrigate the arid land. Mormons in 
Utah, however, successfully implemented irrigation 
projects because they worked together — they were a 
ready-made community willing to work for common purposes. 
Powell thought that most of the arid West should be 
settled in a similar way, with cooperative use of range 
land and democratic controls to aid distribution to what 
water there was.10
Powell knew that most of the West was suited more to 
grazing than to farming. But even ranches needed some 
irrigable land for general subsistence and winter feed.
It took several acres of western grasses to support a cow 
and calf through the year. Recognizing that, Powell 
recommended that the size of homesteads be increased and 
that the federal government create, in effect, "grazing 
homesteads" instead of farming ones. But even on 
holdings large enough to support enough of a herd to 
support a family of settlers, it took water to raise 
extra feed or to raise cattle. Unfortunately, the 
rectangular survey system did not allow the most 
equitable access to water, because land divisions, Powell
High Plains, 1910-1970 (Austin: University of Texas
Press, 1973).
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believed, did not conform to the landscape and failed to 
take into account the location of surface water.11
Powell discussed only the Utah Territory in detail 
in his Report, but after its publication, he called on 
the Montana Territory's constitutional convention in 
Helena to change governmental policy and land use in that 
future state. According to Stegner, Powell "urged the 
Montana delegates to organize their state not according 
to arbitrary county lines, but by drainage divides" so 
that watersheds, benchlands, and bottomlands could be 
cooperatively managed to make the maximum use of the 
available water "for the common good."12 By the 1880, 
only a small part of western Montana Territory had been 
surveyed by the General Land Office, so Montana 
potentially could have been surveyed by a method more 
sensitive to the location of surface water. Despite 
Powell's warnings, the Surveyor General's Office divided 
Montana using the rectangular grid system, and the
10 Powell, Report, 6-14.
11 Ibid., 18-24.
12 Wallace Stegner, Introduction to Report on the Lands 
of the Arid Region of the United States, by John Wesley 
Powell (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University 
Press, 1962), xxii, hereafter cited as Stegner, 
Introduction to Report.
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Montana legislature largely ignored the landscape and 
watershed considerations when it established counties.
Powell also believed that it took more than 160 
acres of land for a farm or ranch to be economically 
viable. The original Homestead Act's allotment of 160 
acres was not enough to consistently support anyone in 
the arid West. A farm's viability depended either upon 
irrigation or larger land allotments. But since 
irrigation required a considerable capital outlay, Powell 
proposed that the homestead allotment be altered to 
sixteen times its original size, from a quarter section 
(160 acres) to four sections (2560 acres) .13 Congress 
increased the homestead allotment to 320 acres in 1909, 
but that was still not nearly enough.14 Decades later 
land utilizationists also recognized that it took more 
land in the arid West to support a family.
Powell believed that one equitable way to provide 
pasturage for settlers would be to organize grazing 
districts on large tracts of land.15 During the 1920s in 
Montana, ranchers did just that, in order to provide for
13 Powell, Report, 25-37.
14 United States Department of the Interior Bureau of 
Land Management, Historical Highlights of Public Land 
Management (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1962), 44.
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the long-term lease of land in a cooperative manner. And 
a half century after Powell had made his recommendations, 
the federal government, as part of the Land Utilization 
Program in the New Deal, bought back failed homesteads 
and promoted the organization of grazing districts on 
public land.
Powell also realized that the meager population 
supported by the arid West would be widely scattered, 
unless some effort was made to group settlers so that 
housing, schools, churches, roads, and other social 
benefits could be efficiently managed. According to 
Powell, this would be accomplished "by making the 
pasturage farms conform to topographic features in such 
manner as to give the greatest possible number of water 
fronts."15 A half century later, Land Utilization 
proponents such as Lewis Gray argued that the rural 
population needed to be more concentrated, particularly 
for economic efficiency, because the cost of maintaining 
roads and schools for such a dispersed population drained 
county coffers and raised taxes.17
15 Powell, Report, 24-26.
16 Ibid., 23.
17 Albert Z. Guttenberg, "The Land Utilization Movement 
of the 1920s," Agricultural History 50(1988):481; 
Proceedings of the National Conference on Land
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Powell's vision of a cooperatively-settled arid West 
was not without precedent. In Utah, settlers worked 
cooperatively to irrigate lands, and apparently a few 
Mormon communities in Utah showed some sensitivity to the 
landscape and organized by watershed. Settlers lived on 
lots in town but worked in fields outside of towns, 
allowing the efficient clustering of services and social 
amenities. Water was owned and controlled by the 
community, so that use of and access to the water was 
more democratically maintained, at least among the early 
Mormon settlers. There were some obvious lessons to be 
learned from the Mormon experience. Although the Mormons 
worked cooperatively as a matter of principle, Utah's 
aridity reinforced their collectivist practices.18
Utilization (Washington, D. C.: Government Printing
Office, 1932), 58-67.
18 Stegner, Beyond the Hundredth Meridian, 226-228;
Leonard J. Arrington, Great Basin Kingdom: An Economic
History of the Latter-day Saints, 1830-1900 (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1958), 39-65. See also Donald 
Worster, "The Kingdom, the Power, and the Water," in 
Great Basin Kingdom Revisited: Contemporary
Perspectives, 21-38; and Donald W. Meinig, "The Mormon 
Culture Region: Strategies and Patterns in the Geography
of the American West, 1847-1964," Association of American 
Geographers Annals 55 (June 1965):191-220.
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The consequences of Powell's failed efforts are well 
known among historians of the American West.19 According 
to historian Donald Worster, the multifaceted Powell 
promoted "a strategy of ecological adaptation" that 
seemed practical and democratic, a plan for a 
"technological democracy."20 But Worster criticized 
Powell for assuming that decentralization and self- 
determination meant democracy. Democratic or not, 
Powell's ideas were far-sighted. The failure to follow 
Powell's blueprint meant that adjustments would occur 
only after economic and environmental problems brought 
disaster to the inhabitants of the Great Plains.
Powell's attempts, and even the land 
utilizationists' efforts, to shape land use on the Great 
Plains would not be the last — the struggle continues.
In 1987, planners Deborah Popper and Frank Popper 
proposed that the Great Plains be returned to the 
buffalo, creating a "Buffalo Commons." Despite the 
prosperity that returned during World War II, the Poppers
19 Montana historian Joseph Kinsey Howard recognized that 
the need for a federal Land Utilization Program resulted 
from the failure to implement Powell's ideas. See 
Montana: High, Wide, and Handsome (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1943; reprint ed., 1959), 30-37.
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argued that the Great Plains "remained a poor region, 
falling further behind most of the rest of the country 
economically and continuing to suffer depopulation." The 
loss of population could only continue, argued the 
Poppers, because of problems inherent with farming and 
living on the arid plains. Lack of rainfall, and 
accompanying dust storms and erosion, continue to cause 
problems, and fossil water (for much of the Great Plains, 
the Ogallala Aquifer) is a limited resource. "The brute 
fact is that most Plains land is simply not competitive 
with land elsewhere." While the Land Utilization Program 
returned parts of the Great Plains to ranchers (through 
the lease of public grazing lands), the Poppers suggested 
looking even further back in time, to when the land was a 
commons. The federal government could buy back the land, 
resettle land owners, tear down buildings and fences, not 
unlike efforts during the 1930s, but instead of putting 
cattle on the land, the Popper's proposed to turn the 
Great Plains into a large park and allow the buffalo to
20 Donald Worster, Rivers of Empire: Water, Aridity, and
the Growth of the American West (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1985), 138,135.
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repopulate the grasslands.21 The Poppers were angrily- 
denounced by plains residents as "a pair of wacko 
professors from New Jersey." The criticism came from all 
quarters. Kansas Senator Bob Dole's press secretary 
suggested that the Poppers be put "in front of a buffalo 
stampede." In 1990, the Poppers traveled the plains 
meeting with residents in forums. Montanans, like other 
plains residents, resented the interlopers and their 
ideas.22 In a paper aptly titled "After the Dust Bowl:
'How Many Times Do We Have to Buy Back the Great 
Plains?"' one historian offered support for the Popper 
proposal, listing the various federal programs that have 
either subsidized agriculture on the Great Plains or have 
removed Great Plains land from cultivation (such as the 
Land Utilization Program or the Conservation Reserve 
Program, a more recent program which pays farmers not to 
cultivate the land) ,23
21 Deborah Epstein Popper and Frank J. Popper, "The Great
Plains: From Dust to Dust," Planning 53 (December
1987) : 12-18, quotes on 14, 16.
22 Anne Matthews, Where the Buffalo Roam (New York:
Grove Weidenfeld, 1992), quote on 8, 18,
23 Timothy Lehman, "After the Dust Bowl: 'How Many Times
Do We Have to Buy Back the Great Plains?,'" paper 
presented at the 8th Biennial Conference of the American 
Society for Environmental History, Las Vegas, Nevada, 10 
March 1995.
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The Popper proposal has not received much recent 
press coverage, but any federal intervention remains 
controversial to those living on the Great Plains. 
Contemporary writer Jonathan Raban, curious about 
homesteaders and their failures, traveled to eastern 
Montana to research his recent book, Bad Land: An
American Romance. After reading the reminiscences of 
homesteaders and interviewing their children, Raban 
chronicled the emotional stories of hope, failure, and 
perseverance. Those who managed to stay during the very 
lean years clung to the land in part because they had 
nowhere to go but also because they had a romance with 
the land. Despite the volume of aid that has been 
necessary to keep people on the land in the arid West, 
many ranchers and farmers that remained have a suspicion 
that borders on hatred for the federal government. Raban 
wrote:
Ranchers and farmers, with their wheat subsidies and 
grazing rights, had more tax-dollars in their 
pockets than any other single group of Americans, 
not excluding, say, single teenage mothers on 
welfare; but if they were grateful for this public 
largesse, they kept their feelings well concealed. 
The agencies — the BLM, the EPA, OSHA, the Forest 
Service, and the rest — were hated as nests of big- 
city liberal types with college degrees and no 
understanding of the land.
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A hatred of the federal government was not reflected in 
articles and editorials in the Lewistown Democrat-News 
during the 1930s, but it is possible that the increased 
presence of the federal government (due to the purchase 
and management of additional public domain) helped 
engender this sentiment. During the 1930s, most people 
apparently welcomed the federal intervention and accepted 
allotment checks, submarginal land purchase checks, 
relief checks, and federal paychecks. Raban suggests a 
different theory: that the root cause of the dislike of
the federal government is directly linked to its 
encouragement of settlement on land inherently unsuited 
for cultivation.24
Many of the ideas of the Land Utilization movement 
came to fruition during the New Deal. Federal land 
policy underwent significant change as the homestead 
movement ended and the federal government began to 
repurchase failed homesteads to create a new public 
domain. Instead of encouraging settlement of the public 
domain, the federal government worked to remove families 
from land that by the 1930s was considered "submarginal."
24 Jonathan Raban, Bad Land: An American Romance (New
York: Pantheon Books, 1996), quote on 252.
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The Land Utilization Program, then, reversed the 
homestead movement, a bold change from the land policies 
of the nineteenth-century land policies that sought to 
alienate as much land as possible. The history of the 
Land Utilization Program, then, is the history of a 
dramatic shift in federal land policy. The new policies 
signified a deeper shift in the role of government as the 
government relinquished its trust of individual 
landowners to protect and maintain the country's land 
resources. The federal government had begun to see the 
land resources as important to the collective well-being 
of the country which had to be protected from 
exploitation by the individual.
The Land Utilization Program, through the purchase 
of submarginal agricultural land and the conversion of 
that land to grazing, contributed to the stabilization of 
the agricultural economy in Fergus County. Over the 
years many ideas that had been promoted by land 
utilizationists were implemented in various ways.
Grazing increased, wheat farming decreased, farms got 
larger and more diversified, but the amount of land under 
cultivation in Fergus County, for example, increased.
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Although, the Land Utilization Program was short-lived, 
many of the ideas of the land utilization movement, such 
as land classification and planning, continue to 
influence agricultural policy.
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